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Abstract
After the financial and economic crisis in Europe, a broad consensus has emerged that 
a stronger fiscal dimension may be needed to complete the architecture of Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). This paper analyses the performance of interregional transfers 
in existing fiscal-federal systems, notably in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain and the 
United States, and aims to draw lessons for the design of a euro area fiscal instrument. 
The empirical risk-sharing analysis in this paper suggests that effective cross-regional 
stabilisation of asymmetric shocks tends to work via direct cash transfers to households, 
such as unemployment benefits, which are financed out of cyclical central government 
taxes and social security contributions. This would suggest that a euro area budgetary 
instrument for stabilisation should be designed as a tool that enhances the automatic 
stabilisation capacity in the single currency area. At the same time, it seems important that 
a prospective central stabilisation instrument for the euro area would be integrated in an 
overall fiscal policy framework that ensures proper incentives for national policymakers.
Keywords: euro area fiscal capacity, fiscal risk-sharing, fiscal federalism.
JEL classification: E62, H11, H77.
Resumen
Tras la crisis económica y financiera, ha emergido en Europa un amplio consenso sobre la 
necesidad de reforzar la dimensión fiscal para completar la Unión Económica y Monetaria 
(UEM). Este documento analiza el papel de las transferencias interregionales en algunas 
de las principales federaciones fiscales (centrado en Austria, Bélgica, Alemania, España 
y Estados Unidos), con el objetivo de extraer las conclusiones necesarias para el diseño 
de un instrumento fiscal para el área del euro.
El análisis empírico de compartición de riesgos llevado a cabo en este documento sugiere 
que una estabilización interregional de los shocks asimétricos es más efectiva cuando está 
basada en transferencias directas de efectivo a los hogares, tales como las pensiones 
por desempleo, financiadas por medio de los impuestos cíclicos del Gobierno Central 
y de las contribuciones a la Seguridad Social. Estos resultados sugieren que un instrumento 
centralizado de estabilización macroeconómica para el conjunto del área esté basado en la 
mejora de los mecanismos de estabilización automática. Al mismo tiempo, parece importante 
que dicho instrumento de estabilización central esté integrado en un marco general de 
política fiscal que asegure los incentivos adecuados para los Gobiernos nacionales.
palabras clave: capacidad fiscal del área del euro, canal fiscal de compartición de riesgos, 
federalismo fiscal.
códigos Jel: E62, H11, H77.
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Executive summary 
After the financial and economic crisis in Europe, a broad consensus has emerged 
that a stronger fiscal dimension may be needed to complete the architecture of 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The European Union lacks policy instruments 
to provide additional, targeted stimulus in the event of a severe economic downturn. A 
fiscal capacity at euro area level would increase public risk-sharing. This would involve 
fiscal transfers acting as cross-country insurance against large and unforeseen 
macroeconomic shocks. It may also facilitate private risk-sharing, driving closer credit 
and capital market integration. Currently, empirical risk-sharing models point to 
relatively limited risk-sharing via private channels in the euro area, while public 
risk-sharing is largely absent. 
A large number of more concrete policy proposals for a fiscal capacity for the euro 
area – such as a budget that can be deployed as a stabilisation tool in case of 
asymmetric shocks – have been put forward by analysts and policymakers. Common 
elements of these proposals include macroeconomic stabilisation through transfers to 
the government budgets of Member States. Also, such transfers would require 
compliance with fiscal rules under the EU’s fiscal governance framework. 
This paper analyses the performance of interregional transfers in existing 
fiscal-federal systems with a view to drawing lessons for the design of a euro area 
fiscal capacity. The interregional stabilisation mechanisms are analysed, first, with 
regard to their effectiveness in smoothing regional consumption in the event of 
idiosyncratic shocks. Second, the paper assesses the efficiency of the 
intergovernmental transfer schemes in terms of creating transfer dependency and 
weakened incentives for sound public finances. The following systems are analysed. 
• Austria’s federal system features significant expenditure decentralisation, but 
very little revenue decentralisation. About 8% of GDP shocks are smoothed via 
fiscal channels, most importantly via federal taxes and social benefits (2000-17 
estimates). At the same time, the vertical fiscal imbalance – the degree to which 
sub-national spending is financed via transfers – is very sizeable. This goes 
hand-in-hand with misaligned incentives for provinces and municipalities. 
• In Belgium, regional and local governments are responsible for almost half of 
public sector expenditures and the federal structure provides for a relatively high 
degree of tax autonomy. Central government taxes and unemployment benefits 
provide the largest contribution to macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence 
across regions. A solidarity mechanism compensates regions with lower 
personal income tax per capita. 
• Germany’s federal system features large expenditure decentralisation, but very 
little tax autonomy for the states. It is estimated that 7.3% of a shock in a state’s 
GDP is smoothed by the government sector, mainly through the social security 
system (1996-2016 estimates). At the same time, a federal financial equalisation 
system (known as the FES), which broadly aligns states’ per capita tax revenue, 
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does not play a prominent risk-sharing role. The FES does, however, create 
negative fiscal incentives particularly for financially weak states, because a rise 
in tax revenue is almost entirely offset by a concomitant reduction in transfers 
re eived. 
• Spain is a highly decentralised unitary state, with large expenditure 
decentralisation and tax autonomy enjoyed by autonomous communities. The 
government sector smooths around 10.3% of a shock in autonomous regions’ 
GDP (2003-16 estimates), mainly through federal social benefits but also through 
an interregional revenue-sharing scheme. Significant vertical transfers from the 
central government to the autonomous regions create clear negative fiscal 
incentives. 
• The United States is characterised by a fairly decentralised fiscal-federal system, 
with pronounced expenditure decentralisation and tax autonomy at the state and 
local level. 11.3% of the interstate variation in real GDP growth per capita is 
stabilised, mostly through federal social security and income maintenance 
payments (1999-2016 estimates). Intergovernmental transfers only play a limited 
role in interstate risk-sharing in the United States. The fairly decentralised US 
fiscal-federal system is typically viewed as having sound fiscal institutions and 
effective disciplining by financial markets, which supports sustainable public 
finances at the state level. 
The paper concludes, first, that fiscal-federal structures differ considerably with regard 
to the degree of sub-national tax autonomy. In particular, US states have a high level 
of tax autonomy, while European countries typically feature a significant degree of 
intergovernmental redistribution of central government revenue through grants. 
Second, estimates indicate a relatively similar degree of fiscal risk-sharing across the 
countries, in spite of distinct differences between the fiscal-federal structures. Third, 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers explain a relatively small part of the total fiscal 
risk-sharing between regions in both the United States and European federal states. 
Fourth, risk-sharing in the countries considered here mainly occurs via federal taxes 
and transfers to households rather than intergovernmental transfers. 
The insights gained from the case studies can usefully be applied to the policy 
discourse on a euro area fiscal capacity. Dedicated interregional transfer schemes 
typically do not provide much income smoothing and are prone to creating vertical 
imbalances and transfer dependency. In contrast to most recent policy proposals, our 
analysis provides arguments in favour of a genuine European scheme that operates 
via direct transfers to citizens (e.g. a European unemployment insurance scheme that 
complements national systems in severe recessions), financed out of federal 
European taxes or social security contributions. The US experience seems to indicate 
that a higher degree of tax autonomy, paired with credible federal no-bailout policies 
and the resulting self-imposed sub-national balanced budget rules, tends to promote 
regional incentives for sound fiscal policies. 
This policy paper adds to the literature on both fiscal federalism and optimum currency 
areas (OCA). The “first-generation” fiscal federalism literature looks at the optimal 
allocation of government functions to ensure macroeconomic stabilisation, among 
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other things. This paper contributes to the empirical part of this literature by providing 
structured comparative case studies on fiscal federations and draws lessons for closer 
fiscal integration in the euro area. The OCA literature investigates essential elements 
for the sm oth functioning of a monetary union. This paper also contributes to this 
literature by measuring the degree of risk-sharing across fiscal federations. Finally, the 
paper adds to the second-generation fiscal federalism literature, which analyses the 
disciplining effect of different institutional arrangements for sub-national public 
finances. 
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1 Introduction 
After the Great Recession and the ensuing sovereign debt crisis in Europe, a broad 
consensus has emerged in both the policy and the academic domain that the 
architecture of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) remains incomplete. The Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for a clear division of 
responsibilities between European and national policymakers.1 But with taxation and 
government spending almost entirely at the national level, the European Union lacks 
policy instruments to provide additional, targeted stimulus in the event of a severe 
economic downturn. 
According to empirical estimates, private and public risk-sharing – the notion that 
economic agents insure their consumption streams against fluctuations in the 
business cycle – in the United States ensure a smoothing of around 70% of the 
macroeconomic shocks at the state level (see, for example, Cimadomo et al. (2018)). 
The bulk of this cross-regional stabilisation takes place through private channels 
related to portfolio diversification across state borders and the integrated credit 
market. The US federal budget complements these private channels by smoothing 
around 10% of shocks. In the euro area, by contrast, empirical estimates suggest that 
large portions of idiosyncratic shocks in Member States remain unsmoothed, partly 
because public risk-sharing is largely absent. 
Closer credit and capital market integration that would provide the euro area with a 
higher degree of risk-sharing via private channels might require a stronger fiscal 
dimension in the EMU architecture. Farhi and Werning (2017) show that, even in the 
case of complete financial markets, private risk-sharing may need to be supplemented 
by a fiscal transfer scheme, since private agents do not internalise the macroeconomic 
stabilisation effects of their actions. As a result, the degree of public and private 
stabilisation provided in individual euro area countries may be sub-optimally low from 
the perspective of the single currency area as a whole. This suggests that private and 
public insurance are complements rather than substitutes. In a recent speech, former 
ECB President Mario Draghi argued that financial integration “only arises in the shelter 
of public risk-sharing, such as strong backstops and deposit insurance schemes.”2 
The Five Presidents’ Report proposes progress towards “a Fiscal Union that delivers 
both fiscal sustainability and fiscal stabilisation” (Juncker et al. (2015)). Analysts and 
policymakers subsequently put forward a large number of more concrete policy 
proposals for a fiscal capacity for the euro area – a budget that can be deployed as a 
stabilisation tool in the event of asymmetric shocks and that is operated by an 
institution at the European level (see Table 1). We consider four of these that are the 
most relevant to the policy debate at the current point in time. First, 14 prominent 
                                                                    
1  Monetary policy is conducted at the supranational level for the euro area as a whole, while fiscal policies 
have remained largely in the competence of national governments and reflect national political 
preferences and economic conditions. While largely the responsibility of governments in the Member 
States, fiscal policies are subject to the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
2  “Stabilisation policies in a monetary union”, speech by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, at the 
Academy of Athens, 1 October 2019. 
Stronger fiscal dimension proposed 
to complete EMU architecture. 
Empirical risk-sharing models point 
to more limited risk-sharing via 
private channels in the euro area 
compared to the United States while 
public risk-sharing is largely absent 
in EMU. 
A fiscal capacity at euro area level 
would not only increase public 
risk-sharing but might also facilitate 
private risk-sharing. 
Several policy proposals for a euro 
area fiscal capacity. 
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French and German economists suggested, among other things, reforming the fiscal 
architecture with the aim of making fiscal rules – constraints on fiscal policy through 
numerical limits on budgetary aggregates – less procyclical and easier to enforce, 
while at the same time “expanding fiscal stabilisation options in a way that creates 
good i centives for ational economic oli y” (Bénassy-Quéré t al. (2018)). Second, 
IMF staff put forward a proposal for a dedicated macroeconomic stabilisation fund that 
makes transfers to countries in bad times and is financed by regular annual 
contributions (Arnold et al. (2018)). Third, the European Commission proposed a 
macroeconomic stabilisation tool that aims at maintaining public investment in event of 
large asymmetric shocks, preserving stability and facilitating economic recovery.3 
Finally, in the context of the Meseberg Declaration, the French and German 
governments pro ose to implement a euro area budget and European unemployment
reinsurance fund.4 In this context, in June 2019 the Eurogroup agreed on the main 
features of the budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness (BICC) for 
euro area countries (and for ERM II countries on a voluntary basis) within the EU 
budget. This instrument is, however, not geared towards macroeconomic stabilisation, 
aiming instead at providing incentives for structural reforms and public investment at 
the national level. 
There are common elements to these prominent recent proposals for a euro area 
fiscal capacity in the policy discourse described above (see Table 1). First, the 
proposals specifically target macroeconomic stabilisation. The proposed instruments 
are largely based on intergovernmental transfers. In other words, even if some of the 
proposals call for funds to be incorporated in the EU budget, the euro area fiscal 
capacity is a dedicated fund that makes payments to national governments and is 
financed by national contributions. Payments are normally triggered automatically by 
changes in a cyclical economic indicator. Second, proposals for a euro area fiscal 
capacity typically include mechanisms to limit the adverse incentives of the 
stabilisation mechanism. More specifically, the proposals usually include eligibility 
criteria for access to the stabilisation mechanism in form of adherence to the EU’s 
fiscal governance framework. 
Against the background of existing proposals for a euro area fiscal capacity, this paper 
analyses the performance of interregional transfers in existing fiscal-federal systems 
with the aim of drawing lessons for the design of a euro area fiscal capacity. Its core 
content comprises case studies on Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain and the United 
States, five countries with distinct fiscal-federal systems. The case studies provide a 
description of the structure of fiscal federalism as well as the mechanisms for 
interregional stabilisation and convergence in each country. The interregional 
stabilisation mechanisms are analysed across two dimensions. First, the paper 
assesses the effectiveness of interregional transfers in facilitating risk-sharing by 
estimating empirically the degree to which such transfers smooth regional 
consumption in the event of idiosyncratic shocks.5 To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first paper to provide a consistent cross-country comparison of the quantitative 
                                                                    
3  “European Investment Stabilisation Function”, European Commission, 31 May 2018. 
4  “French German roadmap for the Euro Area”, non-paper, 20 June 2018. 
5  We consider both intergovernmental transfers and federal taxes and transfers to households. The 
analysis is not carried out for Belgium, which only has three federal regions. 
Common elements of proposals 
include macroeconomic stabilisation 
through intergovernmental transfers 
and conditionality of funding. 
Paper aims to draw lessons for EMU 
from national experiences with 
interregional transfer mechanisms. 
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numerical limits on budgetary aggregates – less procyclical and easier to enforce, 
while at the same time “expanding fiscal stabilisation options in a way that creates 
good incentives for national economic policy” (Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2018)). Second, 
IMF staff put forward a proposal for a dedicated macroeconomic stabilisation fund that 
makes transfers to countries in bad times and is financed by regular annual 
contributions (Arnold et al. (2018)). Third, the European Commission proposed a 
macroeconomic stabilisation tool that aims at maintaining public investment in event of 
large asymmetric shocks, preserving stability and facilitating economic recovery.3 
Finally, in the context of the Meseberg Declaration, the French and German 
governments propose to implement a euro area budget and European unemployment 
reinsurance fund.4 In this context, in June 2019 the Eurogroup agreed on the main 
features of the budgetary instrument for convergence and competitiveness (BICC) for 
euro area countries (and for ERM II countries on a voluntary basis) within the EU 
budget. This instrument is, however, not geared towards macroeconomic stabilisation, 
aiming instead at providing incentives for structural reforms and public investment at 
the national level. 
There are common elements to these prominent recent proposals for a euro area 
fiscal capacity in the policy discourse described above (see Table 1). First, the 
proposals specifically target macroeconomic stabilisation. The proposed instruments 
are largely based on intergovernmental transfers. In other words, even if some of the 
proposals call for funds to be incorporated in the EU budget, the euro area fiscal 
capacity is a dedicated fund that makes payments to national governments and is 
financed by national contributions. Payments are normally triggered automatically by 
changes in a cyclical economic indicator. Second, proposals for a euro area fiscal 
capacity typically include mechanisms to limit the adverse incentives of the 
stabilisation mechanism. More specifically, the proposals usually include eligibility 
criteria for access to the stabilisation mechanism in form of adherence to the EU’s 
fiscal governance framework. 
Against the background of existing proposals for a euro area fiscal capacity, this paper 
analyses the performance of interregional transfers in existing fiscal-federal systems 
with the aim of drawing lessons for the design of a euro area fiscal capacity. Its core 
content comprises case studies on Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain and the United 
States, five countries with distinct fiscal-federal systems. The case studies provide a 
description of the structure of fiscal federalism as well as the mechanisms for 
interregional stabilisation and convergence in each country. The interregional 
stabilisation mechanisms are analysed across two dimensions. First, the paper 
assesses the effectiveness of interregional transfers in facilitating risk-sharing by 
estimating empirically the degree to which such transfers smooth regional 
consumption in the event of idiosyncratic shocks.5 To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first paper to provide a consistent cross-country comparison of the quantitative 
                                                                    
3  “European Investment Stabilisation Function”, European Commission, 31 May 2018. 
4  “French German roadmap for the Euro Area”, non-paper, 20 June 2018. 
5  We consider both intergovernmental transfers and federal taxes and transfers to households. The 
analysis is not carried out for Belgium, which only has three federal regions. 
Common elements of proposals 
include macroeconomic stabilisation 
through intergovernmental transfers 
and conditionality of funding. 
Paper aims to draw lessons for EMU 
from national experiences with 
interregional transfer mechanisms.  
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importance of different fiscal channels for cross-regional consumption-smoothing in 
the event of asymmetric shocks. Second, the paper also assesses the efficiency of the 
intergovernmental transfer schemes. More specifically, the case studies look at the 
potential adverse impact on economic efficiency at the sub-national level in terms of 
vertical fiscal imbalances – transfer dependency due to significant shares of regional 
spending not financed out of own tax revenues – and weakened incentives for sound 
public finances (Eyraud and Lusine (2013)). The analytical approach used in this 
paper helps to provide a comprehensive assessment – in terms of stabilisation and 
economic efficiency – f the design and functioning of fe eral in titutions in major 
European economies and the United States. Our findings are therefore relevant for the 
ongoing debate on the creation of a stabilisation function at the euro area level as well 
as for the assessment of concrete design proposals. 
The paper first concludes from the case studies that fiscal-federal structures differ 
considerably with regard to the degree of sub-national tax autonomy. In particular, US 
states have a high degree of tax autonomy, while European countries typically feature 
a significant degree of intergovernmental redistribution of central government revenue 
through grants. Second, estimates indicate a relatively similar degree of fiscal 
risk-sharing across the countries, in spite of distinct differences between the 
fiscal-federal structures. Interregional risk-sharing is estimated to total around 11% of 
GDP in the United States and Spain and only slightly less in Germany and Austria at 
7-8% of GDP. Third, intergovernmental fiscal transfers explain a relatively small part of 
the total fiscal risk-sharing between regions in both the United States and European 
federal states. Fourth, risk-sharing in all the countries considered here mainly occurs 
via federal taxes and transfers to households rather than intergovernmental transfers. 
The insights gained from the case study can usefully be applied to the policy discourse 
on a euro area fiscal capacity. First, the analysis shows that existing large-scale, 
formula-based transfer schemes do not provide for significant risk-sharing. 
Cross-regional stabilisation in these fiscal-federal systems takes place mainly via the 
(federal) social benefit and tax system. Automatic and discretionary stabilisation 
mainly happens via the federal budget and the tax and social security system. This 
finding suggests that a genuine European scheme involving direct transfers to citizens 
(e.g. a European unemployment insurance scheme that complements national 
systems in severe recessions) that is financed by federal European taxes or social 
security contributions may be better suited to enhance the euro area’s resilience to 
economic shocks.6 Second, dedicated intergovernmental transfer schemes may lead 
to significant vertical imbalances and transfer dependency, which weakens 
sub-national incentives for sound public finances as a result. The US experience 
seems to indicate that a higher degree of tax autonomy, paired with credible federal 
no-bailout policies and the resulting self-imposed sub-national balanced budget rules, 
tends to promote regional incentives for sound fiscal policies. This reduces the 
trade-off between providing effective cross-regional risk-sharing on the one hand and 
reducing the adverse incentives of interregional transfers on the other. 
                                                                    
6  The US state unemployment scheme, for example, is co-financed by state and federal payroll taxes and 
provides for the extended benefits or federal emergency compensation in times of high unemployment in 
a given state (see, for example, U.S. Department of Labor (2019)). 
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GDP in the United States and Spain and only slightly less in Germany and Austria at 
7-8% of GDP. Third, intergovernmental fiscal transfers explain a relatively small part of 
the total fiscal risk-sharing between regions in both the United States and European 
federal states. Fourth, risk-sharing in all the countries considered here mainly occurs 
via federal taxes and transfers to households rather than intergovernmental transfers. 
The insights gained from the case study can usefully be applied to the policy discourse 
on a euro area fiscal capacity. First, the analysis shows that existing large-scale, 
formula-based transfer schemes do not provide for significant risk-sharing. 
Cross-regional stabilisation in these fiscal-federal systems takes place mainly via the 
(federal) social benefit and tax system. Automatic and discretionary stabilisation 
mainly happens via the federal budget and the tax and social security system. This 
finding suggests that a genuine European scheme involving direct transfers to citizens 
(e.g. a European unemployment insurance scheme that complements national 
systems in severe recessions) that is financed by federal European taxes or social 
security contributions may be better suited to enhance the euro area’s resilience to 
economic shocks.6 Second, dedicated intergovernmental transfer schemes may lead 
to significant vertical imbalances and transfer dependency, which weakens 
sub-national incentives for sound public finances as a result. The US experience 
seems to indicate that a higher degree of tax autonomy, paired with credible federal 
no-bailout policies and the resulting self-imposed sub-national balanced budget rules, 
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trade-off between providing effective cross-regional risk-sharing on the one hand and 
reducing the adverse incentives of interregional transfers on the other. 
                                                                    
6  The US state unemployment scheme, for example, is co-financed by state and federal payroll taxes and 
provides for the extended benefits or federal emergency compensation in times of high unemployment in 
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The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant 
literature. Section 3 develops performance criteria for intergovernmental transfer 
systems. Section 4 then presents the five case studies. Section 5 draws lessons from 
these case studies and Section 6 concludes. 
Table 1 
Selected roposals for a euro area fisc l capacity 
  Description Objective Type of instrument 
Automatic 
trigger  
Contribution 
financed 
Fiscal rule 
compliance 
Reconciling 
risk-sharing 
with market 
discipline 
(CEPR 
economists, 
January 2018) 
Reinsurance 
fund for large 
shocks affecting 
the labour 
market in euro 
area countries 
Macroeconomic 
stabilisation 
(of large shocks 
affecting the 
labour market) 
Intergovernmental 
(in the EU budget or 
as a subsidiary of 
the ESM) 
Yes 
(changes in the 
unemployment 
rate, 
employment or 
the wage bill) 
Yes 
(0.1% of GDP 
of the 
participating 
countries) 
Yes 
(ex ante and ex 
post 
conditionality) 
A Central 
Fiscal 
Stabilization 
Capacity for 
the Euro Area 
(IMF staff, 
March 2018) 
Dedicated 
ma roeconomic 
stabilisation 
fund that makes 
transfers to 
countries in bad 
times and is 
financed by 
regular annual 
contributions 
Macroeconomic 
stabilisation 
(proportional to 
cyclical 
fluctuations) 
Intergovernmental 
(build up assets in 
good times, 
i.e. rainy-day fund) 
Yes 
(deviation in 
unemployment 
above 7-year 
moving 
average) 
Yes 
(e.g. annual 
contributions 
of 0.35% of 
GDP) 
Yes 
(implementation 
of medium-term 
spending plans) 
European 
Investment 
Stabilisation 
Function 
(European 
Commission,
May 2018) 
Maintain public 
investment in 
event of large 
asymmetric 
shocks, 
preserving 
stability and 
facilitating 
economic 
recovery 
Macroeconomic 
stabilisation 
(loans when 
public finances 
become 
stretched) 
Intergovernmental 
(fund assigned to 
the EU budget) 
No 
(funds to be 
requested by 
Member States) 
Yes  
(equivalent to 
a share of 
monetary 
income) 
Yes 
(eligibility criteria 
based on sound 
policies) 
French 
German 
roadmap for 
the Euro Area 
(Meseberg 
Declaration, 
May 2018) 
Eurozone 
budget and 
European 
Unemployment 
Stabilization 
Fund 
Competitiveness 
and 
convergence 
and 
macroeconomic 
stabilisation 
Central capacity 
and 
intergovernmental 
Not indicated Partially 
(national 
contributions, 
allocation of 
tax revenues 
and European 
resources) 
Not mentioned 
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importance of different fiscal channels for cross-regional consumption-smoothing in 
the event of asymmetric shocks. Second, the paper also assesses the efficiency of the 
intergovernmental transfer schemes. More specifically, the case studies look at the 
potential adverse impact on economic efficiency at the sub-national level in terms of 
vertical fiscal imbalances – transfer dependency due to significant shares of regional 
spending not financed out of own tax revenues – and weakened incentives for sound 
public finances (Eyraud and Lusine (2013)). The analytical approach used in this 
paper helps to provide a comprehensive assessment – in terms of stabilisation and 
economic efficiency – of the design and functioning of federal institutions in major 
European economies and the United States. Our findings are therefore relevant for the 
ongoing debate on the creation of a stabilisation function at the euro area level as well 
as for the assessment of concrete design proposals. 
The paper first concludes from the case studies that fiscal-federal structures differ 
considerably with regard to the degree of sub-national tax autonomy. In particular, US 
states have a high degree of tax autonomy, while European countries typically feature 
a significant degree of intergovernmental redistribution of central government revenue 
through grants. Second, estimates indicate a relatively similar degree of fiscal 
risk-sharing across the countries, in spite of distinct differences between the 
fiscal-federal structures. Interregional risk-sharing is estimated to total around 11% of 
GDP in the United States and Spain and only slightly less in Germany and Austria at 
7-8% of GDP. Third, intergovernmental fiscal transfers explain a relatively small part of 
the total fiscal risk-sharing between regions in both the United States and European 
federal states. Fourth, risk-sharing in all the countries considered here mainly occurs 
via federal taxes and transfers to households rather than intergovernmental transfers. 
The insights gained from the case study can usefully be applied to the policy discourse 
on a euro area fiscal capacity. First, the analysis shows that existing large-scale, 
formula-based transfer schemes do not provide for significant risk-sharing. 
Cross-regional stabilisation in these fiscal-federal systems takes place mainly via the 
(federal) social benefit and tax system. Automatic and discretionary stabilisation 
mainly happens via the federal budget and the tax and social security system. This 
finding suggests that a genuine European scheme involving direct transfers to citizens 
(e.g. a European unemployment insurance scheme that complements national 
systems in severe recessions) that is financed by federal European taxes or social 
security contributions may be better suited to enhance the euro area’s resilience to 
economic shocks.6 Second, dedicated intergovernmental transfer schemes may lead 
to significant vertical imbalances and transfer dependency, which weakens 
sub-national incentives for sound public finances as a result. The US experience 
seems to indicate that a higher degree of tax autonomy, paired with credible federal 
no-bailout policies and the resulting self-imposed sub-national balanced budget rules, 
tends to promote regional incentives for sound fiscal policies. This reduces the 
trade-off between providing effective cross-regional risk-sharing on the one hand and 
reducing the adverse incentives of interregional transfers on the other. 
                                                                    
6  The US state unemployment scheme, for example, is co-financed by state and federal payroll taxes and 
provides for the extend d ben fits or federal emergency comp nsation in times of high unemployment in 
a given state (see, for example, U.S. Department of Labor (2019)). 
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2 Literature review 
This paper assesses fiscal-federal systems in terms of both their effectiveness in 
stabilising asymmetric macroeconomic shocks and their efficiency in maintaining 
sound sub-national public finances. By looking at the macroeconomic stabilisation 
performance of fiscal-federal arrangements, the paper adds to the literature on both 
fiscal federalism and optimum currency areas (OCA). The assessment of the fiscal 
sustainability of fiscal-federal systems mainly links with the second generation of fiscal 
federalism literature.7 
Broadly speaking, the first-generation fiscal federalism theory – seeking to combine 
the advantages of both decentralised and centralised forms of government – posits 
the following fiscal arrangements in a federation: local public goods should be 
supplied at the regional/local level to ensure that it best reflects heterogeneous 
regional/local preferences and conditions (Oates (1972)).8 At the same time, national 
public goods (like defence) and government policies for macroeconomic stabilisation 
and income redistribution are best allocated to the central government level (Oates 
(1999)). Taxes on relatively immobile tax bases should be assigned to regional/local 
governments, while taxes on relatively more mobile tax bases should be assigned to 
the central government level in order to avoid harmful tax competition (Musgrave 
(1983) and Oates (1999)).9 
This paper contributes to a large set of first-generation fiscal federalism literature that 
describes the performance of fiscal-federal systems with several layers of 
government.10 It presents accounts of the fiscal federalism arrangements – how 
revenue and spending are assigned to the central and regional/local level – in Austria, 
                                                                    
7  The fiscal federalism literature “lays out a general normative framework for the assignment of functions to 
different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these functions” 
(Oates (1999), p. 1121). It asks at which level of government – local, regional or central – revenue and 
spending functions and instruments should be allocated to achieve an efficient provision of public goods, 
other fiscal objectives (income redistribution, macroeconomic stabilisation) but also to maintain sound 
public finances. The more macroeconomy-driven optimum currency area literature asks which criteria 
need to be met for a currency union of heterogeneous entities to function smoothly (Mundell (1961), 
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969)). More specifically, the literature focuses on how a shock in one 
member of a currency area can be addressed, given that countries have lost their monetary policy 
instrument and cannot adjust their nominal exchange rates. One central instrument for this purpose is a 
fiscal transfer mechanism to entities adversely affected by an asymmetric shock. 
8  According to the “decentralisation theorem”, decentral public good provision is more efficient than central 
provision in the case of heterogeneous local preferences and in the absence of spillover effects and 
economies of scale. 
9  In practice, the allocation of taxation and spending responsibilities to different layers of government 
commonly results in a mismatch between decentralised revenues and expenditures (vertical imbalance) 
that relies crucially on the implementation of a mechanism to determine intergovernmental transfers and 
revenue-sharing (Jha (2015)). In fact, in most (decentralised) countries, the central government keeps 
control of the major tax bases, while the regional/local government level is tasked with many government 
functions, meaning that vertical transfers are needed to balance the budget at the sub-national level. At 
the same time, horizontal revenue-sharing is typically used to equalise living standards and financial 
resources across entities where there are large structural differences. 
10  According to the European system of accounts (ESA 2010), the general government sector has four 
subsectors: central government, state government, local government and social security funds. The 
general government is defined as consisting of “institutional units which are non-market producers whose 
output is intended for individual and collective consumption, and are financed by compulsory payments 
made by units belonging to other sectors, and institutional units principally engaged in the redistribution 
of national income and wealth.” 
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regional/local pre erences and conditio s (Oates (1972)).8 At the same time, national 
public goods (like defence) and governm nt p licies for ma roeconomic stabilisation 
and income r distr bution are best allocated to the c n ral governm nt l v l (Oates 
(1999)). Taxes on relatively imm bile tax bases should be assigned to regional/local 
governments, while taxes on relati ly ore mob l  tax bases sh uld be assigned to
the central government level in order to avoid harmful tax competitio  (Musgrave 
83  and Oates (1999)).9 
This paper contributes to a large set of first-generation fiscal federalism literature that 
describes the performance of fiscal-federal systems with several layers of 
government.10 It presents accounts of the fiscal federalism arrangements – how 
revenue and spending are assigned t  the central nd regional/loc l level – in Aus ri ,
                                                                    
7  The fiscal federalism literature “lays out a general normative framework for the assignment of functions to 
different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal instruments f r carrying out these functions” 
(Oates (1999), p. 1121). It asks at which level of government – local, regional or central – revenue and 
spending functions and instruments should be allocated to achieve an efficient provision of public goods, 
other fiscal objectives (income redistribution, macroeconomic stabilisation) but also to maintain sound 
public finances. The more macroeconomy-driven optimum currency area literature asks which criteria 
need to be met for a currency union of heterogeneous entities to function smoothly (Mundell (1961), 
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969)). More specifically, the literature focuses on how a shock in one 
member of a currency area can be addressed, given that countries have lost their monetary policy 
instrument and cannot adjust their nominal exchange rates. One central instrument for this purpose is a 
fiscal transfer mechanism to entities adversely affected by an asymmetric shock. 
8  According to the “decentralisation theorem”, decentral public good provision is more efficient than central 
provision in the case of heterogeneous local preferences and in the absence of spillover effects and 
economies of scale. 
9  In practice, the allocat on of taxa on nd sp nding responsibilities to different layers of government 
commonly results in a mismatch between decentralised revenues and expenditures (vertical imbalance) 
that relies crucially on the implementation of a mechanism to determine intergovernmental transfers and 
revenue-sharing (Jha (2015)). In fact, in most (decentralised) countries, the central government keeps 
control of the major tax bases, while the regional/local government level is tasked with many government 
functions, meaning that vertical transfers are needed to balance the budget at the sub-national level. At 
the same time, horizontal revenue-sharing is typically used to equalise living standards and financial 
resources across entities where there are large structural differences. 
10  According to the European system of accounts (ESA 2010), the general government sector has four 
subsectors: central government, state government, local government and social security funds. The 
general government is defined as consisting of “institutional units which are non-market producers whose 
output is intended for individual and collective consumption, and are financed by compulsory payments 
made by units belonging to other sectors, and institutional units principally engaged in the redistribution 
of national income and wealth.” 
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B lgium, Germany, Spain and the United States. In-depth country case studies are 
available for practically all federal states, including the United Stat s (e.g. Baicker et 
al. (2012)), Germany (e.g. Hepp and von Hagen (2012)), Spain (e. . Suárez Pandiello
(2005)) and Switzerland (e.g. Feld et al. (2018)). There are also several collections of 
cross-country studi s into fiscal federalism (Fossati and P nella (2005), Ecclest n 
and Krever (2017) and T r-Minassian et l. (2017)). In cont ast to these tudies, this 
paper provides a structured juxtaposition of the country cases, which allows more 
meaningful p licy conclusions to e drawn from the comp rison. 
This paper also contributes to a g owing body of terature that attempts to draw
lessons from established federations for closer fiscal integration in the euro area. 
Baimbridge and Whyman (2004), for exampl , uild their is ussion on fiscal 
federalism in t  EU and the eur  area on country case studies for Australia, Canad
and Switzerl nd. Henning a d Kessler (2012) draw lesson  from the history of US 
fiscal federalism f r the euro are , arguing, am g other things, in fav ur of a c ntral 
capacity for countercyclical macroeconomic stabilisation. Balassone et al. (2014) find 
that th  expe ence of other successful curr ncy unions suggests th t th  euro ar a
would benefit from a fiscal cap city. 
The OCA literatur  is commonly ref rred to in the d bat  on institutional reforms of 
EMU. A currency u ion implies that a member entity does not have monetary 
independenc  to deal w th asymmetric shocks, and ational fiscal policy is the primary
policy instrument left to deal with asymmetric shocks.11 In a currency union with 
limited factor mobility and rigid prices and wages, fiscal policy plays a particularly 
important role in macroeconomic stabilisation, along with financial market 
integration.12 At the same time, fiscal constraints may be more binding for 
governments in a currency union, given that they may be subject to fiscal rules as part 
of the union and they cannot monetise their debt (De Grauwe (2018)). Here, 
asymmetric shocks may need to be mitigated by international transfers either vertically 
from a common budget or horizontally between entities.13 In their seminal theoretical 
contribution, Farhi and Werning (2017) show that fiscal risk-sharing in currency unions 
                                                                    
11  During a slowdown, the government can open up a budget deficit that is financed by public borrowing. In 
an upswing, the government then runs a budget surplus in order to pay back its debt. This decentralised 
system is an insurance mechanism with intertemporal transfers within a country from good to bad times, 
which smooths economic differentials between countries. 
12  Closer financial market integration fosters cross-border lending, borrowing and shareholding. 
Theoretically, fully integrated financial markets can make union-wide fiscal risk-sharing unnecessary, if 
the central authority is solely concerned with providing insurance to member countries (Kehoe and 
Pastorino (2017) and Mundell (1973)). However, this requires financial markets to be fully integrated and 
efficient. Yet, while sharing and smoothing the volatility of the real economy, growth and integration of 
financial markets can also create volatility. When a systemic crisis erupts, financial markets typically fail 
to provide insurance (Schelkle (2017)). 
13  These transfers can be implicit or explicit. Implicit transfers between regions result from the centralisation 
of large budget items in the automatic budgetary stabilisers. Explicit transfers exist when there is revenue 
redistribution between regions through grants from the central government or transfers between regions. 
These transfers typically depend on the regions’ relative income level, as is the case in some federal 
states. 
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2 Literature revie  
This paper assesses fiscal-federal systems in terms of both their effectiveness in 
stabilising asymmetric macroeconomic shocks and their efficiency in maintaining 
sound sub-national public finances. By looking at the macroeconomic stabilisation 
performance of fiscal-federal arrangements, the paper adds to the literature on both 
fiscal federalism and optimum currency areas (OCA). The assessment of the fiscal 
sustainability of fiscal-federal systems mainly links with the second generation of fiscal 
federalism literature.7 
Broadly speaking, the first-generation fiscal federalism t ory – seeki g to combine 
the advantag s of both decentralised and centralised forms of government – posits 
the following fiscal arrangements in a federation: local public goods should be 
supplied at the regional/local level to ensure that it best reflects heterogeneous 
regional/local preferences and conditions (Oates (1972)).8 At the same time, national 
public goods (like defence) and government policies for macroeconomic stabilisation 
and income redistribution are best allocated to the central government level (Oates 
(1999)). Taxes on relatively immobile tax bases should be assigned to regional/local 
governments, while taxes on relatively more mobile tax bases should be assigned to 
the central government level in order to avoid harmful tax competition (Musgrave 
(1983) and Oates (1999)).9 
This paper c ntribut s to a large set of first-generation fiscal federalism literatur that 
describes the p rformance of fiscal-federal systems with several layers of 
government.10 It presents accounts of the fiscal federalism arrangements – how 
revenue and spending are assigned to the central and regional/local level – in Austria, 
                                                                    
7  The fiscal federalism literature “lays out a general normative framework for the assignment of functions to 
different levels of government and the appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these functions” 
(Oates (1999), p. 1121). It asks at which leve  of government – loc l, regional or c ntral – revenue and 
spending functions and instruments should be allocated to achieve an efficient provision of public goods, 
other fiscal objectives (income redistribution, macroeconomic stabilisation) but also to maintain sound 
public finances. The more macroeconomy-driven optimum curren y are  literature asks which criteria 
need to be met for a currency union of heterogeneous entities to function smoothly (Mundell (1961), 
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969)). More specifically, the literature focuses on how a shock in one 
member of a currency area can be addressed, given that countries have lost their monetary policy 
instrument and cannot adjust their nominal exchange rates. One central instrument for this purpose is a 
fiscal transfer mechanism to entities adversely affected by an asymmetric shock. 
8  According to the “decentralisation theorem”, decentral public good provision is more efficient than central 
provision in the case of heterogeneous local preferences and in th  absence of spillover effects nd 
economies of scale. 
9  In practice, the allocation of taxation and spending responsibilities to different layers of government 
commo ly results in a mismatch betwe n dec ntralised revenues and expenditures (vertic l imbala ce) 
that relies crucially on the implementation of a mechanism to determine intergovernmental transfers and 
revenue-sharing (Jha (2015)). In fact, in most (decentralised) countries, the central government keeps 
control of the ajor tax bases, while the regional/local government level is tasked with many government 
functions, meaning that vertical transfers are needed to balance the budget at the sub-national level. At 
the same time, horizontal revenue-sharing is typically used to equalise living standards and financial 
resources across entities where there are large structural differences. 
10  According to the Europe n system of accounts (ESA 2010), the general government sector has four 
subsectors: central government, state government, local government and social security funds. The 
general government is defined as consisting of “institutional units which are non-market pro ucers whose 
output is ntended for individual a d collectiv  consumption, and are financed by compulsory payments 
made by units belonging to other sectors, and institutional units principally engaged in the redistribution 
of national income and wealth.” 
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Belgium, Germany, Spain and the United States. In-depth country case studies are 
available for practically all federal states, including the United States (e.g. Baicker et 
al. (2012)), Germany (e.g. Hepp and von Hagen (2012)), Spain (e.g. Suárez Pandiello 
(2005)) and Switzerland (e.g. Feld et al. (2018)). There are also several collections of 
cross-country studies into fiscal federalism (Fossati and Panella (2005), Eccleston 
and Krever (2017) and Ter-Minassian et al. (2017)). In contrast to these studies, this 
paper provides a structured juxtaposition of the country cases, which allows more 
meaningful policy conclusions to be drawn from the comparison. 
This paper also contributes to a growing body of literature that attempts to draw 
lessons from established federations for closer fiscal integration in the euro area. 
Baimbridge and Whyman (2004), for example, build their discussion on fiscal 
federalism in the EU and the euro area on country case studies for Australia, Canada 
and Switzerland. Henning and Kessler (2012) draw lessons from the history of US 
fiscal federalism for the euro area, arguing, among other things, in favour of a central 
capacity for countercyclical macroeconomic stabilisation. Balassone et al. (2014) find 
that the experience of other successful currency unions suggests that the euro area 
would benefit from a fiscal capacity. 
The OCA literature is commonly referred to in the debate on institutional reforms of 
EMU. A currency union implies that a member entity does not have monetary 
independence to deal with asymmetric shocks, and national fiscal policy is the primary 
policy instrument left to deal with asymmetric shocks.11 In a currency union with 
limited factor mobility and rigid prices and wages, fiscal policy plays a particularly 
important role in macroeconomic stabilisation, along with financial market 
integration.12 At the same time, fiscal constraints may be more binding for 
governments in a currency union, given that they may be subject to fiscal rules as part 
of the union and they cannot monetise their debt (De Grauwe (2018)). Here, 
asymmetric shocks may need to be mitigated by international transfers either vertically 
from a common budget or horizontally between entities.13 In their seminal theoretical 
contribution, Farhi and Werning (2017) show that fiscal risk-sharing in currency unions 
                                                                    
11  During a slowdown, the government can open up a budget deficit that is financed by public borrowing. In 
an upswing, the government then runs a budget surplus in order to pay back its debt. This decentralised 
system is an insurance mechanism with intertemporal transfers within a country from good to bad times, 
which smooths economic differentials between countries. 
12  Closer financial market integration fosters cross-border lending, borrowing and shareholding. 
Theoretically, fully integrated financial markets can make union-wide fiscal risk-sharing unnecessary, if 
the central authority is solely concerned with providing insurance to member countries (Kehoe and 
Pastorino (2017) and Mundell (1973)). However, this requires financial markets to be fully integrated and 
efficient. Yet, while sharing and smoothing the volatility of the real economy, growth and integration of 
financial markets can also create volatility. When a systemic crisis erupts, financial markets typically fail 
to provide insurance (Schelkle (2017)). 
13  These transfers can be implicit or explicit. Implicit transfers between regions result from the centralisation 
of large budget items in the automatic budgetary stabilisers. Explicit transfers exist when there is revenue 
redistribution between regions through grants from the central government or transfers between regions. 
These transfers typically depend on the regions’ relative income level, as is the case in some federal 
states. 
… and draws lessons for closer 
fiscal integration in the euro area. 
OCA l iterature investigates 
elements needed for smooth 
functioning of EMU. 
 
ECB Occasional Paper Series No 239 / April 2020 
 
12 
smooths consumption across countries and improves macroeconomic stability in the 
union.14 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on risk-sharing within fiscal-federal 
systems by providing a consistent measure of the degree of risk-sharing through 
interregional transfers in the country case studies. To the knowledge of the authors, it 
is the only study that attempts such a cross-country analysis. Other empirical studies 
typically find a relatively high degree of risk-sharing between states in the United 
States and a relatively low degree of risk-sharing between countries in the euro area. 
In their seminal contribution, Asdrubali et al. (1996) find that in the United States, for 
example, 13% of shocks to gross state product are smoothed by the federal 
government, while 39% are smoothed by capital markets and 23% by credit markets, 
and 15% remain unsmoothed.15 According to Melitz (2004) and Cimadomo et al. 
(2018), private and fiscal risk-sharing in the euro area lags behind the United States. 
Dreyer and Schmid (2015) show that a risk-sharing capacity providing a similar degree 
of redistribution and stabilisation to the US system would require significantly larger 
intergovernmental transfers in the euro area. 
While the first-generation theory of fiscal federalism and the OCA literature argue in 
favour of the centralisation of macroeconomic stabilisation and redistribution policy, 
the second-generation theory emphasises the incentive structures of government 
agents at central and regional/local level. With a public choice perspective, this 
literature assumes that policymakers are rent- or vote-seekers rather than benevolent 
welfare-maximisers (Weingast (2009)). It typically argues that decentralisation of 
spending should go together with large tax autonomy for regional and local 
governments and that the resulting tax competition is not necessarily harmful, but may 
have instead a disciplinary effect (Brennan and Buchanan (1980)). Oth r authors have 
also argued that the lack of assigned regional or local taxation powers is responsible 
for bailout expectations from central government and is therefore connected to deficit 
biases (Von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996)). It should be noted, however, that 
conclusions of empirical studies are mixed with regard to the effect of fiscal 
decentralisation on fiscal sustainability.16 
                                                                   
14  At the same time, other authors point to the problems of such stabilisation mechanisms, such as the 
difficulty for central governments to appropriately target grants (Lockwood (1999)) and issues of moral 
hazard pertaining to insurance mechanisms (Person and Tabellini (1996a and b)). In particular when 
shocks and transfers become permanent, a large degree of solidarity or sense of common destiny is 
necessary, which goes hand-in-hand with the formation of a political union (Baldwin and Wyplosz 
(2015)). 
15  Similarly, Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) provide evidence that the federal US government insures 
member states against regional income shocks in the magnitude of between one-third and one-half of the 
initial shock. Obstfeld and Peri (1998) show that fiscal transfers from booming to depressed regions in the 
United States are crucial for both redistribution and stabilisation purposes. 
16  Oates (1985), using cross-section data for 43 countries, does not find a significant correlation between 
decentralisation and government size. However, a significant number of authors find evidence for the 
“Leviathan hypothesis”, namely that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in 
decentralised countries (Marlow (1988), Rodden (2003), Neyapti (2010) and Foremny (2014)). Rodden 
(2003) puts emphasis on the form of decentralisation: using an OECD sample, he finds that when the 
decentralisation is financed by autonomous local taxation, it is associated with a small government size. 
In this context, Nepyapti (2013) shows that fiscal rules can contribute to the effectiveness of 
decentralisation in achieving fiscal discipline. Rodden (2002) shows that large and persistent aggregate 
deficits occur when sub-national governments are simultaneously dependent on intergovernmental 
transfers and free to borrow – a combination found most frequently among constituent units in 
federations. 
Paper contributes to growing 
literature measuring the degree of 
risk-sharing. 
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smooths consumption across countries and improves macroeconomic stability in the 
union.14 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on risk-sharing within fiscal-federal 
systems by providing a consistent measure of the degree of risk-sharing through 
interregional transfers in the country case studies. To the knowledge of the authors, it 
is the only study that attempts such a cross-country analysis. Other empirical studies 
typically find a relatively high degree of risk-sharing between states in the United 
States and a relatively l w degree of risk-sharing b tween countries in the eur  area. 
In their seminal contribution, Asdrubali et al. (1996) find that in the United States, for 
example, 13% of shocks to gross state product are smoothed by the federal 
government, while 39% are smoothed by capital markets and 23% by credit markets, 
and 15% emain un m othed.15 According to Melitz (2004) and Cimadomo et l.
(2018), private and fiscal risk-sharing in the euro area lags behind the United States. 
Dreyer and Schmid (2015) show that a risk-sharing capacity providing a similar degree 
of redistribution and stabilisation to the US system would require significantly larger 
intergov rnm ntal transfers in the euro are . 
While the first-generation theory of fiscal federalism and the OCA literature argue in 
favour of the centralisation of macroeconomic stabili ation and r distribution policy, 
the second-generation theory emphasises the incentive structures of government 
agents at central and regional/local level. With a pub c choice perspective, this 
literature assumes that policymakers are rent- or vote-seekers rather than benevolent
welfare-maximisers (Weingast (2009)). It typically argues that decentralisation of 
spending should go together with large tax autonomy for regional and local 
governments and that the resulting tax competition is not necessarily harmful, but may 
have in tead a disciplinary effect (Brennan and Buchana  (1980)). Othe  authors have 
also argued that the lack of assigned regional or local taxation powers is responsible 
for bailout expectations from central government and is therefore con ected to deficit 
biases (Von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996)). It should be noted, however, that 
conclusions of empirical studies are mixed with regard to the effect of fiscal 
decentralisation o  fiscal sustainability.16 
                                                                    
14  At the same time, other authors point to the problems of such stabilisation mechanisms, such as the 
difficulty for central governments to appropriately target grants (Lockwood (1999)) and issues of moral 
hazard pertaining to insurance mechanisms (Person and Tabellini (1996a and b)). In particular when 
sho ks and transfers b come permanent, a large degree of solidarity or sense of common destiny is 
necessary, which goes hand-in-hand with the formation of a political union (Baldwin and Wyplosz 
(2015)). 
15  Similarly, Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) provide evidence that the federal US government insures 
member states against regional income shocks in the magnitude of between one-third and one-half of the 
initial shock. Obstfeld and Peri (1998) show that fiscal transfers from booming to depressed regions in the 
United States are crucial for both redistribution and stabilisation purposes. 
16  Oates (1985), using cross-section data for 43 countries, does not find a significant correlation between 
decentralisation and government size. However, a significant number of authors find evidence for the 
“Leviathan hypothesis”, namely that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in 
decentralised countries (Marlow (1988), Rodden (2003), Neyapti (2010) and Foremny (2014)). Rodden 
(2003) puts emphasis on the form of decentralisation: using an OECD sample, he finds that when the 
decentralisation is financed by autonomous local taxation, it is associated with a small government size. 
In this context, Nepyapti (2013) shows that fiscal rules can contribute to the effectiveness of 
decentralisation in achieving fiscal discipline. Rodden (2002) shows that large and persistent aggregate 
deficits occur when sub-national governments are simultaneously dependent on intergovernmental 
transfers and free to borrow – a combination found most frequently among constituent units in 
federations. 
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Belgium, Germany, Spain and the United States. In-depth country case studies are 
available for practically all federal states, including the United States (e.g. Baicker et 
al. (2012)), Germany (e.g. Hepp and von Hagen (2012)), Spain (e.g. Suárez Pandiello 
(2005)) and Switzerland (e.g. Feld et al. (2018)). There are also several collections of 
cross-country studies into fiscal federalism (Fossati and Panella (2005), Eccleston 
and Krever (2017) and Ter-Minassian et al. (2017)). In contrast to these studies, this 
paper provides a structured juxtaposition of the country cases, which allows more 
meaningful policy conclusions to be drawn from the comparison. 
This paper also contributes to a growing body of literature that attempts to draw 
lessons from established federations for closer fiscal integration in the euro area. 
Baimbridge and Whyman (2004), for example, build their discussion on fiscal 
federalism in the EU and the euro area on country case studies for Australia, Canada 
and Switzerland. Henning and Kessler (2012) draw lessons from the history of US 
fiscal federalism for the euro area, arguing, among other things, in favour of a central 
capacity for countercyclical macroeconomic stabilisation. Balassone et al. (2014) find 
that the experience of other successful currency unions suggests that the euro area 
would benefit from a fiscal capacity. 
The OCA literature is commonly referred to in the debate on institutional reforms of 
EMU. A currency union implies that a member entity does not have monetary 
independence to deal with asymmetric shocks, and national fiscal policy is the primary 
policy instrument left to deal with asymmetric shocks.11 In a currency union with 
limited factor mobility and rigid prices and wages, fiscal policy plays a particularly 
important role in macroeconomic stabilisation, along with financial market 
integration.12 At the same time, fiscal constraints may be more binding for 
governments in a currency union, given that they may be subject to fiscal rules as part 
of the union and they cannot monetise their debt (De Grauwe (2018)). Here, 
asymmetric shocks may need to be mitigated by international transfers either vertically 
from a common budget or horizontally between entities.13 In their seminal theoretical 
contribution, Farhi and Werning (2017) show that fiscal risk-sharing in currency unions 
                                                                 
11  During a slowdown, the government can open up a budget deficit that is financed by public borrowing. In 
an upswing, the government then runs a budget surplus in order to pay back its debt. This decentralised 
system is an insurance mechanism with intertemporal transf rs within a cou try from good to bad times,
which smooths ec nomic differ tials between co ntries. 
12  Closer financial market integration fosters cross-border lending, borrowing and shareholding. 
Theoretically, fully integrated financial mark ts can make union-wide fiscal risk-sharing unnecessary, if 
the c ntr l authority is solel  concerned with providing insurance to member countri s (Kehoe and 
Pastorino (2017) and Mundell (1973)). How ver, this requires financial m rkets to be fully i tegrated and 
effici t. Yet, while sharing and smoothing e volat lity of the real economy, gr wth and integration of 
financial markets can also create volatility. When a ystemic crisis erupts, financial markets typically fail 
to provide insurance (Schelkle (2017)). 
13  These transfers can be implicit or explicit. Implicit transfers between regions result from the centralisation 
of large budget items in the automatic budgetary stab lise s. Explicit transf rs xist when there is revenue 
redi tribution between regions through grants from the central government o  transfers betw en regions.
These t ansf rs typic lly d pend on the regions’ relative income level, as is the case in som federal 
states. 
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smooths consumption across countries and improves macroeconomic stability in the 
union.14 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on risk-sharing within fiscal-federal 
systems by providing a consistent measure of the degree of risk-sharing through 
interregional transfers in the country case studies. To the knowledge of the authors, it 
is the only study that attempts such a cross-country analysis. Other empirical studies 
typically find a relatively high degree of risk-sharing between states in the United 
States and a relatively low degree of risk-sharing between countries in the euro area. 
In their seminal contribution, Asdrubali et al. (1996) find that in the United States, for 
example, 13% of shocks to gross state product are smoothed by the federal 
government, while 39% are smoothed by capital markets and 23% by credit markets, 
and 15% remain unsmoothed.15 According to Melitz (2004) and Cimadomo et al. 
(2018), private and fiscal risk-sharing in the euro area lags behind the United States. 
Dreyer and Schmid (2015) show that a risk-sharing capacity providing a similar degree 
of redistribution and stabilisation to the US system would require significantly larger 
intergovernmental transfers in the euro area. 
While the first-generation theory of fiscal federalism and the OCA literature argue in 
favour of the centralisation of macroeconomic stabilisation and redistribution policy, 
the second-generation theory emphasises the incentive structures of government 
agents at central and regional/local level. With a public choice perspective, this 
literature assumes that policymakers are rent- or vote-seekers rather than benevolent 
welfare-maximisers (Weingast (2009)). It typically argues that decentralisation of 
spending should go together with large tax autonomy for regional and local 
governments and that the resulting tax competition is not necessarily harmful, but may 
have instead a disciplinary effect (Brennan and Buchanan (1980)). Other authors have 
also argued that the lack of assigned regional or local taxation powers is responsible 
for bailout expectations from central government and is therefore connected to deficit 
biases (Von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996)). It should be noted, however, that 
conclusions of empirical studies are mixed with regard to the effect of fiscal 
decentralisation on fiscal sustainability.16 
                                                                    
14  At the same time, other authors point to the problems of such stabilisation mechanisms, such as the 
difficulty for central governments to appropriately target grants (Lockwood (1999)) and issues of moral 
hazard pertaining to insurance mechanisms (Person and Tabellini (1996a and b)). In particular when 
shocks and transfers become permanent, a large degree of solidarity or sense of common destiny is 
necessary, which goes hand-in-hand with the formation of a political union (Baldwin and Wyplosz 
(2015)). 
15  Similarly, Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) provide evidence that the federal US government insures 
member states against regional income shocks in the magnitude of between one-third and one-half of the 
initial shock. Obstfeld and Peri (1998) show that fiscal transfers from booming to depressed regions in the 
United States are crucial for both redistribution and stabilisation purposes. 
16  Oates (1985), using cross-section data for 43 countries, does not find a significant correlation between 
decentralisation and government size. However, a significant number of authors find evidence for the 
“Leviathan hypothesis”, namely that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in 
decentralised countries (Marlow (1988), Rodden (2003), Neyapti (2010) and Foremny (2014)). Rodden 
(2003) puts emphasis on the form of decentralisation: using an OECD sample, he finds that when the 
decentralisation is financed by autonomous local taxation, it is associated with a small government size. 
In this context, Nepyapti (2013) shows that fiscal rules can contribute to the effectiveness of 
decentralisation in achieving fiscal discipline. Rodden (2002) shows that large and persistent aggregate 
deficits occur when sub-national governments are simultaneously dependent on intergovernmental 
transfers and free to borrow – a combination found most frequently among constituent units in 
federations. 
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smooths consumption across countries and improves macroeconomic stability in the 
union.14 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on risk-sharing within fiscal-federal 
systems by providing a consistent measure of the degree of risk-sharing through 
interregional transfers in the country case studies. To the knowledge of the authors, it 
is the only study that attempts such a cross-country analysis. Other empirical studies 
typically find a relatively high degree of risk-sharing between states in the United 
States and a relatively low degree of risk-sharing between countries in the euro area. 
In their seminal contribution, Asdrubali et al. (1996) find that in the United States, for 
example, 13% of shocks to gross state product are smoothed by the federal 
government, while 39% are smoothed by capital markets and 23% by credit markets, 
and 15% remain unsmoothed.15 According to Melitz (2004) and Cimadomo et al. 
(2018), private and fiscal risk-sharing in the euro area lags behind the United States. 
Dreyer and Schmid (2015) show that a risk-sharing capacity providing a similar degree 
of redistribution and stabilisation to the US system would require significantly larger 
intergovernmental transfers in the euro area. 
While the first-generation theory of fiscal federalism and the OCA literature argue in 
favour of the centralisation of macroeconomic stabilisation and redistribution policy, 
the second-generation theory emphasises the incentive structures of government 
agents at central and regional/local level. With a public choice perspective, this 
literature assumes that policymakers are rent- or vote-seekers rather than benevolent 
welfare-maximisers (Weingast (2009)). It typically argues that decentralisation of 
spending should go together with large tax autonomy for regional and local 
governments and that the resulting tax competition is not necessarily harmful, but may 
have instead a disciplinary effect (Brennan and Buchanan (1980)). Other authors have 
also argued that the lack of assigned regional or local taxation powers is responsible 
for bailout expectations from central government and is therefore connected to deficit 
biases (Von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996)). It should be noted, however, that 
conclusions of empirical studies are mixed with regard to the effect of fiscal 
decentralisation on fiscal sustainability.16 
                                                                  
14  At the same time, other authors point to the problems of suc  stabilisation mechanisms, such as t e 
difficulty for central governments to appropriately target grants (Lockwood (1999)) and issues of moral 
hazard pertaining to insurance mechanisms (Person and Tabellini (1996a and b)). In particular when 
shocks and transfers become permanent, a large degree of solidarity or sense of common destiny is 
necessary, which goes hand-in-hand with the formation of a political union (Baldwin and Wyplosz 
(2015)). 
15  Similarly, Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) provide evidence that the fed ral US government insures 
member states against regional income shocks in the magnitude of between one-third and one-half of the 
initial shock. Obstfeld and Peri (1998) show that fiscal transfers from booming to depressed regions in the 
United States are crucial for both redistribution and stabilisation purposes. 
16  Oates (1985), using cross-section data for 43 countries, does not find a significant correlation between 
decentralisation and government size. However, a significant number of authors find evidence for the 
“Leviath n hypothesis”, namely that ax com etition limit  the growth of government spending in 
ecentralised countries (Marlow (1988), Rodd n (2003), Neyapti (2010) and Forem y (2014)). Rodden 
(2003) puts emphasis on the form of decentralisation: using an OECD s mple, he finds that when the 
decentr lisa io  is finan ed by autonomous local taxation, it is associated with a small g vernment ize. 
In thi  context, Nepyapti (2013) shows tha  fiscal rules can contribute to the effectiveness of 
decentralisation in achieving fiscal discipline. Rodden (2002) shows that large and persistent aggregate 
deficits occur when sub-national governments are simultaneously dependent on intergovernmental 
transfers and free to borrow – a combination found most frequently among constituent units in 
federations. 
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risk-sharing. 
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smooths consumption across countries and improves macroeconomic stability in the 
union.14 
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i terregional transfe s in the country case studies. To the knowledge of the authors, it 
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States and a relatively low degree of risk-sharing between countries in the euro area. 
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(2018), private and fiscal risk-sharing in the euro area lags behind the United States. 
Dreyer and Schmid (2015) show that a risk-sharing capacity providing a similar degree 
of redistribution and stabilisation to the US system would require significantly larger 
intergovernmental transfers in the euro area. 
While the fir t-g neration theory of fiscal f deralism and th  OCA literature argue in 
favou  of the cent alisation of macroeconomi  stabilisation and redist ibution policy, 
the second-generation theory emphasises the incentive structures of g vernment 
agents at central and regional/local level. With a public choi  pe spective, this 
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governments and th t the resulting tax competition is not necessarily harmful, but may 
have instead  disciplinary eff ct (Brennan an  Buc nan (1980)). Other authors have 
also argued that the lack of assigned regional or local taxation powers is responsible 
for bailout expectations from central government and is therefore connected to deficit 
biases (Von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996)). It should be noted, however, that 
conclusions of emp ric l studies re ixed with regard to the eff ct of fi cal 
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4 At the same time, other authors point to the problems of suc  stabilisation mechanisms, such as the 
difficulty for central governments to appropriately arget rants (Lockwood (1999)) and issues of m ral 
haz rd pertaining to insurance mechanisms (Per on and Tabellini (1996a and b)). In particular whe  
shocks and transfe s become permanent, a large egree of s lidarity or ense of common destiny is 
necessary, which goes hand-in-hand with the formation of a political union (Baldwin and Wyplosz 
(2015)). 
15  Simil rly, Sala-i-Martin a d Sachs (1991) provide evidence that the federal US government insures 
member states gainst regional income sh cks in the magnitude of betwee  one-third and one-half of the 
initial shock. Obstfeld and P ri (1998) show hat fiscal transfers from booming to d pres ed regions in the 
Unit d States are crucial for both redistribution nd stabilisat on purpos s. 
16  Oates (1985), using cross-section data for 43 countries, does not find a significant correlation between 
decentralisation and government size. However, a significant number of authors find evidence for the 
“Leviathan hypothesis”, namely that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in 
decentralised countries (Marlow (1988), Rodden (2003), Neyapti (2010) and Foremny (2014)). Rodden 
(2003) puts emphasis on the form of decentralisation: using an OECD sample, he finds that when the 
decentralisation is financed by autonomous local taxation, it is associated with a small government size. 
In this context, Nepyapti (2013) shows that fiscal rules can contribute to the effectiveness of 
decentralisation in achieving fiscal discipline. Rodden (2002) shows that large and persistent aggregate 
deficits occur when sub-national governments are simultaneously dependent on intergovernmental 
transfers and free to borrow – a combination found most frequently among constituent units in 
federations. 
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This paper links with the second-generation fiscal federalism literature insofar as it 
provides an overview of the mechanisms for fiscal discipline at play across the 
countries included in the study. It adds o contributions such as Rodden et al. (2003), 
who provide a multi-country study of the conditions under which decentralised 
cou trie  mig t ensure fiscal discipline. They find that most countries rely on both 
market mechanisms and hierarchical constraints to maintain fiscal discipline. Bordo et 
al. (2013), drawing on the experience in Arg ntina, Brazil, Canada, Germany and the 
United States, argue in favour of a credible commitment to a no-bailout rule under 
Article 125 TFEU. Finally, Henning and Kessler (2012), drawing lessons from the 
history of US fiscal federalism, argue in favour of strong ownership of national fiscal 
rules in the euro area. 
Paper contributes to 
second-generation fiscal federalism 
literature by providing overview of 
mechanisms for fiscal discipline. 
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3 Performance criteria for interregional 
transfer systems 
As highlighted in Section 2, the theoretical literature on optimum currency areas 
suggests that interregional transfers play an important role in currency unions where 
jurisdictions do not have the exchange rate mechanism available to adjust to 
asymmetric shocks. Risk-sharing via interregional transfers that flow from regions 
experiencing a boom to ones in recession tends to improve macroeconomic stability in 
a currency union. Among interregional transfers, intergovernmental transfer schemes 
are typically not designed to exclusively provide risk-sharing against idiosyncratic 
shocks or convergence. Instead, they are primarily intended to distribute tax revenues 
across regions allowing them to provide similar levels of public goods and services. To 
the extent that they result in large vertical fiscal imbalances of permanent nature, 
entailing transfer dependency due to significant shares of regional spending not 
financed out of own tax revenues, such intergovernmental transfers may create 
problems of soft budget constraints and undermine regional economic efficiency. An 
evaluation of the effectiveness of intergovernmental transfer schemes therefore needs 
to weigh the costs in terms of possible inefficiencies against the benefits of 
macroeconomic stabilisation across regions. Effectiveness in providing risk-sharing 
The concept of risk-sharing typically relates to the synchronisation of output and 
consumption in a federation or currency union. Two channels exist to smooth shocks 
to GDP by reducing the correlation between consumption growth and output growth. 
First, intertemporal private consumption may be smoothed by means of private 
savings or debt-financed government transfers to households. Second, consumption 
may also be insured via risk-sharing through interregional fiscal transfers which help to 
cushion asymmetric shocks. The empirical literature in this respect typically identifies 
three different channels (see the seminal contribution by Asdrubali et al. (1996)): the 
“capital channel” (or “factor markets channel”), which operates via cross-border flows 
of factor income (e.g. dividends);17 the “credit channel”, which relates to cross-border 
loans; and the “fiscal channel”. The latter captures not only taxes, social security 
contributions and social benefits to households, but also intergovernmental 
transfers.18 
The framework presented in Asdrubali et al. (1996) has been used to identify and 
quantitatively assess the different channels of interregional risk-sharing in several 
existing federations, including the United States, Canada, Germany, Spain and 
Switzerland (see, for example, Alberola and Asdrubali (1997), Hepp and von Hagen 
(2013) and Feld et al. (2018)). In this paper, we place the emphasis on the fiscal 
risk-sharing channel. Concretely, we aim to assess the effectiveness of interregional 
transfers by estimating the degree to which these support the smoothing of (public and 
private) consumption in the event of idiosyncratic shocks. Next, we distinguish 
                                                                    
17  Note that this channel also contains the effect of the smoothing of corporations’ dividends over the 
business cycle. 
18  See, for example, Cimadimo et al. (2018). 
Cost and benefits of 
intergovernmental transfers need to 
be evaluated when assessing the 
effectiveness of federal schemes. 
Interregional transfers may support 
consumption-smoothing in the event 
of asymmetric regional shocks. 
The effectiveness of interregional 
transfers in contributing to 
interregional risk-sharing may be 
used as an economic performance 
criterion. 
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between the role of intergovernmental schemes and the role of taxes, social security 
contributions and transfers to households (social benefits). 
This standard risk-sharing framework builds on the following decomposition of the 
cross-sectional variance of regional GDP:  
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣{∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔} = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣{∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 ,∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 − ∆ log 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠}+ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣{∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 ,∆ log 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − ∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠}+ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣{∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 ,∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − ∆ log 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐} +  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣{∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 ,∆ log 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐} (1) 
where gdp is regional gross domestic product, si is regional primary income, dsi is 
regional disposable income and c is regional (public and private) consumption (all in 
per capita terms).19 In order to derive ordinary least squares estimates of the different 
risk-sharing channels, both sides of equation (1) are divided by the variance of 
∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔. 
The 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽-coefficients measure the estimated impact of the “capital channel” (K), the 
“credit channel” (C) and the “fiscal channel” (F) respectively, and fulfil the following 
restriction: 1 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈  
As mentioned above, we are interested in assessing the fiscal risk-sharing channel 
and therefore in estimating 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹. According to Asdrubali et al. (1996), this can be done 
by estimating 
∆ log 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  ∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  ∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (2) 
where 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 are time-fixed effects which are introduced to ensure that common shocks 
to the federation are absorbed, so that 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 only captures the fiscal smoothing of 
asymmetric or region-specific shocks.20 
The fiscal channel can be further decomposed into its subcomponents by estimating  
∆ log(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥  ∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (3) 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the quantitative impact of the respective fiscal subcomponent, such as 
specific fiscal transfers to a regional government or households located in region i. In 
their paper, Asdrubali et al. (1996) fully decompose the fiscal channel into the 
respective sub-items by separating the impact of (i) federal taxes and social security 
                                                                    
19  Regional primary income is the sum of regional households’ primary income and indirect and corporate 
taxes generated in the respective region. Regional disposable income and regional consumption reflect 
the income and consumption of both households and regional governments in the respective region. 
20  Estimation equations (2) and (3) are estimated using standard pooled OLS with Driscoll and Kraay 
standard errors that account for cross-sectional dependence. 
The risk-sharing framework of 
Asdrubali et al. (1996) can be used 
to identify the stabilising role of fiscal 
transfers across regions within a 
federation. 
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3 Performance criteria for interregional 
transfer systems 
As highlighted in Section 2, the theoretical literature on optimum currency areas 
suggests that interregional transfers play an important role in currency unions where 
jurisdictions do not have the exchange rate mechanism available to adjust to 
asymmetric shocks. Risk-sharing via interregional transfers that flow from regions 
experiencing a boom to ones in recession tends to improve macroeconomic stability in 
a currency union. Among interregional transfers, intergovernmental transfer schemes 
are typically not designed to exclusively provide risk-sharing against idiosyncratic 
shocks or convergence. Instead, they are primarily intended to distribute tax revenues 
across regions allowing them to provide similar levels of public goods and services. To 
the extent that they result in large vertical fiscal imbalances of permanent nature, 
entailing transfer dependency due to significant shares of regional spending not 
financed out of own tax revenues, such intergovernmental transfers may create 
problems of soft budget constraints and undermine regional economic efficiency. An 
evaluation of the effectiveness of intergovernmental transfer schemes therefore needs 
to weigh the costs in terms of possible inefficiencies against the benefits of 
macroeconomic stabilisation across regions. Effectiveness in providing risk-sharing 
The concept of risk-sharing ty ically r lat s to the synchronisation of output and 
consumption in a federation or currency union. Two channels exist to smooth shocks 
to GDP by reducing the correlation between consumption growth and output growth. 
First, intertemporal private consumption may be smoothed by means of private 
savings or debt-financed government transfers to households. Second, consumption 
may also be insured via risk-sharing through interregional fiscal transfers which help to 
cushion asymmetric shocks. The empirical literature in this respect typically identifies 
three different channels (see the seminal contribution by Asdrubali et al. (1996)): the 
“capital channel” (or “factor markets channel”), which operates via cross-border flows 
of factor income (e.g. dividends);17 the “credit channel”, which relates to cross-border 
loans; and the “fiscal channel”. The latter captures not only taxes, social security 
contributions and social benefits to households, but also intergovernmental 
transfers.18 
The framework presented i  Asdrubali et al. (1996) has been used to identify and 
quantitatively assess the different channels of interregional risk-sharing in several 
existing federations, including the United States, Canada, Germany, Spain and 
Switzerland (see, for example, Alberola and Asdrubali (1997), Hepp and von Hagen 
(2013) and Feld et al. (2018)). In this paper, we place the emphasis on the fiscal 
risk-sharing channel. Concretely, we aim to assess the effectiveness of interregional 
transfers by estimating the degree to which these support the smoothing of (public and 
private) consumption in the event of idiosyncratic shocks. Next, we distinguish 
                                                                    
17  Note that this channel also contains the effect of the smoothing of corporations’ dividends over the 
business cycle. 
18  See, for example, Cimadimo et al. (2018). 
Cost and benefits of 
intergovernmental transfers need to 
be evaluated when assessing the 
effectiveness of federal schemes. 
Interregional transfers may support 
consumption-smoothing in the event 
of asymmetric regional shocks. 
The effectiveness of interregional 
transfers in contributing to 
interregional risk-sharing may be 
used as an economic performance 
crit rion. 
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between the role of intergovernmental schemes and the role of taxes, social security 
contributions and transfers to households (social benefits). 
This standard risk-sharing framework builds on the following decomposition of the 
cross-sectional variance of regional GDP:  
𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣{∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔} = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣{∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 ,∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 − ∆ log 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠}+ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣{∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 ,∆ log 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − ∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠}+ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣{∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 ,∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 − ∆ log 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐} +  𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣{∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 ,∆ log 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐} (1) 
where gdp is regional gross domestic product, si is regional primary income, dsi is 
regional disposable income and c is regional (public and private) consumption (all in 
per capita terms).19 In order to derive ordinary least squares estimates of the different 
risk-sharing channels, both sides of equation (1) are divided by the variance of 
∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔. 
The 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽-coefficients measure the estimated impact of the “capital channel” (K), the 
“credit channel” (C) and the “fiscal channel” (F) respectively, and fulfil the following 
restriction: 1 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈  
As mentioned above, we are interested in assessing the fiscal risk-sharing channel 
and therefore in estimating 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹. According to Asdrubali et al. (1996), this can be done 
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where 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 are time-fixed effects which are introduced to ensure that common shocks 
to the federation are absorbed, so that 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 only captures the fiscal smoothing of 
asymmetric or region-specific shocks.20 
The fiscal channel can be further decomposed into its subcomponents by estimating  
∆ log(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 ,𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥  ∆ log𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹,𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (3) 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the quantitative impact of the respective fiscal subcomponent, such as 
specific fiscal transfers to a regional government or households located in region i. In 
their paper, Asdrubali et al. (1996) fully decompose the fiscal channel into the 
respective sub-items by separating the impact of (i) federal taxes and social security 
                                                                    
19  Regional primary income is the sum of regional households’ primary income and indirect and corporate 
taxes generated in the respective region. Regional disposable income and regional consumption reflect 
the income and consumption of both households and regional governments in the respective region. 
20  Estimation equations (2) and (3) are estimated using standard pooled OLS with Driscoll and Kraay 
standard errors that account for cross-sectional dependence. 
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contributions, (ii) direct transfers to households including social security payments, 
and (iii) intergovernmental transfers. In the cas  studies presented in Section 4, we 
aim to replicat  this appro ch to the exte t possible f r ur sample cou tries. U l k  
 literature so far, which has typical y focused n individual country cases, we aim to 
provide a consistent cross-country comparison of the quantit tive importance of 
different fiscal channels for cross-regional consumption-smoothing in the event of 
asymmetric shocks. 
Based on the empirical approach described above, differences i regional primary 
income nd regional disposabl  incom , and he ce interregional risk-sharing, mainly 
reflect the redistribution of tax revenues and social security contributions via 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers and direct federal transfers paid to households. As 
highlighted in the literature (see, for example, Dullien (2019)), it is important to be 
aware that the approach adopted by Asdrubali et al. (1996) does not capture regional 
income stabilisation effects via direct federal spending, except in the case of social 
transfers (e.g. investment or subsidies). Moreover, as highlighted above, it only 
captures the smoothing of asymmetric economic shocks. The impact of fiscal 
stabilisation of aggregate macroeconomic shocks affecting the entire federation by 
means of discretionary federal policy measures, for example, is not reflected. 
3.1 Economic efficiency 
While intergovernmental transfers financed by central government revenue can help 
to smooth business cycles across regions, such transfers may also have an adverse 
impact on economic efficiency at the sub-national level. Concretely, multi-tiered 
governments may face problems of moral hazard if regional governments can finance 
their spending out of a common pool of resources, particularly if net transfers become 
permanent (see Section 2.3.2). Strong transfer dependency or vertical imbalances 
tend to undermine fiscal discipline and can result in an excessive accumulation of debt 
in the presence of implicit bailout expectations (see, for example, Rodden (2002)). 
Eyraud and Lusine (2013) argue that a vertical fiscal imbalance exists if own spending 
(i.e. total spending net of transfers paid) exceeds own revenues (i.e. total revenues 
minus transfers received). The theoretical literature suggests that such vertical 
imbalances may reduce the incentives for sub-national governments to raise 
distortionary taxes while increasing incentives to spend. Such incentives are typically 
related to the presence of common pools and the failure of sub-national policymakers 
to fully internalise the externalities on other jurisdictions. Moreover, strong transfer 
dependency – which may also reflect regional income inequality – is typically 
associated with soft budget constraints and hence weak incentives for own financial 
responsibility in the presence of bailout expectations. 
Government finance statistics data provide a rich set of indicators at the sub-national 
level measuring the degree of revenue and expenditure decentralisation as well as 
intergovernmental transfers and sub-national deficit and debt levels. These can be 
complemented by data from the OECD fiscal decentralisation database on 
Interregional risk-sharing mainly 
reflects intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers and direct federal transfers 
to households. 
Strong transfer dependency and 
vertical fiscal imbalances may 
undermine economic efficiency due 
to weakened incentives for fiscal 
discipline at the sub-national level. 
Government finance statistics and 
the OECD decentralisation 
database can be used to quantify 
and assess vertical fiscal 
imbalances across countries. 
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sub-national tax autonomy to provide an overview of fiscal-federal structures.21 The 
country case studies in Section 4 provide information on the sub-federal revenue and 
expenditure structure, the level of sub-national debt and the size of vertical 
imbalances. This quantitative information is complemented by a detailed qualitative 
description of the fiscal-federal system in place in the different countries to present an 
overall assessment of economic efficiency. 
                                                                    
21  See Dougherty et al. (2019) for a recent overview paper. 
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4 Case studies 
4.1 Austria 
4.1.1 Fiscal-federal structure 
Austria is a federal country with nine provinces, one of which, covering the capital 
Vienna, is a city-province. The other eight provinces comprise about 2,100 
municipalities, with which they are heavily interconnected on a financial and regulatory 
level (so it makes sense to consolidate the province and municipal level as done in 
Table 2). Table 2 shows that the vertical imbalance in Austrian fiscal federalism is 
particularly large.22 The share of the provinces and municipalities in consolidated 
government expenditure is relatively large due to their tasks in the areas of hospitals, 
education (elementary, primary and lower secondary), social protection (long-term 
care, basic social assistance) and infrastructure. At the same time, their share in 
consolidated revenue is small as tax revenue decentralisation is extremely low in 
Austria, and even within these small non-federal taxes, there is little tax autonomy. 
This set-up is heavily criticised by fiscal experts (from both Austria and international 
organisations), as it leads to misaligned incentives for provincial governments. 
Table 2 
Fiscal decentralisation in Austria 
  1999 2017 Change 
Fiscal decentralisation indicators (province and local gov. consolidated) 
Revenue decentralisation (%)1) 10.0 10.0 0.0 
Tax revenue decentralisation (%)2) 7.0 6.3 -0.7 
   based on tax-setting autonomy (%) 1.6 1.5 -0.1 
Expenditure decentralisation (%)1) 30.9 31.8 0.9 
Vertical imbalance (% of GDP)3) 11.2 10.8 -0.4 
Vertical imbalance (% of own expenditure)3) 69.3 69.0 -0.3 
Sub-national public finances (province and local gov. consolidated) 
debt (% GDP)4) 6.0 9.9 3.9 
   mean5) (% of regional GDP) n.a. 10.3 n.a. 
   range (% of regional GDP) n.a. 17.2 n.a. 
   variation coefficient (% of regional GDP) n.a. 0.6 n.a. 
Source: National statistics. 
1) Share of consolidated revenue (expenditure) of province and local government in total revenue (expenditure) of general government. 
Based on national accounts. 
2) Share of province and local government tax revenue in total federal, province and local government tax revenue. Tax-setting 
autonomy: share of revenue from province and local government taxes for which the tax rates are set autonomously. Based on 
government finance statistics. 
3) Transfers received by consolidated province and local government from central government and social security. Based on national 
accounts. 
4) Debt of province and local government incurred with the public and non-public sector. Based on national annual debt statistics. 
5) Not population-weighted. 
                                                                    
22  When calculating the tax revenue of provinces and municipalities based on tax-setting power, the vertical 
imbalance becomes even larger as the tax rate of by far most important local tax (the municipal payroll 
tax) is set by the federal government. 
Austria’s federal system features 
significant expenditure 
decentralisation, but very little 
revenue decentralisation. 
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4) Debt of province and local government incur d with the public and non-public sect r. Based on national annual debt tatistics. 
5) Not population-weighted. 
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4 Case studies 
4.1 Austria 
4.1.1 Fiscal-federal structure 
Au tria is a f deral coun ry with nine provinces, one of which, covering the capital 
Vienna, is a city-province. The other eight provinces comprise about 2,100 
municipalities, with which they are heavily interconnected on a financial and regulatory 
level (so it makes sense to consolidate the province and municipal level as done in 
Table 2). Table 2 shows that the vertical imbalance in Austrian fiscal federalism is 
particularly large.22 The share of the provinces and municipalities in consolidated 
government expenditure is relatively large due to their tasks in the areas of hospitals, 
education (elementary, primary and lower secondary), social protection (long-term 
care, basic social assistance) and infrastructure. At the same time, their share in 
consolidated revenue is small as tax revenue decentralisation is extremely low in 
Austria, and even within these small non-federal taxes, there is little tax autonomy. 
This set-up is heavily criticised by fiscal experts (from both Austria and international 
organisations), as it leads to misaligned incentives for provincial governments. 
Table 2 
Fiscal decentralisation in Austria 
  1999 2017 Change 
Fiscal decentralisation indicators (province and local gov. consolidated) 
Revenue decentralisation (%)1) 10.0 10.0 0.0 
Tax revenue decentralisation (%)2) 7.0 6.3 -0.7 
   based on tax-setting autonomy (%) 1.6 1.5 -0.1 
Expenditure decentralisation (%)1) 30.9 31.8 0.9 
Vertical imbalance (% of GDP)3) 11.2 10.8 -0.4 
Vertical imbalance (% of own expenditure)3) 69.3 69.0 -0.3 
Sub-national public finances (province and local gov. consolidated) 
debt (% GDP)4) 6.0 9.9 3.9 
   mean5) (% of regional GDP) n.a. 10.3 n.a. 
   range (% of regional GDP) n.a. 17.2 n.a. 
   variation coefficient (% of regional GDP) n.a. 0.6 n.a. 
Source: National statistics. 
1) Share of c solid ted revenue (expenditure) of province and local government in total revenue (expenditure) of general government. 
Based on national accounts. 
2) Share of province and local government tax revenue in total federal, province and local government tax revenue. Tax-setting 
autonomy: share of revenue from province nd local government taxes for which the tax rates are set autonomously. Based on 
govern ent finance statistics. 
3) Transfers received by con olidated province and local government from central government and social security. Based on national 
accounts. 
4) Debt of province and local government incurred with the public and non-public sector. Based on national annual debt statistics. 
5) Not p pulation-weighted. 
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The Austrian fiscal rules framework is set by the “Österreichischer Stabilitätspakt”. 
This intergovernmental agreement between the federal government and the nine 
provincial governments specifies structural balance targets for the federal government 
(including social security funds), for each provincial government and (implicitly) for the 
sum of municipal governments province by province. It also aims to break down the 
other EU fiscal rules across the different levels of government. There is neither a 
no-bailout clause nor an explicit bailout obligation for the federal government in the 
Austrian constitution. However, the constitution does state that the different levels of 
government should not be overburdened in fulfilling their tasks, which can be 
interpreted as obliging the federal government not to neglect provinces facing financial 
difficulties. However, this does not necessarily imply complete bailouts (as was shown 
in the recent case of the province of Carinthia23). 
4.1.2 Mechanisms for stabilisation and convergence 
Transfers from the federal government and from health insurance funds are the main 
sources of finance for provinces and municipalities. These vertical transfers consist of 
the following three major components: 
Table 3 
Overview of intergovernmental transfer schemes in Austria 
  
Intergovern- 
mental transfers 
(total) 
Sharing of federal 
tax revenue 
Other federal 
transfers to 
provinces and 
municipalities 
Transfers by 
health insurance 
funds for hospital 
funding 
Macroeconomic objective/effect  Risk sharing/ 
convergence 
Risk sharing/ 
convergence 
Risk sharing/ 
convergence 
Activation trigger  Largely based on 
population size 
(permanent) 
Expenditure on 
salaries and 
pensions of state 
teachers, hospitals, 
long-term care 
(permanent) 
Transfers 
according to 
predefined keys 
(permanent) 
Transfer direction  Vertical Vertical Vertical 
Size     
   Formula/total available funds (% of GDP) 10.8%1) 
(2017) 
6.7%1) 
(2017) 
2.7% 
(2017) 
1.5% 
(2017) 
   Realised transfers (% of GDP)2) 0.3% 
(2017) 
0.2% 
(2017) 
0.1% 
(2017) 
0.1% 
(2017) 
Source: Own calculations based on national statistics and Ministry of Finance data. 
1) This figure differs from national accounts, largely because we excluded the tax on property transactions (0.3% of GDP in 2017), which 
is collected by federal government but shared among municipalities according to locally generated revenue. 
2) The sum of realised transfers is smaller than the sum of individual schemes as some provinces are net payers in the first scheme but 
net recipients in the second scheme. 
The federal government controls all major taxes and social security contributions in 
Austria, and also collects most of them. (Social security contributions are mainly 
collected by health insurance funds.) However, it automatically shares most taxes in 
                                                                    
23  In 2016 it seemed likely that guarantees granted by the provincial government of Carinthia on the debt of 
a failing bad bank would be called in. As a full call would have put substantial strain on Carinthia’s public 
finances, holders of guaranteed debt instruments of this bad bank were offered a deal under which only 
parts of their claims were honoured. The budgetary costs of this deal (i.e. the difference between the 
payouts to creditors and the receipts from the bad bank) were shared between the province of Carinthia 
and the federal government. 
Budgetary framework: fiscal rules 
and bailouts 
Federal transfers are the main 
source of revenue for provinces and 
municipalities. 
The largest intergovernmental 
schemes are based on sharing 
federal tax revenue. 
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the narrow sense (i.e. excluding social security contributions) with provinces and 
municipalities according to predefined keys, with the latter two receiving about 
one-third of each of personal and corporate income tax, VAT, excise duties, insurance 
taxes and motor vehicle tax. The horizontal distribution among provinces and 
municipalities is mostly based on pop lation size. The exact parameters are specified 
by a temporary law (“Finanzausgleichsgesetz”) which is renegotiated every five years. 
On top of this revenue-sharing according to population size, the federal government 
also gives additional grants to provinces and municipalities according to their needs in 
specific predefined areas. Most importantly, the federal government funds the salaries 
and pensions of state-employed teachers. Furthermore, it co-finances expenditure for 
refugee accommodation and to a smaller extent also for long-term care and hospitals 
(including refunds of input VAT incurred in the latter two areas). In the late 2000s there 
was a reduction in these transfers (especially in the areas of transport and housing), 
which was compensated by a higher explicit share in tax revenue collected federally. 
Most of these transfers are also specified in the temporary law governing 
revenue-sharing. There are also small federal transfers (of about 0.01% of GDP per 
year) targeted at municipalities with particularly low revenue per capita. 
In Austria, provincial governments are responsible for running and financing 
hospitals.24 Both the federal government (see above) and the public health insurance 
funds grant transfers to provinces as compensation for this activity. The transfers by 
the health insurance funds are specified by law and far larger than those from the 
federal government. Their overall size depends on the development in revenue from 
health insurance contributions; and their distribution among provinces is largely based 
on predefined percentages, which broadly correspond to population shares from the 
1990s.25 
4.1.3 Macroeconomic structure and budgetary impacts 
Data on the macroeconomic structure of Austrian regions are available from regional 
economic accounts, where the nine federal provinces are classified as NUTS2 
regions. Table 4a indicates that, in 2017, the discrepancies in regional households’ 
primary incomes (coefficient of variation of 6%) are far smaller than in gross regional 
products (coefficient of variation of 16%), which is due in part to the large number of 
inter-province commuters. The coefficient of variation of regional disposable incomes 
is even smaller, as the provinces with lower primary per capita incomes tend to have a 
higher share of pensioners in the population. 
Since 2000, the coefficients of variation have decreased for all income-related 
variables and increased for regional unemployment. This is largely due to relatively 
poor economic performance in the city-province of Vienna, where the unemployment 
rate rose from about 3 percentage points above the Austrian average in 2000 to 
                                                                    
24  In six of the nine Austrian provinces, there are also public hospitals operated by religious organisations, 
but these are also largely financed by provincial governments. 
25  This holds except for the three provinces covering the greater Vienna area. The city of Vienna receives 
higher transfers compared to its population share, while the two provinces covering Vienna’s suburbs 
and exurbs (Lower Austria and Burgenland) receive lower transfers. 
The federal government also 
provides substantial transfers for 
co-financing specific provincial 
spending. 
Financing of provincial hospitals is 
also largely based on 
intergovernmental transfers. 
Differences in GDP per capita are 
sizeable while disposable incomes 
are relatively close. 
Regional inequality has decreased 
since 2000. 
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net recipients in the second scheme. 
The federal government controls all major taxes and social security contributions in 
Austria, and also collects most of them. (Social security contributions are mainly 
collected by health insurance funds.) However, it automatically shares most taxes in 
                                                                    
23  In 2016 it seemed likely that guarantees granted by the provincial government of Carinthia on the debt of 
a failing bad bank would be called in. As a full call would have put substantial strain on Carinthia’s public 
finances, holders of guaranteed debt instruments of this bad bank were offered a deal under which only 
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the narrow sense (i.e. excluding social security contributions) with provinces and 
municipalities according to predefined keys, with the latter two receiving about 
one-third of each of personal and corporate income tax, VAT, excise duties, insurance 
taxes and motor vehicle tax. The horizontal distribution among provinces and 
municipalities is mostly based on population size. The exact parameters are specified 
by a temporary law (“Finanzausgleichsgesetz”) which is renegotiated every five years. 
On top of this revenue-sharing according to population size, the federal government 
also gives additional grants to provinces and municipalities according to their needs in 
specific predefined areas. Most importantly, the federal government funds the salaries 
and pensions of state-employed teachers. Furthermore, it co-finances expenditure for 
refugee accommodation and to a smaller extent also for long-term care and hospitals 
(including refunds of input VAT incurred in the latter two areas). In the late 2000s there 
was a reduction in these transfers (especially in the areas of transport and housing), 
which was compensated by a higher explicit share in tax revenue collected federally. 
Most of these transfers are also specified in the temporary law governing 
revenue-sharing. There are also small federal transfers (of about 0.01% of GDP per 
year) targeted at municipalities with particularly low revenue per capita. 
In Austria, provincial governments are responsible for running and financing 
hospitals.24 Both the federal government (see above) and the public health insurance 
funds grant transfers to provinces as compensation for this activity. The transfers by 
the health insurance funds are specified by law and far larger than those from the 
federal government. Their overall size depends on the development in revenue from 
health insurance contributions; and their distribution among provinces is largely based 
on predefined percentages, which broadly correspond to population shares from the 
1990s.25 
4.1.3 Macroeconomic structure and budgetary impacts 
Data on the macroeconomic structure of Austrian regions are available from regional 
economic accounts, where the nine federal provinces are classified as NUTS2 
regions. Table 4a indicates that, in 2017, the discrepancies in regional households’ 
primary incomes (coefficient of variation of 6%) are far smaller than in gross regional 
products (coefficient of variation of 16%), which is due in part to the large number of 
inter-province commuters. The coefficient of variation of regional disposable incomes 
is even smaller, as the provinces with lower primary per capita incomes tend to have a 
higher share of pensioners in the population. 
Since 2000, the coefficients of variation have decreased for all income-related 
variables and increased for regional unemployment. This is largely due to relatively 
poor economic performance in the city-province of Vienna, where the unemployment 
rate rose from about 3 percentage points above the Austrian average in 2000 to 
                                                                    
24  In six of the nine Austrian provinces, there are also public hospitals operated by religious organisations, 
but these are also largely financed by provincial governments. 
25  This holds except for the three provinces covering the greater Vienna area. The city of Vienna receives 
higher transfers compared to its population share, while the two provinces covering Vienna’s suburbs 
and exurbs (Lower Austria and Burgenland) receive lower transfers. 
The federal government also 
provides substantial transfers for 
co-financing specific provincial 
spending. 
Financing of provincial hospitals is 
also largely based on 
intergovernmental transfers. 
Differences in GDP per capita are 
sizeable while disposable incomes 
are relatively close. 
Regional inequality has decreased 
since 2000. 
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5 percentage points above average in 2017. Furthermore, while starting from a very 
high level in 2000, per capita conomic growth in Vienna has been the lowest by a 
very large margin. Vienna had by far the highest income per capita in 2000, while per 
capita GDP ha moved much closer to th  Austrian average, and disposable and 
primary income are now somewhat below average. 
Variations in gross regional product per capita (see Table C) and the size of the 
inter ove nm ntal sch mes (about 11% of GDP)26 are both relatively large. However, 
as tax collection has mostly been attributed to regions based on households’ primary 
income (social security contributions and direct taxes by households, payroll taxes) 
and disposable income (consumption-related taxes), the amount of redistribution 
induced by the intergovernmental schemes (see Table B) is rather low (around 0.3% 
of GDP). One further reason for this is that there are some mechanisms leading to 
higher per capita transfers to high-income provinces. Most importantly, federal 
transfers related to revenue-sharing are partly based on negotiated percentages 
(“Fixschlüssel”), which tend to be above population shares for provinces with higher 
GDP per capita. Furthermore, federal transfers to municipalities are largely based on 
the “abgestufter Bevölkerungsschlüssel”, which explicitly allows for relatively higher 
per capita transfers to larger municipalities. 
                                                                    
26  To date, no study on fiscal risk-sharing for Austria has been published. The data and analysis in this 
section are based on a companion paper by Reiss (forthcoming). 
Due to low inequality in provinces’ 
primary incomes, redistribution via 
the intergovernmental schemes is 
small. 
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Table 4 
Economic performance and fiscal risk sharing in Austria 
a) Economic performance (interprovincial variation) in Austria 
 
2000 2017 2000-2017 (average) 
Mean4) Range5) CV6) Mean4) Range5) CV6) Mean4) CC7) 
Nominal GDP per capita (EUR) 25,657 19,795 0.21 41,328 20,127 0.16  
 Nominal primary income per capita (EUR) 17,742 4,500 0.08 26,468 5,512 0.06  
 Nominal disposable income per capita (EUR) 15,715 3,021 0.06 23,491 2,358 0.03  
 Real GDP growth per capita (%)1) 1.2 3.5 0.88 2.2 4.1 0.58 1.1 0.82
Real private consumption growth per capita (%)1) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Unemployment rate (%)2) 4.3 4.7 0.33 4.9 7.3 0.43 5.1 0.64 
b) Share of GDP shocks smoothed by fiscal channel over the period 2000-2017 in Austria3) 
Total government 8.0 
(1.8) 
***   
Federal taxes/social contributions 2.9 
(1.2) 
**   
Federal social benefits 2.4 
(0.6) 
***   
   of which: pensions 0.6 
(0.7) 
   
   of which: unemployment benefits 0.8 
(0.6) 
   
Intergovernmental transfers 1.6 
(0.9) 
*   
   Sharing of federal tax revenue 1.8 
(0.7) 
**   
   Other federal transfers to provinces and municipalities -0.5 
(0.7) 
   
   Transfers by health insurance funds for hospitals 0.4 
(0.1) 
***   
Sources: Statistics Austria, own computations. 
1) Calculations based on province-specific chain price indices. Real GDP growth available from 2001 only. 
2) As a % of dependent labour force. 
3) New calculations based on Asdrubali et al. (1996). 
4) Not population-weighted. 
5) Difference between largest and smallest value. 
6) Coefficient of variation (= standard deviation divided by mean). 
7) Mean of provinces' correlation coefficients 2000-2017 (correlation between individual province and total figures). 
Table 4b shows that about 8% of GDP shocks are smoothed via fiscal channels, most 
importantly federal taxes and social benefits. Among the intergovernmental schemes, 
the federal revenue-sharing scheme contributes the most to risk-sharing because 
transfers remain relatively stable, while contributions to the common federal pool vary 
with income. While the city-province of Vienna still receives the highest transfers per 
capita out f revenue-sharing, renegotiations of these schemes in the 2000s have led
to a weaker increase in per capita transfers to Vienna than to the other provinces. As 
economic growth has been much weaker in Vienna at the same time, econometric 
estimates of risk-sharing may underestimate the current amount of fiscal risk-sharing 
between the Austrian provinces. 
The estimated extent of fiscal risk-sharing is not particularly large in Austria, but the 
vertical fiscal imbalance is very sizeable. This goes hand-in-hand with misaligned 
incentives for provinces and municipalities. However, the fiscal set-up is successful in 
Fiscal risk-sharing is primarily driven 
by federal taxes and social benefits. 
Conclusion: Estimated fiscal 
risk-sharing is not particularly large, 
despite the very sizeable vertical 
fiscal imbalance. 
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5 percentage points above average in 2017. Furthermore, while starting from a very 
high level in 2000, per capita economic growth in Vienna has been the lowest by a 
very large margin. Vienna had by far the highest income per capita in 2000, while per 
capita GDP has moved much closer to the Austrian average, and disposable and 
primary income are now somewhat below average. 
Variations in gross regional product per capita (see Table C) and the size of the 
intergovernmental schemes (about 11% of GDP)26 are both relatively large. However, 
as tax collection has mostly been attributed to regions based on households’ primary 
income (social security contributions and direct taxes by households, payroll taxes) 
and disposable income (consumption-related taxes), the amount of redistribution 
induced by the intergovernmental schemes (see Table B) is rather low (around 0.3% 
of GDP). One further reason for this is that there are some mechanisms leading to 
higher per capita transfers to high-income provinces. Most importantly, federal 
transfers related to revenue-sharing are partly based on negotiated percentages 
(“Fixschlüssel”), which tend to be above population shares for provinces with higher 
GDP per capita. Furthermore, federal transfers to municipalities are largely based on 
the “abgestufter Bevölkerungsschlüssel”, which explicitly allows for relatively higher 
per capita transfers to larger municipalities. 
                                                                    
26  To date, no study on fiscal risk-sharing for Austri  has been published. The data and analysis in this 
section are based on a companion paper by Reiss (forthcoming). 
Due to low inequality in provinces’ 
primary incomes, redistribution via 
the intergovernmental schemes is 
small. 
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high level in 2000, per capita economic growth in Vienna has been the lowest by a 
very large margin. Vienna had by far the highest income per capita in 2000, while per 
capita GDP has moved much closer to the Austrian average, and disposable and 
primary income are now somewhat below average. 
Variations in gross regional product per capita (see Table C) and the size of the 
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reducing regional inequality: while variations in regional GDP are about as large as in 
the United States, variations in disposable household incomes are far smaller. 
4.2 Belgium 
4.2.1 The federal structure 
Since 1970 the Belgian administrative system has evolved into a federal structure with 
three communities and three regions. The Flemish, Walloon and Brussels Capital 
Regi ns are territ rially defined entities wit  pow rs in uch spheres as town and 
country planning, housing, the environment, public works, supervision of lower level 
authorities and certain aspects of agriculture, energy, transport, employment and 
economic policy. The Flemish, French and German-speaking communities, 
comprising the population of the Dutch, French and German-language areas, mainly 
have powers relating to subjects concerning people, such as education, culture, 
welfare and certain aspects of health policy. In Flanders, the community and regional 
institutions have been merged. 
In 2014 the federal Parliament agreed on the sixth reform of the Belgian State, which 
came into force in 2015. From an economic and budgetary point of view, the two most 
important aspects of this reform are the transfer of new powers from the federal level 
to the communities and regions and the revision of the Special Finance Act for the 
Communities and Regions. The transfer of new powers has an estimated size of 
around 4.4% of GDP. It mainly concerns family allowances and a substantial amount 
of health care and social support, including health care provided to the elderly, for the 
communities; the regions mainly received more control over specific wage subsidies 
and tax expenditures on housing. The new financing law resulted, among other things, 
in a substantial increase in tax autonomy for the regions, which gained control over 
about a quarter of personal income tax revenues (some 2.5% of GDP), in the form of 
“extended” regional additional percentages. 
Belgium’s regional structure 
consists of communities, defined by 
language, and regions, defined by 
territory. 
The sixth reform of the Belgian State 
substantially increased regional 
spending and taxation powers. 
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Table 5 
Economic efficiency in Belgium 
  1999 2017 Change 
Fiscal decentralisation indicators (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Revenue decentralisation (%)1) 14.5 23.6 9.2 
Tax revenue decentralisation (%)2) 7.4 16.0 8.6 
   based on tax-setting autonomy (%) 6.5 15.4 9.0 
Expenditure decentralisation (%)1) 35.3 46.0 10.7 
Vertical imbalance (% of GDP)3) 10.9 12.0 1.1 
Vertical imbalance (% of regional and local gov. expend.)3) 61.9 50.0 -11.9 
Sub-national public finances (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Debt (% of GDP)4) 18.1 18.4 0.3 
   Mean5) 16.0 20.6 4.6 
   Range6) 10.9 20.8 9.9 
   Coefficient of variation 0.31 0.47 0.16 
Source: National statistics. 
1) Share of consolidated revenue (expenditure) of regional and local government in total revenue (expenditure) of general government 
(incl. social security). Based on national accounts. 
2) Share of regional and local government tax revenue in total federal, regional and local government tax revenue. Tax-setting autonomy: 
share of revenue from regional and local government taxes for which the tax rates are set autonomously. Based on OECD tax autonomy 
indicator categories a and b1 for 1995 (in 1999 column) and 2014 (in 2017 column). 
3) Transfers received by consolidated regional and local government from central government and social security. Based on national 
accounts. 
4) Debt of regional and local government incurred with the public and non-public sector. Based on national annual debt statistics. Local 
debt distributed according to regional GDP by assumption. 
5) Not population-weighted. 
6) Difference between maximum and minimum region. 
The regions, communities and local government are together responsible for 46% of 
general government spending, half of which is financed by own revenues (see 
Table 5). On the revenue side, apart from their share in personal income tax revenues, 
the regions have tax (and tax-setting) autonomy over registration fees, inheritance 
taxes, motor vehicle duty, environmental levies and various other taxes. Local 
government has almost full tax-setting autonomy over its own tax revenues, which 
mainly consists of the additional percentages on personal income tax, which are levied 
at the federal and regional level, and percentages added to the property tax, which are 
levied at the regional level. Besides the own revenues, financing of regions and 
communities and the local government comes from transfers of tax receipts and 
current and capital transfers from central government (i.e. federal government and 
social security), amounting to some 12% of GDP. It should be noted that some of the 
transfers of tax receipts (some 3% of GDP) are distributed according to the regions’ 
respective contributions (see below). 
The cooperation agreement of December 2013 between the federal State and the 
communities and regions transposes the European Fiscal Compact into Belgian law 
and stipulates that the general government budget must be in balance or surplus. 
Each year, following advice from Belgium’s High Council of Finance, the Consultative 
Committee of the federal government and the governments of the regions and 
communities must agree on an allocation of the annual general government budget 
target across the various levels of power.27 The High Council of Finance is tasked with 
monitoring these decisions and assessing compliance with the commitments given by 
                                                                    
27  It should be noted, though, that no agreement has been reached in any of the years since 2013. 
Regional and local governments are 
responsible for almost half of public 
sector spending in Belgium. 
The budgetary framework requires 
the federal and regional 
governments to agree each year on 
the allocation of the general 
government budget target. 
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the governments. The regions, on their side, have the power to exercise control over 
local government finances. As a result of that regionalisation, different rules and 
standards apply to the municipal accounts in the three regions, but they have the 
equilibrium principle in common. Overall, the regions have strengthened the local 
government budgetary framework in recent years. 
The budgetary framework has resulted in limited shares of sub-national governments 
in general government public debt. In 2017 general government debt stood at 103.4% 
of GDP, 13 percentage points of which are liable to the regions and communities and 
5.4 to local authorities. Among the regions, debt, expressed as a share of their own 
GDP, broadly stabilised in the Flemish Region and the Brussels Capital Region, but 
increased by some 10 percentage points in the Walloon Region since 1999, reflecting 
the poorer average annual budgetary performance in this region. 
4.2.2 Mechanisms for macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence 
Transfers from central government to the regions generally are not meant to contribute 
to macroeconomic stabilisation or convergence across regions, except for the 
Solidarity Mechanism (see Table 6). Federal government transfers of tax receipts out 
of federal personal income tax revenues, which were considerably reduced after the 
sixth State reform, are distributed according to the regions’ shares in federal personal 
income tax revenues. As a result, these transfers are conceptually close to own tax 
revenue. Other central government transfers of tax receipts are distributed in part on 
the basis of parameters related to the competences they are supposed to finance 
(such as the number of students for the financing of education spending). Current and 
capital transfers from central government to the regions, communities and local 
government are also intended to finance decentralised competences. For the regions 
and communities, this concerns the transferred envelopes for the new community 
competences since the sixth State reform (such as family allowances and their share 
in health care); for the local governments, it concerns grants for social integration 
allowances and for police and emergency rescue districts. Furthermore, in the case of 
the regions and communities, current transfers statistically also contain notional 
transfers from the federal government for the payment of certain pensions. If the 
transfers from central government cause an unequal per capita distribution across 
regions, which is hardly the case (see Table 5), this does not necessarily contribute to 
interregional stabilisation or convergence. 
The Solidarity Mechanism concerns a vertical transfer in the form of a grant from the 
federal government to the regions where the personal income tax per capita is below 
the national average. The allowance, which was revised in the sixth State reform, 
compensates for 80% of the gap between a region’s share in the population and its 
share in the personal income tax retained at the federal level; it is applied on the 
amount of transfers from central government for which the allocation across regions is 
based on the region’s share in personal income tax28. The mechanism currently 
                                                                    
28  That basic amount is equal to the whole amount covered by the regions’ fiscal autonomy with respect to 
personal income tax, and all or part of the regional and community grants allocated according to the 
personal income tax key. 
The share of sub-national 
governments in total public debt is 
limited. 
Among transfers from central 
government to the regions, only the 
Solidarity Mechanism is meant to 
promote stabilisation and 
convergence. 
The Solidarity Mechanism 
compensates regions with lower 
personal income tax per capita. 
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levied at the regional level. Besides the own revenues, financing of regions and 
communities and the local government comes from transfers of tax receipts and 
current and capital transfers from central government (i.e. federal government and 
social security), amounting to some 12% of GDP. It should be noted that some of the 
transfers of tax receipts (some 3% of GDP) are distributed according to the regions’ 
respective contributions (see below). 
The cooperation agreement of December 2013 between the federal State and the 
communities and regions transposes the European Fiscal Compact into Belgian law 
and stipulates that the general government budget must be in balance or surplus. 
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27  It sh uld be noted, though, that no gr ement has been reached in any of the years sinc  2013. 
Regional and local governments are 
responsible for almost half of public 
sector spending in Belgium. 
The budgetary framework requires 
the federal and regional 
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government budget target. 
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the governments. The regions, on their side, have the power to exercise control over 
local government finances. As a result of that regionalisation, different rules and 
standards apply to the municipal accounts in the three regions, but they have the 
equilibrium principle in common. Overall, the regions have strengthened the local 
government budgetary framework in recent years. 
The budgetary framework has resulted in limited shares of sub-national governments 
in general government public debt. In 2017 general government debt stood at 103.4% 
of GDP, 13 percentage points of which are liable to the regions and communities and 
5.4 to local authorities. Among the regions, debt, expressed as a share of their own 
GDP, broadly stabilised in the Flemish Region and the Brussels Capital Region, but 
increased by some 10 percentage points in the Walloon Region since 1999, reflecting 
the poorer average annual budgetary performance in this region. 
4.2.2 Mechanisms for macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence 
Transfers from central government to the regions generally are not meant to contribute 
to macroeconomic stabilisation or convergence across regions, except for the 
Solidarity Mechanism (see Table 6). Federal government transfers of tax receipts out 
of federal personal income tax revenues, which were considerably reduced after the 
sixth State reform, are distributed according to the regions’ shares in federal personal 
income tax revenues. As a result, these transfers are conceptually close to own tax 
revenue. Other central government transfers of tax receipts are distributed in part on 
the basis of parameters related to the competences they are supposed to finance 
(such as the number of students for the financing of education spending). Current and 
capital transfers from central government to the regions, communities and local 
government are also intended to finance decentralised competences. For the regions 
and communities, this concerns the transferred envelopes for the new community 
competences since the sixth State reform (such as family allowances and their share 
in health care); for the local governments, it concerns grants for social integration 
allowances and for police and emergency rescue districts. Furthermore, in the case of 
the regions and communities, current transfers statistically also contain notional 
transfers from the federal government for the payment of certain pensions. If the 
transfers from central government cause an unequal per capita distribution across 
regions, which is hardly the case (see Table 5), this does not necessarily contribute to 
interregional stabilisation or convergence. 
The Solidarity Mechanism concerns a vertical transfer in the form of a grant from the 
federal government to the regions where the personal income tax per capita is below 
the national average. The allowance, which was revised in the sixth State reform, 
compensates for 80% of the gap between a region’s share in the population and its 
share in the personal income tax retained at the federal level; it is applied on the 
amount of transfers from central government for which the allocation across regions is 
based on the region’s share in personal income tax28. The mechanism currently 
                                                                    
28  That basic amount is equal to the whole amount covered by the regions’ fiscal autonomy with respect to 
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limited. 
Among transfers from central 
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Solidarity Mechanism is meant to 
promote stabilisation and 
convergence. 
The Solidarity Mechanism 
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results in an interregional transfer of 0.2% of GDP to the Walloon Region and the 
Brussels Capital Region. 
By far the biggest contribution to macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence 
across regions comes from c ntral government taxes and unemployment benefits.29 
The automatic stabilisers at the central government level are by far the main source of 
stabilisation and convergence across regions. The Flemish Region, which has 
relatively high income per capita, contributes more than the other regions in personal 
income tax revenues, social security contributions and indirect taxes. Regarding 
corporate income tax s, the Brussels Capital Region, whose central geographical 
location and capital status attract many businesses pursuing a wide range of 
economic activities, is the biggest per capita contributor. The Walloon Region is by far 
the largest recipient of the 1.9% of interregional transfers originating from federal 
taxes, coming from the Flemish Region. These transfers from the Flemish to the 
Walloon Region are seen as permanent, meaning that, besides stabilising the cycle, 
they also reduce income divergence across regions. Unemployment benefits, also 
organised at the central government level, play a similar role, albeit on a smaller scale. 
Table 6 
Overview of interregional transfers in Belgium 
  
Central 
government 
taxes 
Central 
government 
unemployment 
benefits 
Central 
government 
transfers - 
federal tax 
receipts 
(excluding 
Solidarity 
Mechanism) 
Central 
government 
transfers - 
Solidarity 
Mechanism 
Central 
government 
transfers - 
current and 
capital 
transfers 
Distribution key Differences in 
per capita 
financial 
capacities 
Differences in 
unemployment 
Partly regional 
contribution to 
federal tax, 
partly 
parameters 
related to 
regional 
competences 
Differences in 
personal 
income tax per 
capita 
Parameters 
related to 
regional 
competences 
Transfer direction Vertical Vertical   Vertical   
Size           
   Formula/total available funds (% of GDP) 37.2% 1.2% 6.6% 0.3% 1.3% 
   Realised net transfers (% of GDP) 1.9% n.a. 0.1% 0.2% n.a. 
 
4.2.3 The macroeconomic structure 
The three Belgian regions feature significant and structural socioeconomic disparities 
(see Table 6). While the Flemish Region broadly represents the national average, 
nominal value added per capita was 70% above the average in the Brussels Capital 
Region in 2017 and 30% below it in the Walloon Region. The dominant position of the 
Brussels Capital Region was even more marked in the past. However, the distribution 
of value added per capita is not a good indicator for the distribution of income per 
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estimates for the degree of interregional fiscal risk-sharing. 
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the governments. The regions, on their side, have the power to exercise control over 
local government finances. As a result of that regionalisation, different rules and 
standards apply to the municipal accounts in the three regions, but they have the 
equilibrium principle in common. Overall, the regions have strengthened the local 
government budgetary framework in recent years. 
The budgetary framework has resulted in limited shares of sub-national governments 
in general government public debt. In 2017 general government debt stood at 103.4% 
of GDP, 13 percentage points of which are liable to the regions and communities and 
5.4 to local authorities. Among the regions, debt, expressed as a share of their own 
GDP, broadly stabilised in the Flemish Region and the Brussels Capital Region, but 
increased by some 10 percentage points in the Walloon Region since 1999, reflecting 
the poorer average annual budgetary performance in this region. 
4.2.2 Mechanisms for macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence 
Transfers fro  cent al government t  the regions generally are not meant to contribute 
to macroeconomic stabilisation or convergence across regions, except for the 
Solidarity Mechanism (see Table 6). Federal government transfers of tax receipts out 
of federal personal income tax revenues, which were considerably reduced after the 
sixth State reform, are distributed according to the regions’ shares in federal personal 
income tax revenues. As a result, these transfers are conceptually close to own tax 
revenue. Other central government transfers of tax receipts are distributed in part on 
the basis of parameters related to the competences they are supposed to finance 
(such as the number of students for the financing of education spending). Current and 
capital transfers from central government to the regions, communities and local 
government are also intended to finance decentralised competences. For the regions 
and communities, this concerns the transferred envelopes for the new community 
competences since the sixth State reform (such as family allowances and their share 
in health care); for the local governments, it concerns grants for social integration 
allowances and for police and emergency rescue districts. Furthermore, in the case of 
the regions and communities, current transfers statistically also contain notional 
transfers from the federal government for the payment of certain pensions. If the 
transfers from central government cause an unequal per capita distribution across 
regions, which is hardly the case (see Table 5), this does not necessarily contribute to 
interregional stabilisation or convergence. 
Th  Solidarity Mech nism concerns a v rtical transfer in the form of a grant from the 
federal government to the regions where the personal income tax per capita is below 
the national average. The allowance, which was revised in the sixth State refor , 
compensates for 80% of the gap between a region’s share in the population and its 
share in the personal income tax retained at the federal level; it is applied on the 
amount of transfers from central government for which the allocation across regions is 
based on the region’s share in personal income tax28. The mechanism currently 
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the governments. The regions, on their side, have the power to exercise control over 
local government finances. As a result of that regionalisation, different rules and 
standards apply to the municipal accounts in the three regions, but they have the 
equilibrium principle in common. Overall, the regions have strengthened the local 
government budgetary framework in recent ye rs. 
The budgetary framework has resulted in limited shares of sub-national governments 
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4.2.2 Mechanisms for macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence 
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Solidarity Mechanism (see Table 6). Federal government transfers of tax receipts out 
of federal personal income tax revenues, which were considerably reduced after the 
sixth State reform, are distributed according t  the regions’ shares in federal personal 
income tax revenues. As a result, these transf rs are conceptually close to own tax 
revenue. Other central government transfers of tax receipts are di tributed in part n 
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transf rs from the fed ral government for the payment of certain pensions. If the 
transfers from central g vernment cause an unequal per capita distribution acr ss 
regions, which is hardly the case (see Tabl  5), this does not necessarily contribut  to 
interregional stabilisatio  or convergence. 
The Solidarity Mechanism concerns a vertical transfer in the form of a grant from the 
federal government to the regions where the personal income tax per capita is below 
the national average. The allowance, which was revised in the sixth State reform, 
compensates for 80% of the gap between a region’s share in the population and its 
s are in the personal income tax retained at the fed ral lev l; it is applied on the 
amount of tra sf rs from central government for which the alloc tion a ross regions is 
based on the r gion’s s are in personal income tax28. The m chanism curr ntly 
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the governments. The regions, on their side, have the power to exercise control over 
local government finances. As a result of that regionalisation, different rules and 
standards apply to the municipal accounts in the three regions, but they have the 
equilibrium pri ciple in co mon. Overall, the regions have strengthened the local 
governm nt budgetary framework in recent years. 
The budgetary fra ework has resulted in limited shares of sub-national governments 
in general government public debt. In 2017 general government debt stood at 103.4% 
of GDP, 13 percentage points of which are liable to the regions and communities and 
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GDP, b oadly stabilised in the Flemish Region and the Brussels Capital Region, but 
increased by some 10 percentage points in the Walloon Region since 1999, reflecti g
the poorer average annual budgetary performanc  in thi  region.
4.2.2 Mechanisms for macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence 
Transfers from central government to the regions generally are not meant to contribute 
to macroeconomic stabilisation or convergence across regions, except for the 
Solidarity Mechanism (see Table 6). Federal government transfers of tax receipts out 
of federal personal income tax r venues, which were considerably r duced afte  the 
sixth Stat  ref rm, are di tributed according to the regions’ shar s in federal personal 
income tax revenues. As a result, thes  transfers are conceptually close to own tax 
rev nue. Other central governm nt transfers of tax re eipts a e distrib ted in part on 
the basis of parameters related to the competences they are supposed to finance 
(such as the numb r of tud nts for the fin cing of ducation spending). Curren  and 
capital transf s from central government to the regions, communities an  local 
govern ent are also intended to finan e decentralised competence . For the regions 
and communities, this concer s the ransferred env lopes f r the ew community 
ompetences since the sixth Stat  reform (such as family allowa c   their share 
in h alth care); for the local governments, it concerns grants for social integration 
llowances and for poli e and emergency rescu  districts. Fu t rmore, in the case of 
the regio s and communities, current transfers statistically also contain no ional 
transfers fro  the federal government for the payment of certain pensions. If the 
transfers from central government cause an unequal per capita distribution across 
regions, which is hardly the case (see T ble 5), this does not ne ess rily contribute to 
interregional stabilisation or convergence. 
The Solidarity Mechanism concerns a vertical transfer in the form of a grant from the 
federal government to the regions where the personal income tax per capita is below 
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compens tes for 80% of the gap betwe n a region’s share in the population and i s 
share in the personal income tax retain d at th  federal level; i  is applied on the 
amount of tr nsfers from central government for which the allocation across regions is 
based on the region’s shar  in personal i come tax28. Th  mechanism currently 
                                                              
28  That basic amount is equal to the whole amount covered by the regions’ fiscal autonomy with respect to 
personal income tax, and all or part of the regional and community grants allocated according to the 
personal income tax key. 
The share of sub-national 
governments in total public debt is 
limited. 
Among transfers fro  central 
government to the regions, only the 
Solidarity Mechanism is meant to 
promote stabilisation and 
convergence. 
The Solidarity Mechanism 
compensates regions with lower 
personal income tax per capita. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2009
 
ECB Occasional Paper Series No 239 / April 2020 
 
26 
results in an interregional transfer of 0.2% of GDP to the Walloon Region and the 
Brussels Capital Region. 
By far the biggest contribution to macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence 
across regions comes from central government taxes and unemployment benefits.29 
The automatic stabilisers at the central government level are by far the main source of 
stabilisation and convergence across regions. The Flemish Region, which has 
relatively high income per capita, contributes more than the other regions in personal 
income tax revenues, social security contributions and indirect taxes. Regarding 
corporate income taxes, the Brussels Capital Region, whose central geographical 
location and capital status attract many businesses pursuing a wide range of 
economic activities, is the biggest per capita contributor. The Walloon Region is by far 
the largest recipient of the 1.9% of interregional transfers originating from federal 
taxes, coming from the Flemish Region. These transfers from the Flemish to the 
Walloon Region are seen as permanent, meaning that, besides stabilising the cycle, 
they also reduce income divergence across regions. Unemployment benefits, also 
organised at the central government level, play a similar role, albeit on a smaller scale. 
Table 6 
Overview of interregional transfers in Belgium 
  
Central 
government 
taxes 
Central 
government 
unemployment 
benefits 
Central 
government 
transfers - 
federal tax 
receipts 
(excluding 
Solidarity 
Mechanism) 
Central 
government 
transfers - 
Solidarity 
Mechanism 
Central 
government 
transfers - 
current and 
capital 
transfers 
Distribution key Differences in 
per capita 
financial 
capacities 
Differences in 
unemployment 
Partly regional 
contribution to 
federal tax, 
partly 
parameters 
related to 
regional 
competences 
Differences in 
personal 
income tax per 
capita 
Parameters 
related to 
regional 
competences 
Transfer direction Vertical Vertical   Vertical   
Size           
   Formula/total available funds (% of GDP) 37.2% 1.2% 6.6% 0.3% 1.3% 
   Realised net transfers (% of GDP) 1.9% n.a. 0.1% 0.2% n.a. 
 
4.2.3 The macroeconomic structure 
The three Belgian regions feature significant and structural socioeconomic disparities 
(see Table 6). While the Flemish Region broadly represents the national average, 
nominal value added per capita was 70% above the average in the Brussels Capital 
Region in 2017 and 30% below it in the Walloon Region. The dominant position of the 
Brussels Capital Region was even more marked in the past. However, the distribution 
of value added per capita is not a good indicator for the distribution of income per 
                                                                    
29  Note that for Belgium – due to the limited number of sub-national jurisdictions – we do not provide 
estimates for the degree of interregional fiscal risk-sharing. 
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capita in the various regions. The concentration of economic activity in the Brussels 
Capital Region depends heavily on the contribution from commuters from the other 
regions, primarily the Flemish. Looking at primary income per capita of households, 
which accounts for cross-border factor incomes, disparities are much lower, though 
still substantial, with Flemish Region residents earning some 9% more than the 
average and Walloon Region residents 13% less. This income divergence has 
increased over time. Disparities between the regions are further eliminated in the 
disposable per capita income figures, with the help of fiscal policy at the central 
government level, due to differences between the regions in per capita contributions to 
federal taxes and per capita receipts of federal or social security transfers. The 
variations in the primary per capita income of households between the regions go 
hand–in-ha d with differences in the labour market situation, as the employment rate 
in the Flemish Region is around 5 percentage points higher than in the Walloon 
Region and some 11 percentage points above the rate in the Brussels Capital Region. 
The Flemish Region has a considerably higher activity rate and much lower 
unemployment than the two other regions. 
At the same time, the three regions largely follow the same economic cycle. This 
results in a high correlation in the growth rates of economic activity per capita. This 
cyclical convergence does not prevent the regions’ economies from growing at 
different rates on average. AvDepoerage growth in economic activity per capita was 
more than 1 percentage point higher than in the Brussels Capital Region than in the 
Flemish Region between 1999 and 2017. Low per capita growth in the Brussels 
Capital Region can be explained by a relatively high increase in population, which is 
not efficiently integrated in the labour market. 
Table 7 
Economic performance (interregional variation) in Belgium 
 
1999 2017 1999-2017 (average) 
Mean4) Range5) 
Coefficient 
of variation Mean4) Range5) 
Coefficient 
of variation Mean4) 
Correlation 
coefficient6) 
Nominal GDP per capita (EUR) 29,685 30,497 0.44 44,258 36,998 0.35 36,971 0.40 
Nominal primary income per 
capita (EUR)1) 17,116 3,473 0.08 23,122 5,253 0.10 20,119 0.09 
Nominal disposable income per 
capita (EUR)1) 13,839 1,853 0.06 18,914 3,113 0.08 16,377 0.07 
Real GDP growth per capita (%)2) 3.37 2.07 0.26 2.88 1.31 0.20 0.93 0.91 
Unemployment rate (%)3) 11.3 10.3 0.38 9.7 10.5 0.44 10.5 0.82 
Source: national statistics. 
1) Regional data for primary/disposable income of households and private consumption only up to 2016. 
2) Calculations based on region-specific chain price indices. 
3) As a % of dependent labour force (unemployed aged 15 or over). Source: Eurostat. 
4) Not population-weighted. 
5) Difference between maximum and minimum region. 
6) Mean of regions' correlation coefficients 1999-2017 (correlation between individual region and total figures). 
In the past 20 years, average growth 
has been more subdued in the 
Brussels Capital Region than the 
other regions. 
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results in an interregional transfer of 0.2% of GDP to the Walloon Region and the 
Brussels Capital Region. 
By far the biggest contribution to macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence 
across regions comes from central government taxes and unemployment benefits.29 
The automatic stabilisers at the central government level are by far the main source of 
stabilisation and convergence across regions. The Flemish Region, which has 
relatively high income per capita, contributes more than the other regions in personal 
income tax revenues, social security contributions and indirect taxes. Regarding 
corporate income taxes, the Brussels Capital Region, whose central geographical 
location and capital status attract many businesses pursuing a wide range of 
economic activities, is the biggest per capita contributor. The Walloon Region is by far 
the largest recipient of the 1.9% of interregional transfers originating from federal 
taxes, coming from the Flemish Region. These transfers from the Flemish to the 
Walloon Region are seen as permanent, meaning that, besides stabilising the cycle, 
they also reduce income divergence across regions. Unemployment benefits, also 
organised at the central government level, play a similar role, albeit on a smaller scale. 
Table 6 
Overview of interregional transfers in Belgium 
  
Central 
government 
taxes 
Central 
government 
unemployment 
benefits 
Central 
gov rnment 
transfers - 
federal tax 
receipts 
(excluding 
Solidarity 
Mechanism) 
Ce tral 
government 
transfers - 
Solidarity 
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Central 
government 
transfers - 
current and 
capital 
transfers 
Distribution key Differences in 
per capita 
financial 
capacities 
Differences in 
unemployment 
Partly regional 
contribution to 
fed al tax, 
partly 
parameters 
related to 
regional 
competences 
Differences in 
personal 
income tax per 
capita 
Parameters 
related to 
regional 
competences 
Transfer direction Vertical Vertical   Vertical   
Size           
   Formula/total available funds (% of GDP) 37.2% 1.2% 6.6% 0.3% 1.3% 
   Realised net transfers (% of GDP) 1.9% n.a. 0.1% 0.2% n.a. 
 
4.2.3 The macroeco omic structure 
The three Belgian regions feature significant and structural socioeconomic disparities 
(see Table 6). While the Flemish Region broadly represents the national average, 
nominal value added per capita was 70% above the average in the Brussels Capital 
Region in 2017 and 30% below it in the Walloon Region. The dominant position of the 
Brussels Capital Region was even more marked in the past. However, the distribution 
of value added per capita is not a good indicator for the distribution of income per 
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results in an interregional transfer of 0.2% of GDP to the Walloon Region and the 
Brussels Capital Region. 
By far the biggest contribution to macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence 
across regions comes from central government taxes and unemployment benefits.29 
The automatic stabilisers at the central government level are by far the main source of 
stabilisation and convergence across regions. The Flemish Region, which has 
relatively high income per capita, contributes more than the other regions in personal 
income tax rev nues, social security c ntributions and ndirect taxes. R garding 
co porat  income taxes, the Brussels Capital Region, whose central g ographical 
location and apital status a tract many businesses pursuing a wide range of 
economic activities, is the biggest per capita contributor. T e Walloon Region is by far 
the largest rec pient of the 1.9% of interregional t ansfers originating from fed ral 
taxes, coming from the Flemish Region. These transfers from the Flemish to the
Wall on Regi n are seen as permanent, meanin  that, be ides stabilisin  the cycle, 
they also reduce income dive gence acros  r gions. Unemployment ben fits, also 
organised t the central government level, play a simila  role, albeit a smaller scale.
Table 6 
Overview of interregional transfers in Belgium 
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Transfer direction Verti al Verti al   Verti al   
Size           
   Formula/total available funds (% of GDP) 37.2% 1.2% 6.6% 0.3% 1.3% 
   Realised net transfers (% of GDP) 1.9% n.a. 0.1% 0.2% n.a. 
 
4.2.3 The macroeconomic structure 
The three Belgian regions feature significant and structural socioeconomic disparities
(see Table 6). While the Flemish Region broadly represents the national average, 
nominal value added per capita was 70% above the average in the Brussels Capital 
Region in 2017 and 30% below it in the Walloon Region. The dominant position of the 
Brussels Capital Region was even more marked in the past. However, the distribution 
of value added per capita is not a good ndicator for the distribution of income e  
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capita in the various regions. The concentration of economic activity in the Brussels 
Capital Region depends heavily on the contribution from commuters from the other 
regions, primarily the Flemish. Looking at primary income per capita of households, 
which accounts for cross-border factor incomes, disparities are much lower, though 
still substantial, with Flemish Region residents earning some 9% more than the 
average and Walloon Region residents 13% less. This income divergence has 
increased over time. Disparities between the regions are further eliminated in the 
disposable per capita income figures, with the help of fiscal policy at the central 
government level, due to differences between the regions in per capita contributions to 
federal taxes and per capita receipts of federal or social security transfers. The 
variations in the primary per capita income of households between the regions go 
hand–in-hand with differences in the labour market situation, as the employment rate 
in the Flemish Region is around 5 percentage points higher than in the Walloon 
Region and some 11 percentage points above the rate in the Brussels Capital Region. 
The Flemish Region has a considerably higher activity rate and much lower 
unemployment than the two other regions. 
At the same time, the three regions largely follow the same economic cycle. This 
results in a high correlation in the growth rates of economic activity per capita. This 
cyclical convergence does not prevent the regions’ economies from growing at 
different rates on average. AvDepoerage growth in economic activity per capita was 
more than 1 percentage point higher than in the Brussels Capital Region than in the 
Flemish Region between 1999 and 2017. Low per capita growth in the Brussels 
Capital Region can be explained by a relatively high increase in population, which is 
not efficiently integrated in the labour market. 
Table 7 
Economic performance (interregional variation) in Belgium 
 
1999 2017 1999-2017 (average) 
Mean4) Range5) 
Coefficient 
of variation Mean4) Range5) 
Coefficient 
of variation Mean4) 
Correlation 
coefficient6) 
Nominal GDP per capita (EUR) 29,685 30,497 0.44 44,258 36,998 0.35 36,971 0.40 
Nominal primary income per 
capita (EUR)1) 17,116 3,473 0.08 23,122 5,253 0.10 20,119 0.09 
Nominal disposable income per 
capita (EUR)1) 13,839 1,853 0.06 18,914 3,113 0.08 16,377 0.07 
Real GDP growth per capita (%)2) 3.37 2.07 0.26 2.88 1.31 0.20 0.93 0.91 
Unemployment rate (%)3) 11.3 10.3 0.38 9.7 10.5 0.44 10.5 0.82 
Source: national statistics. 
1) Regional data for primary/disposable income of households and private consumption only up to 2016. 
2) Calculations based on region-specific chain price indices. 
3) As a % of dependent labour force (unemployed aged 15 or over). Source: Eurostat. 
4) Not population-weighted. 
5) Difference between maximum and minimum region. 
6) Mean of regions' correlation coefficients 1999-2017 (correlation between individual region and total figures). 
In the past 20 years, average growth 
has been more subdued in the 
Brussels Capital Region than the 
other regions. 
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capita in the various regions. The concentration of economic activity in the Brussels 
Capital Region depends heavily on the contribution from commuters from the other 
regions, primarily the Flemish. Looking at primary inco e per capita of households, 
which accounts for cross-border factor incomes, disparities are much lower, though 
still substantial, with Flemish Region residents earning some 9% more than the 
average and Walloon Region residents 13% less. This income divergence has 
increased over time. Disparities between the regions are further eliminated in the 
disposable per capita income figures, with the help of fiscal policy at the central 
government level, due to differences between the regions in per capita contributions to 
federal taxes and per capita receipts of federal or social security transfers. The 
variations in the primary per capita income of households between the regions go 
hand–in-hand with differences in the labour market situation, as the employment rate 
in the Flemish Region is around 5 percentage points higher than in the Walloon 
Region and some 11 percentage points above the rate in the Brussels Capital Region. 
The Flemish Region has a considerably higher activity rate and much lower 
unemployment than the two other regions. 
At the same time, the three regions largely follow the same economic cycle. This 
results in a high correlation in the growth rates of econo ic activity per capita. This 
cyclical convergence does not prevent the regions’ economies from growing at 
different rates on average. AvDepoerage growth in economic activity per capita was 
more than 1 percentage point higher than in the Brussels Capital Region than in the 
Flemish Region between 1999 and 2017. Low per capita growth in the Brussels 
Capital Region can be explained by a relatively high increase in population, which is 
not efficiently integrated in the labour market. 
Table 7 
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Mean4) Range5) 
Coefficient 
of variation Mean4) Range5) 
Coefficient 
of variation Mean4) 
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In the past 20 years, average growth 
has been more subdued in the 
Brussels Capital Region than the 
other regions. 
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4.3 Germany 
4.3.1 Fiscal-federal structure 
In Germany’s federal system, state and local government account for almost 40% of 
general government expenditure and 37% of revenue. The federal states (“Länder”) 
have their own constitutions and large budgetary autonomy, being responsible for 
important areas like education, police, legal protection and public administration 
(including tax offices). Since most federal acts are implemented through state 
administrations and budgets, the states have a significant say in national law-making 
(via the Bundesrat). Their budgets are primarily funded by joint federal taxes – 
personal and corporate income, turnover and withholding taxes – which they share 
with central and local government. However, the individual states enjoy few tax-setting 
powers (only for real estate transfer tax), unlike local governments which have 
significant autonomy regarding property and business taxes (more than 50% of local 
tax revenue). Accounting for tax autonomy, tax revenue decentralisation in Germany 
reduces from 53% to just 10% (see Table 8).30 Transfers received by state and local 
governments from upper government levels represent 1.6% of GDP or 9.3% of their 
consolidated expenditure (vertical imbalance). However, the transfer dependency rate 
(share of transfers from other levels of government in total expenditure) is clearly 
larger for local government (40%) than for state government (14%). 
Table 8 
Fiscal decentralisation in Germany 
  1999 2017 
Fiscal decentralisation indicators (state and local gov. consolidated) 
Revenue decentralisation (%)1) 34.3 36.7 
Tax revenue decentralisation (%)2) 49.7 52.8 
   based on tax-setting autonomy (%) 7.5 10.2 
Expenditure decentralisation (%)1) 37.1 39.6 
Vertical imbalance (% of GDP)3) 1.74 1.65 
Vertical imbalance (% of state and local gov. expend.) 9.64 9.35 
Sub-national public finances (state and local gov. consolidated) 
Debt (% of GDP)4) 21.7 23.8 
   Mean (% of state GDP) 5) 28.4 31.5 
   Range (% of state GDP) 6) 32.4 63.3 
   Coefficient of variation 0.3 0.5 
Source: National statistics. 
1) Share of consolidated revenue (expend.) of state and local governm. in total revenue (expend.) of general government (incl. social 
security). Based on national accounts. 
2) Share of state and local government tax revenue in total federal, state and local government tax revenue. Tax-setting autonomy: share 
of revenue from state and local government taxes for which the tax rates are set autonomously. Based on government finance statistics. 
Data for 1999 derived from Stegarescu (1999). 
3) Transfers received by consolidated state and local government from central government and social security. Based on national 
accounts. 
4) Debt of state and local government incurred to the public and non-public sector. Based on national annual debt statistics. 
5) Not population-weighted. 
6) Difference between maximum and minimum state values. 
                                                                    
30  For more details on the measurement of tax autonomy, see Stegarescu (2005) or more recently Kim et al. 
(2013). 
Germany’s federal system features 
large expenditure decentralisation, 
but very weak tax autonomy for the 
states. 
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The principle of common federal responsibility is defined in a Constitutional Court 
ruling and provides for implicit bailout for states in the event of extreme budgetary 
hardship. As a result, the highly indebted states of Bremen and Saarland were granted 
central government transfers from 1994 to 2004. State budget rules currently allow 
governments to incur debt to finance public investment or in the event of economic 
downturn. Yet, from 2020, new debt rules envisage structurally balanced budgets. In 
spite of federal aid and recent budget surpluses, differences in per capita debt are very 
large and have increased further. As for local governments, these are subject to 
supervisi n by state governments and are deemed to generally balance their budgets. 
4.3.2 Mechanisms for stabilisation and convergence 
The German Basic Law requires broadly equal living conditions to be provided and 
differences in the per capita financial capacities of the states to be balanced out in an 
appropriate manner. For this purpose, a multi-stage revenue-sharing system is in 
force.31 There are large, persistent disparities in per capita tax revenues, mainly 
between the financially weak eastern German states and the financially strong 
city-states. The states’ share in most joint taxes and receipts from other state taxes 
are allocated to the individual states according to the principle of regional tax 
incidence. The turnover tax, by contrast, is distributed according to population. In the 
first stage of the federal financial equalisation system (known as the FES), up to a 
quarter of the states’ share in turnover tax is redistributed in order to adjust per capita 
tax revenues (2017: €8.4 billion). Then, transfers are paid from financially strong to 
weak states according to a progressive equalisation tariff to further balance out 
differences in financial capacities (€11.2 billion). Finally, differences are reduced 
further by supplementary central government grants to states with financial capacities 
still below average (€4.5 billion). Equalisation transfers reached a record amount of 
€24 billion in 2017, or 0.7% of GDP (see Table 9). After redistribution, each state 
reaches a minimum of 95% of the average financial capacity.32 The 2020 reform 
abolishes interstate transfers, equalisation taking place through distribution of the 
(increased) states’ share in turnover tax and larger central government transfers. 
Supplementary central government transfers are also regularly granted for special 
needs, mainly to support economic convergence. The largest part covers costs 
resulting from the need to upgrade infrastructure in eastern Germany and is financed 
by a solidarity surcharge on national income taxes. These grants were be gradually 
phased out by the end of 2019 (down from €10.5 billion, or 0.5% of GDP, in 2005 to 
currently €2.1 billion, or 0.1% of GDP). Other minor special-purpose transfers address 
higher long-term unemployment in eastern Germany (€0.5 billion). Finally, central 
government provides funds to support macroeconomic stabilisation (investment and 
redemption fund, 2009-11), municipal investment in child care facilities and education 
                                                                    
31  For a description (available in German only), see Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2017 and 2019). A 
detailed analysis is provided by Deutsche Bundesbank (2014). 
32  After turnover tax allocation and interstate equalisation, the range in per capita tax receipts of the states 
(including local governments) falls from originally 100% to around 35% of the national average. 
Differences between the non-city-states narrow to only 7%. 
Budgetary framework: federal 
bailout transfers and debt rules 
Financial equalisation system 
broadly aligns states’ per capita tax 
revenue. 
Regular special-needs and 
discretionary federal grants support 
economic convergence. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 31 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 2009
 
ECB Occasional Paper Series No 239 / April 2020 
 
29 
The principle of common federal responsibility is defined in a Constitutional Court 
ruling and provides for implicit bailout for states in the event of extreme budgetary 
hardship. As a result, the highly indebted states of Bremen and Saarland were granted 
central government transfers from 1994 to 2004. State budget rules currently allow 
governments to incur debt to finance public investment or in the event of economic 
downturn. Yet, from 2020, new debt rules envisage structurally balanced budgets. In 
spite of federal aid and recent budget surpluses, differences in per capita debt are very 
large and have increased further. As for local governments, these are subject to 
supervision by state governments and are deemed to generally balance their budgets. 
4.3.2 Mechanisms for stabilisation and convergence 
The German Basic Law requires broadly equal living conditions to be provided and 
differences in the per capita financial capacities of the states to be balanced out in an 
appropriate manner. For this purpose, a multi-stage revenue-sharing system is in 
force.31 There are large, persistent disparities in per capita tax revenues, mainly 
between the financially weak eastern German states and the financially strong 
city-states. The states’ share in most joint taxes and receipts from other state taxes 
are allocated to the individual states according to the principle of regional tax 
incidence. The turnover tax, by contrast, is distributed according to population. In the 
first stage of the federal financial equalisation system (known as the FES), up to a 
quarter of the states’ share in turnover tax is redistributed in order to adjust per capita 
tax revenues (2017: €8.4 billion). Then, transfers are paid from financially strong to 
weak states according to a progressive equalisation tariff to further balance out 
differences in financial capacities (€11.2 billion). Finally, differences are reduced 
further by supplementary central government grants to states with financial capacities 
still below average (€4.5 billion). Equalisation transfers reached a record amount of 
€24 billion in 2017, or 0.7% of GDP (see Table 9). After redistribution, each state 
reaches a minimum of 95% of the average financial capacity.32 The 2020 reform 
abolishes interstate transfers, equalisation taking place through distribution of the 
(increased) states’ share in turnover tax and larger central government transfers. 
Supplementary central government transfers are also regularly granted for special 
needs, mainly to support economic convergence. The largest part covers costs 
resulting from the need to upgrade infrastructure in eastern Germany and is financed 
by a solidarity surcharge on national income taxes. These grants were be gradually 
phased out by the end of 2019 (down from €10.5 billion, or 0.5% of GDP, in 2005 to 
currently €2.1 billion, or 0.1% of GDP). Other minor special-purpose transfers address 
higher long-term unemployment in eastern Germany (€0.5 billion). Finally, central 
government provides funds to support macroeconomic stabilisation (investment and 
redemption fund, 2009-11), municipal investment in child care facilities and education 
                                                                    
31  For a description (available in German only), see Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2017 and 2019). A 
detailed analysis is provided by Deutsche Bundesbank (2014). 
32  After turnover tax allocation and interstate equalisation, the range in per capita tax receipts of the states 
(including local governments) falls from originally 100% to around 35% of the national average. 
Differences between the non-city-states narrow to only 7%. 
Budgetary framework: federal 
bailout transfers and debt rules 
Financial equalisation system 
broadly aligns states’ per capita tax 
revenue. 
Regular special-needs and 
discretionary federal grants support 
economic convergence. 
 
ECB Occasional Paper Series No 239 / April 2020 
 
29 
The principle of common federal responsibility is defined in a Constitutional Court 
ruling and provides for implicit bailout for states in the event of extreme budgetary 
hardship. As a result, the highly indebted states of Bremen and Saarland were granted 
central government transfers from 1994 to 2004. State budget rules currently allow 
governments to incur debt to finance public investment or in the event of economic 
downturn. Yet, from 2020, new debt rules envisage structurally balanced budgets. In 
spite of federal aid and recent budget surpluses, differences in per capita debt are very 
large and have increased further. As for local governments, these are subject to 
supervision by state governments and are deemed to generally balance their budgets. 
4.3.2 Mechanisms for stabilisation and convergence 
German Basic Law requires broadly equal living conditions to be provided and 
differences in the per capita financial capaciti  of t  states to be balanced out in an 
appropriate manner. For this purpose, a multi-stage rev ue-sharing system is in 
force.31 Th e are la ge, persistent disparities in per capita tax revenues, mainly 
between the fina ially weak eastern Germa  states and the financially strong 
city-states. The states’ shar  in most joint taxe  and receipts from other state taxes 
are allocated to the individual states according to th  principle of regional tax
incidence. Th  turnover tax, by contrast, is distributed according to pop lation. In the 
first stage of the federal financial equalisation system (k own as the FES), up to a 
quarter of the states’ share in turnover tax is redistributed in order to adjust per capita 
tax revenues (2017: €8.4 billion). Then, transfers are paid from financially strong to 
weak states according to a progressive equalisation tariff to further balance out 
differences in financial capacities (€11.2 billion). Finally, differences are reduced 
further by supplementary central government grants to states with financial cap cities 
still b low average (€4.5 billio ). Equalisation transfers reached a record am nt of 
€24 billion in 2017, or 0.7% of GDP (see Table 9). After redistribution, each state 
reaches a minimum of 95% of the average fina cial capacity.32 Th  2020 reform 
abolishes interstate transfers, equalisation t king place through distribution of the 
(incre s d) states’ share in turnover tax and larger central government transfers. 
Supplementary central government transfers are also regularly granted for special 
needs, mainly to support economic convergence. The largest part covers costs 
resulting from the need to upgrade infrastructure in eastern Germany and is financed 
by a solidarity surcharge on national income taxes. These grants were be gradually 
phased out by the end of 2019 (down from €10.5 billion, or 0.5% of GDP, in 2005 to 
currently €2.1 billion, or 0.1% of GDP). Other minor special-purpose transfers address 
higher long-term unemployment in eastern Germany (€0.5 billion). Finally, central 
government provides funds to support macroeconomic stabilisation (investment and 
redemption fund, 2009-11), municipal investment in child care facilities and education 
                                                                    
31  For a description (avail ble i  German only), see Bundesministerium der Fina zen (2017 and 2019). A 
detailed analysis is provided by Deutsche Bundesbank (2014). 
32  After turnover tax allocation and interstate equalisation, the range in per capita tax receipts of the states 
(including local governments) falls from originally 100% to around 35% of the national average. 
Differences between the non-city-states narrow to only 7%. 
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(2015-22) and construction of universities and social housing on a discretionary basis. 
These earmarked grants are co-financed by state and local governments. 
Table 9 
Overview of intergovernmental transfer schemes in Germany 
  
Intergovern- 
mental transfers 
(total) 
Federal fiscal 
equalisation 
scheme 
Supplemen. 
federal gov. 
special-needs 
transfers 
Federal 
investment 
grants 
(discretionary) 
Distribution key . Differences/ 
changes in state 
per capita financial 
capacities 
(permanent) 
Special structural 
or fina cial needs 
(partly temporary) 
Specific municipal 
investment needs 
(temporary) 
Transfer direction . Horizontal/ vertical Vertical Vertical 
Size       
   Formula/total available funds (% of GDP) 11.1% 
(2017)
10.7% 
(2017)1) 
0.1% 
(2017) 
0.2% 
(cumulative 
2015-22) 
  Realised t ansfers (% of GDP) 0.8% 
(2017) 
0.7% 
(2017) 
0.1% 
(2017) 
0.01% 
(2017) 
Source: own calculations based on figures of the Federal Ministry of Finance. 
1) Total state and local government financial capacity (as defined in the federal financial equalisation scheme) incl. supplementary federal 
transfer . 
4.3.3 Macroeconomic and budgetary impacts 
Economic performance varies considerably across states, due to income in astern 
Germany still being widely below national average and the special position of the 
city-states. Differences are larger in terms of per capita GDP than primary or 
disposable income. This is mainly attributable to income redistribution through 
unemployment and social en fits. Despite the progress made in eastern Germany, 
disparity i  p r capita income and un mployment h s only decre sed slightly. 
However, there is almost perfect correlation in unemployment and real business 
cycles, while private consumption growth is correlated to a lesser extent. Evidently, 
federal taxes, fiscal equalisation and social security schemes even out regional 
economic shocks, but not interstate differences. 
The FES aims to broadly level out per capita tax revenue across states to ensure that 
public services are provided at similar levels. Since transfers are linked to the financial 
capacities of the states in relation to the national average, they largely absorb 
asymmetric regional tax revenue shocks. New calculations based on our approach 
which is similar to the one used by Hepp and von Hagen (2013) show that the 
government sector smoothed only 7.3% of shocks in state GDP in Germany, mainly 
through the social security system, while the FES had no significant effect (see Table 
10b).33 
Another strand of literature deals with macroeconomic and regional stabilisation 
effects of the FES. Baskaran et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence that equalisation 
                                                                    
33  Hepp and von Hagen (2013) estimate that in 1995-2006 the government sector smoothed 10% of 
regional shocks, while factor markets accounted for 50% and credit markets 17%, and 21% of shocks 
remained unsmoothed. See also Büttner (2002) for an earlier study.  
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The principle of common federal responsibility is defined in a Constitutional Court 
ruling and provides for implicit bailout for states in the event of extreme budgetary 
hardship. As a result, the highly indebted states of Bremen and Saarland were granted 
central government transfers from 1994 to 2004. State budget rules currently allow 
governments to incur debt to finance public investment or in the event of economic 
downturn. Yet, from 2020, new debt rules envisage structurally balanced budgets. In 
spite of federal aid and recent budget surpluses, differences in per capita debt are very 
large and have increased further. As for local governments, these are subject to 
supervision by state governments and are deemed to generally balance their budgets. 
4.3.2 Mechanisms for stabilisation and converge ce 
The German Basic Law requires broadly equal living conditions to be provided and 
differences in the per capita financial capacities of the states to be balanced out in an 
appropriate manner. F r this purpose, a multi-stage revenue-sharing system is in 
force.31 There are large, persistent disparities in per capita tax revenues, mainly 
between the financially weak eastern Ger an states and the financially strong 
city-states. The states’ share in ost joint taxes and receipts from other state taxes 
are allocated to the individual states according to the principle of regional tax 
incidence. The turnover tax, by contrast, is distributed ccordi g to population. In the 
first stag  of the federal financial equalis tion syste  (known as the FES), up to a 
quarter of the states’ share in turnover tax is redistributed in order to adjust per capita 
tax revenues (2017: €8.4 billion). Then, transfers are paid from financially strong to 
weak states according to a progressive equalisation tariff to further balance out 
differences in financial capacities (€11.2 billion). Finally, differences are reduced 
furth r by supplementary central gover ment grants to states with financial capacities 
still below a r g  (€4.5 billio ). Equ lis tion t ansfers reached  record amount of 
€24 billion i  2017, or 0.7% f GDP (see Table 9). After edistribution, ach tate 
a hes a minimum f 95% of th  aver ge fi ncial capacity.32 The 2020 reform 
aboli hes in er tate transfers, equalisati n taking plac  through distribution of the 
(increased) sta es’ share in turnover tax and larger ce tral government tra sfers. 
Supplementary central government transfers are also regularly granted for special 
needs, mainly to support economic convergence. The largest part covers costs 
resulting from the need to upgrade infrastructure in eastern Germany and is financed 
by a solidarity surcharge on national income taxes. These grants were be gradually 
phased out by the end of 2019 (down from €10.5 billion, or 0.5% of GDP, in 2005 to 
currently €2.1 billion, or 0.1% of GDP). Other minor special-purpose transfers address 
higher long-term unemployment in eastern Germany (€0.5 billion). Finally, central 
government provides funds to support macroeconomic stabilisation (investment and 
redemption fund, 2009-11), municipal investment in child care facilities and education 
                                                                    
31  For a de cription (available in G rman only), se  Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2017 and 2019). A 
detailed analysis is provided by Deutsche Bundesbank (2014). 
32  After turnover tax allocation and interstate equalisation, the range in per capita tax receipts of the states 
(including local governments) falls from originally 100% to around 35% of the national average. 
Differences between the non-city-states narrow to only 7%. 
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The principle of common federal responsibility is defined in a Constitutional Court 
ruling and provides for implicit bailout for states in the event of extreme budgetary 
hardship. As a result, the highly indebted states of Bremen and Saarland were granted 
central government transfers from 1994 to 2004. State budget rules currently allow 
governments to incur debt to finance public investment or in the event of economic 
downturn. Yet, from 2020, new debt rules envisage structurally balanced budgets. In 
spite of federal aid and recent budget surpluses, differences in per capita debt are very 
large and have increased further. As for local governments, these are subject to 
supervision by state governments and are deemed to generally balance their budgets. 
4.3.2 Mechanisms for stabilisation and convergence 
The German Basic Law requires broadly equal living conditions to be provided and 
differences in the per capita financial capacities of the states to be balanced out in an 
appropriate manner. For this purpose, a multi-stage revenue-sharing system is in 
force.31 There are large, persistent disparities in per capita tax revenues, mainly 
between the financially weak eastern German states and the financially strong 
city-states. The states’ share in most joint taxes and receipts from other state taxes 
are allocated to the individual stat  according to the principle of regional tax 
incidence. The turnover tax, by contrast, i  distributed according to population. In the 
first tage of the federal financial equalisation ystem (know  as the FES), up to a 
quarter of the states’ shar  in turnover tax is redistributed in order to adjust per capita 
tax revenue  (2017: €8.4 billio ). Then, transfers ar  paid from financially strong to 
weak states according to a progr ssive equali tion tariff to further balance out 
diff renc s in financial capacities (€11.2 billion). Finally, differences are reduced 
further by supplementary central government rants to states with financial capacities 
till below average (€4.5 billion). Equalisation transfers reached  record amo nt of 
€24 billion in 2017, or 0.7% of GDP (see Table 9). After redistribution, each state 
reaches a minimum of 95% of the average financial capacity.32 The 2020 reform 
abolishes interstate transfers, equalisation taking place through distribution of the 
(increased) states’ share i  turno r tax and larger central government tra sfers. 
Supplementary central government transfers are also regularly granted for special 
needs, mainly to support economic convergence. The largest part covers costs 
resulting from the ne d to upgrade infra tructure i  eastern Germany and is financed 
by a solidarity surcharge on national income taxes. These grants w re be gra u lly 
phased out by the end of 2019 (down from €10.5 billion, or 0.5% of GDP, in 2005 to 
currently €2.1 billion, or 0.1% of GDP). Other minor special-purpose transfers address 
higher long-term unemployment in eastern Germany (€0.5 billion). Finally, central 
government provides funds to support macroeconomic stabilisa ion (investment nd 
redemption fund, 2009-11), municipal investment in child care facilities and education 
                                                                    
31  For a de cription (available in German only), see Bundesmi isterium d r Fi anzen (2017 and 2019). A 
detailed analysis is provided by Deutsche Bundesbank (2014). 
32  After turnover tax allocation and interstate equalisation, the range in per capita tax receipts of the states 
(including local governments) falls from origi ally 100% to around 35% of the n tional average. 
Differences between the non-city-states narrow to only 7%. 
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(2015-22) and construction of universities and social housing on a discretionary basis. 
These earmarked grants are co-financed by state and local governments. 
Table 9 
Overview of intergovernmental transfer schemes in Germany 
  
Intergovern- 
mental transfers 
(total) 
Federal fiscal 
equalisation 
scheme 
Supplemen. 
federal gov. 
special-needs 
transfers 
Federal 
investment 
grants 
(discretionary) 
Distribution key . Differences/ 
changes in state 
per capita financial 
capacities 
(permanent) 
Special structural 
or financial needs 
(partly temporary) 
Specific municipal 
investment needs 
(temporary) 
Transfer direction . Horizontal/ vertical Vertical Vertical 
Size       
   Formula/total available funds (% of GDP) 11.1% 
(2017) 
10.7% 
(2017)1) 
0.1% 
(2017) 
0.2% 
(cumulative 
2015-22) 
   Realised transfers (% of GDP) 0.8% 
(2017) 
0.7% 
(2017) 
0.1% 
(2017) 
0.01% 
(2017) 
Source: own calculations based on figures of the Federal Ministry of Finance. 
1) Total state and local government financial capacity (as defined in the federal financial equalisation scheme) incl. supplementary federal 
transfers. 
4.3.3 Macroeconomic and budgetary impacts 
Economic performance varies considerably across states, due to income in eastern 
Germany still being widely below national average and the special position of the 
city-states. Differences are larger in terms of per capita GDP than primary or 
disposable income. This is mainly attributable to income redistribution through 
unemployment and social benefits. Despite the progress made in eastern Germany, 
disparity in per capita income and unemployment has only decreased slightly. 
However, there is almost perfect correlation in unemployment and real business 
cycles, while private consumption growth is correlated to a lesser extent. Evidently, 
federal taxes, fiscal equalisation and social security schemes even out regional 
economic shocks, but not interstate differences. 
The FES aims to broadly level out per capita tax revenue across states to ensure that 
public services are provided at similar levels. Since transfers are linked to the financial 
capacities of the states in relation to the national average, they largely absorb 
asymmetric regional tax revenue shocks. New calculations based on our approach 
which is similar to the one used by Hepp and von Hagen (2013) show that the 
government sector smoothed only 7.3% of shocks in state GDP in Germany, mainly 
through the social security system, while the FES had no significant effect (see Table 
10b).33 
Another strand of literature deals with macroeconomic and regional stabilisation 
effects of the FES. Baskaran et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence that equalisation 
                                                                    
33  Hepp and von Hagen (2013) estimate that in 1995-2006 the government sector smoothed 10% of 
regional shocks, while factor markets accounted for 50% and credit markets 17%, and 21% of shocks 
remained unsmoothed. See also Büttner (2002) for an earlier study.  
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The principle of common federal responsibility is defined in a Constitutional Court 
ruling and provides for implicit bailout for states in the event of extreme budgetary 
hardship. As a result, the highly indebted states of Bremen and Saarland were granted 
central government transfers from 1994 to 2004. State budget rules currently allow 
governments to incur debt to finance public investment or in the event of economic 
downturn. Yet, from 2020, new debt rules envisage structurally balanced budgets. In 
spite of federal aid and recent budget surpluses, differences in per capita debt are very 
large and have increased further. As for local governments, these are subject to 
supervision by state governments and are deemed to generally balance their budgets. 
4.3.2 Mechanisms for stabilisation and convergence 
The German Basic Law requires broadly equal living conditions to be provided and 
differences in the per capita financial capacities of the states to be balanced out in an 
appropriate manner. For this purpose, a multi-stage revenue-sharing system is in 
force.31 There are large, persistent disparities in per capita tax revenues, mainly 
between the financially weak eastern German states and the financially strong 
city-states. The states’ share in most joint taxes and receipts from other state taxes 
are allocated to the individual states according to the principle of regional tax 
incidence. The turnover tax, by contrast, is distributed according to population. In the 
first stage of the federal financial equalisation system (known as the FES), up to a 
quarter of the states’ share in turnover tax is redistributed in order to adjust per capita 
tax revenues (2017: €8.4 billion). Then, transfers are paid from financially strong to 
weak states according to a progressive equalisation tariff to further balance out 
differences in financial capacities (€11.2 billion). Finally, differences are reduced 
further by supplementary central government grants to states with financial capacities 
still below average (€4.5 billion). Equalisation transfers reached a record amount of 
€24 billion in 2017, or 0.7% of GDP (see Table 9). After redistribution, each state 
reaches a minimum of 95% of the average financial capacity.32 The 2020 reform 
abolishes interstate transfers, equalisation taking place through distribution of the 
(increased) states’ share in turnover tax and larger central government transfers. 
Supplementary central government transfers are also regularly granted for special 
needs, mainly to support economic convergence. The largest part covers costs 
resulting from the need to upgrade infrastructure in eastern Germany and is financed 
by a solidarity surcharge on national income taxes. These grants were be gradually 
phased out by the end of 2019 (down from €10.5 billion, or 0.5% of GDP, in 2005 to 
currently €2.1 billion, or 0.1% of GDP). Other minor special-purpose transfers address 
higher long-term unemployment in eastern Germany (€0.5 billion). Finally, central 
government provides funds to support macroeconomic stabilisation (investment and 
redemption fund, 2009-11), municipal investment in child care facilities and education 
                                                                    
31  For a description (available in German only), see Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2017 and 2019). A 
detailed analysis is provided by Deutsche Bundesbank (2014). 
32  After turnover tax allocation and interstate equalisation, the range in per capita tax receipts of the states 
(including local governments) falls from originally 100% to around 35% of the national average. 
Differences between the non-city-states narrow to only 7%. 
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(2015-22) and construction of universities and social housing on a discretionary basis. 
These earmarked grants are co-financed by state and local governments. 
Table 9 
Overview of intergovernmental t ansf r schemes in Germany 
  
Intergovern- 
mental transfers 
(total) 
Federal fiscal 
equalisation 
scheme 
Supplemen. 
federal gov. 
special-needs 
transfers 
Federal 
investment 
grants 
(discretionary) 
Distribution key . Differences/ 
changes in state 
per capita financial 
capacities 
(permanent) 
Special structural 
or financial needs 
(partly temporary) 
Specific municipal 
investment needs 
(temporary) 
Transfer direction . Horizontal/ vertical Vertical Vertical 
Size       
   Formula/total available funds (% of GDP) 11.1% 
(2017) 
10.7% 
(2017)1) 
0.1% 
(2017) 
0.2% 
(cumulative 
2015-22) 
   Realised transfers (% of GDP) 0.8% 
(2017) 
0.7% 
(2017) 
0.1% 
(2017) 
0.01% 
(2017) 
Source: own calculations based on figures of the Federal Ministry of Finance. 
1) Total state and local government financial capacity (as defined in the federal financial equalisation scheme) incl. supplementary federal 
transfers. 
4.3.3 Macroeconomic and budgetary impacts 
Economic performance varies considerably across states, due to income in eastern 
Germany still being widely below national average and the special position of the 
city-states. Differences are larger in terms of per capita GDP than primary or 
disposable income. This is mainly attributable to income redistribution through 
unemployment and social benefits. Despite the progress made in eastern Germany, 
disparity in per capita income and unemployment has only decreased slightly. 
However, there is almost perfect correlation in unemployment and real business 
cycles, while private consumption growth is correlated to a lesser extent. Evidently, 
federal taxes, fiscal equalisation and social security schemes even out regional 
economic shocks, but not interstate differences. 
The FES aims to broadly level out per capita tax revenue across states to ensure that 
public services are provided at similar levels. Since transfers are linked to the financial 
capacities of the states in relation to the national average, they largely absorb 
asymmetric regional tax revenue shocks. New calculations based on our approach 
which is similar to the one used by Hepp and von Hagen (2013) show that the 
government sector smoothed only 7.3% of shocks in state GDP in Germany, mainly 
through the social security system, while the FES had no significant effect (see Table 
10b).33 
Another strand of lit r ture deal with macroeconomic and egional stabilisation 
effects of the FES. Baskaran et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence that equalisation 
                                                                    
33  Hepp and von Hagen (2013) estimate that in 1995-2006 the government sector smoothed 10% of 
regional shocks, while factor markets accounted for 50% and credit markets 17%, and 21% of shocks 
remained unsmoothed. See also Büttner (2002) for an earlier study.  
Economic performance differs 
considerably across German states 
in spite of strong interrelations. 
Empirical studies show the FES has 
only a marginal contribution to 
interstate risk-sharing. 
Macroeconomic and regional 
stabilisation effects 
 
ECB Occasional Paper Series No 239 / April 2020 
 
31 
transfers had an insignifica t or negativ  ffect on economic growth in western 
German states. This is attributed to the use of transfers to subsidise declining 
industries instead of financing growth-related investment. In a DSGE model, Matthaei 
et al. (2016) show that abolishing the FES would favour the transfer-paying region 
since income and wages grow, also increasing migration into this region. On 
aggregate, however, the average household’s welfare would be negatively affected. 
Table 10 
Ec nomic performan e and fi cal risk sharing in Germany 
a) Economic performance (interstate variation) 
 
1999 2017 1999-2017 (average) 
Mean 
4) 
Range 
5) 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Mean 
4) 
Range 
5) 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Mean 
4) 
Correl tion 
coefficient 
6) 
Nominal GDP per capita (EUR) 24,523 29,963 0.31 37,862 38,007 0.26   
 Nominal primary income per capita 
(EUR)1) 17,131 10,272 0.20 24,571 12,789 0.17   
 Nominal disposable income per
capita (EUR)1) 15,060 5,933 0.12 21,092 6,122 0.09   
 Real GDP growth per capita (%)2) 2.15 3.24 0.46 1.73 1.68 0.26 1.34 0.82
Real private consumption growth 
per capita (%)1) 2) 3.11 4.02 0.39 1.19 3.08 0.59 1.02 0.62 
Unemployment rate (%)3) 13.7 14.4 0.33 7.3 7.6 0.28 11.2 0.96 
Source: national statistics. 
1) State data for primary/disposable income of households and private consumption only 
available until 2016.  
2) Calculations based on state specific chain price indices.  
3) In % of dependent labour force.  
4) Non-population weighted.  
5) Difference between maximum and minimum state values.  
6) Mean of states' correlation coefficients 
 
b) Share of GDP shocks smoothed by fiscal channel (%)1) 
 
1996-2016  
Total government 
   of which: 
7.3 
(3.3) 
**  
   Federal taxes and social contributions -4.7 
(5.1) 
  
   Intergovernmental transfers to states 2.4 
(2.1) 
  
      VAT redistribution 0.6 
(1.3) 
  
      Interstate transfers 1.0 
(0.8) 
  
      Federal supplementary (general-purpose) transfers 0.8 
(2.1) 
  
   Federal transfers to households     
      Social security benefits 6.1 
(1.1) 
***  
      of which: pensions 2.2 
(0.9) 
**  
Source: National statistics. 
1) Calculations based o Asdrubali et al. (1996). 
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The principle of commo  federal responsibility is defined in a Constitutional Court 
ruling and provi es for implicit bailout for states in the event of extreme budgetary 
hardship. As a result, the highly indebted states of Bremen and Saarland were granted 
central government transfers from 1994 to 2004. State budget rules currently allow 
governments to incur debt to financ  public investment or in the event of econo ic 
downturn. Yet, from 2020, new debt rules envisage structurally balanced budgets. In 
spite of federal id and recent budget surpluses, differences in per capita debt ar  very 
large and have increased further. As for local governments, these ar  subj ct to 
supervision by state governments and are deemed to generally balance their budgets. 
4.3.2 Mechanisms for stabilisation and convergence 
The German Basic Law requires broadly equal living conditions to be provided and 
diff rences in the per capita financial capacities of the states to be balanced out in an 
appropriate m nner. For this purpose, a multi-stage revenue-sharing system is in 
force.31 There are large, persistent disparities in per capita tax revenues, mainly 
between the financially weak eastern German states and the financially strong 
city-states. The states’ share in most joint taxes and receipts from other state taxes 
are allocated to the individual states according to the principle of regional tax 
incidenc . The turnover tax, by contrast, is distributed according to population. In the 
first stage of the federal financial equalisation system (known as the FES), up to a 
quarter of the states’ share in turnover tax is redistributed in order to adjust per capita 
tax revenues (2017: €8.4 billion). Then, transfers are paid from financially strong to 
weak states according to a progressive equalisation tariff to further balance out 
differences in financial capacities (€11.2 billion). Finally, differences are reduced 
further by supplementary central government grants to states with financial capacities 
still below average (€4.5 billion). Equalisation transfers reached a record amount of 
€24 billion in 2017, or 0.7% of GDP (see Table 9). After redistribution, each state 
reaches a minimum of 95% of the average financial capacity.32 The 2020 reform 
abolishes interstate transfers, equalisation taking place through distribution of the 
(increased) states’ share in turnover tax and larger central government transfers. 
Supplementary central government transfers are also regularly granted for special 
needs, mainly t  support economic convergence. The larg st part covers costs 
resulti g from the need to upgrade infrastructure n easter  Germany a d is financed 
by a solidarity surcharg on n tional income tax s. These grants were be gradually 
phased out by the end of 2019 (down from €10.5 billion, or 0.5% of GDP, in 2005 to 
currently €2.1 billion, or 0.1% of GDP). Other minor special-purpose transfers address 
higher long-term unemployment in eastern Germany (€0.5 billion). Finally, central 
government provides funds to support macroeconomic stabilisation (investment and 
redemption fund, 2009-11), municipal investment in child care facilities and education 
                                                                    
31  For a description (available in German only), see Bundesministeriu  der Finanzen (2017 and 2019). A 
detailed analysis is provided by Deutsche Bundesbank (2014). 
32  After turnover tax allocation and interstate equalisation, the range in per capita tax receipts of the states 
(including local governments) falls from originally 100% to around 35% of the national average. 
Differences between the non-city-states narrow to only 7%. 
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Whi automati ally safeguarding against shocks in tax receipts, the FES creates 
negative fiscal incentives due to exces ive revenu  abs rption rates: a rise in tax 
revenue (i.e. financial capacity) is almost entirely offset by a concomitant reduction in 
received transfers. Therefore, particularly weak states have no incentive to boost their 
tax generation capacity by enacting growth enhancing policies, for example. There is 
even some evidence for negative incentives in terms of tax collection and 
enforcement.34 
The FES and potential federal bailouts also tend to induce states receiving transfers to 
incur higher debt and weaken budgetary discipline.35 Heppke-Falk a d Wolff (2008) 
identified financial market moral hazard for state government bonds, owing to investor 
expectations that distressed states would be bailed out. Stehn and Fedelino (2009) 
show th t net-recipient states did not reduce primary expenditure in response to rising
deficits and raised expenditure in good times instead, expecting higher transfers. 
To sum up, the German FES aims primarily to secure similar per capita levels of public 
expenditure across states and tur s out not to help smooth economic shocks or 
promote economic convergence. Empirical evidence supports the view that 
risk-sharing is instead mostly provided by federal transfers to households (pensions, 
social benefits), hich are financed by central government tax revenue. Economic 
convergence and macroeconomic stabilisation are addressed by special central 
government transfers. Potential federal bailouts together with excessive revenue 
redistribution and weak tax autonomy tend to limit financial responsibility of the 
individual states. This results in negative budgetary incentives and higher 
indebtedness. With few exceptions, the FES consolidates differences in financial 
capacities over time. However, debt rules due to come into force in 2020 will contribute 
to sound state government finances. 
4.4 Spain 
4.4.1 The Spanish “non-federal” structure of autonomous communities 
Spain is not a federation, but a highly decentralised unitary state comprising 
17 autonomous communities (or regions) and two autonomous cities. The 
Constitution of 1978 established that the sovereignty is vested in the nation as a 
whole, represented in the central institutions of government. However, Chapter II 
states that the nation is formed by a plurality of nationalities, and it therefore allows the 
nation to devolve powers or competencies to the autonomous communities. This 
devolution process was not symmetric across regions. It started in the early 1980s 
with the historical regions (Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia and in 1980 Andalusia), 
but was extended to all regions in 1992. This means that each community has its own 
set of devolved powers, typically with more competencies in the historical ones. On 
                                                                   
34  See Baretti et al. (2002) and Bönke et al. (2016). For a dissenting assessment based on tax auditing, see 
Troost (2016). 
35  See, for example, Rodden (2002). 
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(2015-22) and construction of universities and social housing on a discretionary basis. 
These earmarked grants are co-financed by state and local governments. 
Table 9 
Overview of intergovernmental transfer schemes in Germany 
  
Intergovern- 
mental transfers 
(total) 
Federal fiscal 
equalisation 
scheme 
Supplemen. 
federal gov. 
special-needs 
transfers 
Federal 
inv stment 
grants 
(discretionary) 
Distribution key . Differences/ 
changes in state 
per capita financial 
capacities 
(permanent) 
Special structural 
or financial needs 
(partly temporary) 
Specific municipal 
investment needs 
(temporary) 
Transfer direction . Horizontal/ vertical Vertical Vertical 
Size       
   Formula/total available funds (% of GDP) 11.1% 
(2017) 
10.7% 
(2017)1) 
0.1% 
(2017) 
0.2% 
(cumulative 
2015-22)
   Realised tra sfers (% of GDP) 0.8% 
(2017) 
0.7% 
(2017) 
0.1% 
(2017) 
0.01% 
(2017) 
Source: own calcul tions based on figures of the Federal Ministry of Finance. 
1) Total state and local government financial capacity (as defined in the federal financial equalisation sche e) incl. supplementary federal 
transfers. 
4.3.3 Macro onomic a d budg ta y impacts 
Economic performance varies considerably across states, due to income in eastern 
Germany still being widely below national average and the special position of the 
city-states. Differences are larger in terms of r capit  GDP than rimary or 
disposable income. This is mainly attributable to income redistribution through 
un mployment and social ben fits. Despite the pro ress made in eastern G rm ny, 
isparity in per ca ita income and unem loyment has only decreased slightly. 
However, there is almost perfect correl tion in unemployment and real busine s
cycl s, whil  private consumption growth is correlated to  lesser extent. Evidently, 
federal taxes, fiscal equalisation and social security schemes eve  out regi al 
economic shock , but not interstate differenc . 
The FES aims to broadly level out per capita tax revenue acr ss states to ensure that
public services are provided at similar levels. Since transfers are linked to the financial 
capacities of the st tes in elation to the national aver ge they largely absorb 
asy metric regio al tax revenue shocks. New calculations based on our approach 
which is imilar to th  one used by H pp and von Hagen (2013) show that the 
government sector smoothed o l  7.3% of shocks in state GDP in Germany, mainly 
through the social security system, while he FES had no significant effect (see Table 
10b).33 
Another strand of literature deals with macroeconomic and regional stabilisation 
effects of the FES. Baskaran et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence that equalisation 
                                                                    
33  Hepp and von Hagen (2013) estimate that in 1995-2006 the government sector smoothed 10% of 
regional shocks, while factor markets accounted for 50% and credit markets 17%, and 21% of shocks 
remain d unsmoothed. See also Büttner (2002) fo  an earlier study.  
Economic performance differs 
considerably across German states 
in spite of strong interrelations. 
Empirical studies show the FES has 
only a marginal contribution to 
interstate risk-sharing. 
Macroeconomic and regional 
stabilisation effects 
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While automatically safeguarding against shocks in tax receipts, the FES creates 
negative fiscal incentives due to excessive revenue absorption rates: a rise in tax 
revenue (i.e. financial capacity) is almost entirely offset by a concomitant reduction in 
received transfers. Therefore, particularly weak states have no incentive to boost their 
tax generation capacity by enacting growth enhancing policies, for example. There is 
even some evidence for negative incentives in terms of tax collection and 
enforcement.34 
The FES and potential federal bailouts also tend to induce states receiving transfers to 
incur higher debt and weaken budgetary discipline.35 Heppke-Falk and Wolff (2008) 
identified financial market moral hazard for state government bonds, owing to investor 
expectations that distressed states would be bailed out. Stehn and Fedelino (2009) 
show that net-recipient states did not reduce primary expenditure in response to rising 
deficits and raised expenditure in good times instead, expecting higher transfers. 
To sum up, the German FES aims primarily to secure similar per capita levels of public 
expenditure across states and turns out not to help smooth economic shocks or 
promote economic convergence. Empirical evidence supports the view that 
risk-sharing is instead mostly provided by federal transfers to households (pensions, 
social benefits), which are financed by central government tax revenue. Economic 
convergence and macroeconomic stabilisation are addressed by special central 
government transfers. Potential federal bailouts together with excessive revenue 
redistribution and weak tax autonomy tend to limit financial responsibility of the 
individual states. This results in negative budgetary incentives and higher 
indebtedness. With few exceptions, the FES consolidates differences in financial 
capacities over time. However, debt rules due to come into force in 2020 will contribute 
to sound state government finances. 
4.4 Spain 
4.4.1 The Spanish “non-federal” structure of autonomous communities 
Spain is not a federation, but a highly decentralised unitary state comprising 
17 autonomous communities (or regions) and two autonomous cities. The 
Constitution of 1978 established that the sovereignty is vested in the nation as a 
whole, represented in the central institutions of government. However, Chapter II 
states that the nation is formed by a plurality of nationalities, and it therefore allows the 
nation to devolve powers or competencies to the autonomous communities. This 
devolution process was not symmetric across regions. It started in the early 1980s 
with the historical regions (Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia and in 1980 Andalusia), 
but was extended to all regions in 1992. This means that each community has its own 
set of devolved powers, typically with more competencies in the historical ones. On 
                                                                    
34  See Baretti et al. (2002) and Bönke et al. (2016). For a dissenting assessment based on tax auditing, see 
Troost (2016). 
35  See, for example, Rodden (2002). 
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transfers had an insignificant or negative effect on economic growth in western 
German states. This is attributed to the use of transfers to subsidise declining 
industries instead of financing growth-related investment. In a DSGE model, Matthaei 
et al. (2016) show that abolishing the FES would favour the transfer-paying region 
since income and wages grow, also increasing migration into this region. On 
aggregate, however, the average household’s welfare would be negatively affected. 
Table 10 
Economic performance and fiscal risk sharing in Germany 
a) Economic performance (interstate variation) 
 
1999 2017 1999-2017 (average) 
Mean 
4) 
Range 
5) 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Mean 
4) 
Range 
5) 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Mean 
4) 
Correlation 
coefficient 
6) 
Nominal GDP per capita (EUR) 24,523 29,963 0.31 37,862 38,007 0.26   
 Nominal primary income per capita 
(EUR)1) 17,131 10,272 0.20 24,571 12,789 0.17   
 Nominal disposable income per 
capita (EUR)1) 15,060 5,933 0.12 21,092 6,122 0.09   
 Real GDP growth per capita (%)2) 2.15 3.24 0.46 1.73 1.68 0.26 1.34 0.82
Real private consumption growth 
per capita (%)1) 2) 3.11 4.02 0.39 1.19 3.08 0.59 1.02 0.62 
Unemployment rate (%)3) 13.7 14.4 0.33 7.3 7.6 0.28 11.2 0.96 
Source: national statistics. 
1) State data for primary/disposable income of households and private consumption only 
available until 2016.  
2) Calculations bas d on state specific chain price indices.  
3) In % of dependent labour force.  
4) Non-population weighted.  
5) Differ nce between maximum and minimum state valu s.  
6) Mean of states' correlation coefficients 
 
b) Share of GDP shocks smoothed by fiscal channel (%)1) 
 
1996-2016  
Total government 
   of which: 
7.3 
(3.3) 
**  
   Federal taxes and social contributions -4.7 
(5.1) 
  
   Intergovernmental transfers to states 2.4 
(2.1) 
  
      VAT redistribution 0.6 
(1.3) 
  
      Interstate transfers 1.0 
(0.8) 
  
      Federal supplementary (general-purpose) transfers 0.8 
(2.1) 
  
   Federal transfers to households     
      Social security benefits 6.1 
(1.1) 
***  
      of which: pensions 2.2 
(0.9) 
**  
Source: National statistics. 
1) Calculations based o Asdrubali et al. (1996). 
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the revenue side, the main taxes are levied and collected by the central government 
and then redistributed to all regions through transfers under the Funding System of the 
Autonomous Communities (FSA), the purpose of which in part is fiscal equalisation.36 
As a result, the Spanish autonomous communities and local government currently 
account for almost 45% of general government expenditure and 28% of revenue 
(Table 11). The autonomous communities are responsible for important areas of 
spending like education, health, housing, environmental protection, culture and public 
administration. Their budgets are primarily funded through central government 
transfer payments (under the FSA), based on an adjusted measure of population.37 
The autonomous communities receive a significant proportion of several taxes 
collected centrally (50% of personal income tax and VAT, 58% of special taxes, 100% 
of electricity and hydrocarbon taxes and car registration taxes) and keep all the 
revenues from taxes collected locally (wealth tax, inheritance and donation tax, stamp 
duty and gaming tax), enjoying normative capacity over most of their resources. Local 
governments also have significant taxation powers – mainly over property taxes, tax 
on economic activity and car tax – which cover more than 50% of local tax revenue. 
Therefore, taking tax autonomy into account, the degree of tax revenue 
decentralisation in Spain remains fairly significant at 34%.38 Transfers received by 
autonomous communities and local governments from upper government levels, 
mainly through the FSA, represent 8.5% of GDP or 44% (46%) of their consolidated 
revenues (expenditures) (vertical imbalance). 
                                                                    
36  An exception are the Basque Country and Navarre communities, recognised by the constitution as 
“chartered” territories, which allows them the ability to levy and collect all taxes. Since they collect almost 
all taxes, they transfer back to the central government a pre-arranged amount for the competences 
exclusive to the central government, which means they do not participate in “fiscal equalisation”. 
37  The calculation of the adjusted population used to distribute transfers includes total population (30%), 
population of school age (20.5%), population over 64 (8.5%), population protected (in terms of health 
spending, 38%), size in km2 (1.8%), dispersion of population (0.6%) and insularity (0.6%). 
38  For more details on the Spanish tax structure, see López-Rodríguez and García-Ciria (2018). 
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While automatically safeguarding against shocks in tax receipts, the FES creates 
negative fiscal incentives due to excessive revenue absorption rates: a rise in tax 
revenue (i.e. financial capacity) is almost entirely offset by a concomitant reduction in 
received transfers. Therefore, particularly weak states have no incentive to boost their 
tax generation capacity by enacting growth enhancing policies, for example. There is 
even some evidence for negative incentives in terms of tax collection and 
enforcement.34 
The FES and potential federal bailouts also tend to induce states receiving transfers to 
incur higher debt and weaken budgetary discipline.35 Heppke-Falk and Wolff (2008) 
identified financial market moral hazard for state government bonds, owing to investor 
expectations that distressed states would be bailed out. Stehn and Fedelino (2009) 
show that net-recipient states did not reduce primary expenditure in response to rising 
deficits and raised expenditure in good times instead, expecting higher transfers. 
To sum up, the German FES aims primarily to secu e similar per capita levels of public 
expe diture across states and turns out not to help smooth economic shocks or 
promote economic convergence. Empirical evidence supports the view that 
risk-sharing is instead mostly provided by federal transfers to households (pensions, 
social benefits), which are financed by central government tax revenue. Economic 
convergence and macroeconomic stabilisation are addressed by special central 
government transfers. Potential federal bailouts together with excessive revenue 
redistribution and weak tax autonomy tend to limit financial responsibility of the 
individual states. This results in negative budgetary incentives and higher 
indebtedness. With few exceptions, the FES consolidates differences in financial 
capacities over time. However, debt rules due to come into force in 2020 will contribute 
to sound state government finances. 
4.4 Spain 
4.4.1 The Spanish “no -federal” structure of autonomous co munities 
Spain is not a federation, but a highly decentralised unitary state comprising 
17 autonomous communities (or regions) and two autonomous cities. The 
Constitution of 1978 established that the sovereignty is vested in the nation as a 
whole, represented in the central institutions of government. However, Chapter II 
states that the nation is formed by a plurality of nationalities, and it therefore allows the 
nation to devolve powers or competencies to the autonomous communities. This 
devolution process was not symmetric across regions. It started in the early 1980s 
with the historical regions (Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia and in 1980 Andalusia), 
but was extended to all regions in 1992. This means that each community has its own 
set of devolved powers, typically with more competencies in the historical ones. On 
                                                                    
34  See Baretti et al. (2002) and Bönke et al. (2016). For a dissenting assessment based on tax auditing, see 
Troost (2016). 
35  See, for example, Rodden (2002). 
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redistribution  weak tax autonomy tend t  limit financial responsibility of the 
individual states. This results in negative budgetary inc ntives and higher 
indebtedness. With few exceptions, the FES consolidates differences in financial 
capacities over time. However, debt rules d e to come into force i  2020 will contribute 
to soun  state governm nt finances. 
4.4 Spain 
4.4.1 The Spanish “non-federal” structure of autonomous communities 
Spai  is not a federatio , but  highly decentralised unitary state comp ising 
17 auton mous communities (or regions) and two autono ous cities. The 
Constituti n of 1978 established that the sovereignty is vested in the nation as a 
whole, represented in the c ntr nstitutions of g vernment. However, Chapter II 
states that the nation is formed by a plurality of nationalities, and it t refore allows the 
nation to devolve powers or competencies to the autonomous communities. This 
devolution process was not symmetric across regi s. It starte  in the early 1980s 
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set of devolved powers, typically with more competencies in the historical o es. On 
                                                              
34  See Baretti et al. (2002) and Bönke et al. (2016). For a dissenting assessment based on tax auditing, see 
Troost (2016). 
35  See, for example, Rodden (2002). 
Excessive revenue absorption rate 
of the FES creates negative fiscal 
incentives for financially weak 
states. 
The FES and implicit federal bailout 
provide for moral hazard. 
Conclusion: moderate risk-sharing 
and stabilisation effects of the FES 
counterbalanced by serious fiscal 
disincentives. 
Spain is a highly decentralised 
unitary state, with large expenditure 
decentralisation and tax autonomy 
of the autonomous communities. 
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the revenue side, the main taxes are levied and collected by the central government 
and then redistributed to all regions through transfers under the Funding System of the 
Autonomous Communities (FSA), the purpose of which in part is fiscal equalisation.36 
As a result, the Spanish autonomous communities and local government currently 
account for almost 45% of general government expenditure and 28% of revenue 
(Table 11). The autonomous communities are responsible for important areas of 
spending like education, health, housing, environmental protection, culture and public 
administration. Their budgets are primarily funded through central government 
transfer payments (under the FSA), based on an adjusted measure of population.37 
The autonomous communities receive a significant proportion of several taxes 
collected centrally (50% of personal income tax and VAT, 58% of special taxes, 100% 
of electricity and hydrocarbon taxes and car registration taxes) and keep all the 
revenues from taxes collected locally (wealth tax, inheritance and donation tax, stamp 
duty and gaming tax), enjoying normative capacity over most of their resources. Local 
governments also have significant taxation powers – mainly over property taxes, tax 
on economic activity and car tax – which cover more than 50% of local tax revenue. 
Therefore, taking tax autonomy into account, the degree of tax revenue 
decentralisation in Spain remains fairly significant at 34%.38 Transfers received by 
autonomous communities and local governments from upper government levels, 
mainly through the FSA, represent 8.5% of GDP or 44% (46%) of their consolidated 
revenues (expenditures) (vertical imbalance). 
                                                                    
36  An exception are the Basque Country and Navarre communities, recognised by the constitution as 
“chartered” territories, which allows them the ability to levy and collect all taxes. Since they collect almost 
all taxes, they transfer back to the central government a pre-arranged amount for the competences 
exclusive to the central government, which means they do not participate in “fiscal equalisation”. 
37  The calculation of the adjusted population used to distribute transfers includes total population (30%), 
population of school age (20.5%), population over 64 (8.5%), population protected (in terms of health 
spending, 38%), size in km2 (1.8%), dispersion of population (0.6%) and insularity (0.6%). 
38  For more details on the Spanish tax structure, see López-Rodríguez and García-Ciria (2018). 
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Table 11 
Fiscal decentralisation in Spain 
 
1999 2017 Change 
Fiscal decentralisation indicators (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Reven e decentralisation (%)1) 20.5 28.2 7.7 
ax rev nue decentralisation (%)2) 26.0 38.0 12.0 
   based on tax-s tting autonomy (%) 21.9 34.2 12.3 
Expenditure decentralisation (%)1) 38.6 44.4 5.8 
Vertical imbal nce (% of GDP)3) 7.87 8.46 0.59 
Vertic l imbalance (% of own expenditur )3) 49.5 45.90 -3.64 
Sub-national public finances (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Total (% of nation l GDP) 9.60 27.20 17.60 
   Mean5) (% of regional GDP) 5.29 23.67 18.38 
   Range (% of regio al GDP) 6.70 28.25 21.55 
   Coefficient of vari tion (% of regional GDP) 0.42 0.33 -0.10 
Source: national statistics. 
1) Sha e of consolidated revenue (expenditure) of regional and l cal government in total revenue (exp nditure) of general government. 
Based on national accounts. 
2) Share of egion l and local government tax reve ue in total federal, regional and local government tax rev nue. Tax-setting autonomy: 
share of revenue from regional and local government taxes for which the tax rates are set autonomously. Based on government finance 
statistics. 
3) Transfers received by consolidated regional and local government from central government and social security. Based on national 
accounts. 
4) Debt of regional and local government incurred with the public and non-public sector. Based on national annual debt statistics. 
5) Not population-weighted. 
The Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability passed in 2012 includes a 
no-bailout clause (Article 8), under which the State will not be liable for the 
commitments of autonomous regions, local authorities or their dependent bodies.39 In 
addition, autonomous communities are subject to the same budgetary rules as the 
general government, nam ly, to maintain a struct rally bala c  budget, an 
expenditure rule and a debt rule.40 Local governments also face an expenditure and 
debt rule, while they have to maintain a balanced budget. 
With respect to debt, before the 2008 crisis autonomous communities financed 
themselves m inly by dir ctly issuing d bt on the markets with no explicit central 
government guarantee. However, the central government provided them with 
extraor i ary liquidity support mechanisms in 2012 in the form of bilateral loans in 
resp nse to the deterioration of public finances during the crisis, which more than 
doubled the share of debt over GDP in the hands of autonomous communities. All 
these mechanisms were consolidated in 2015 to form the Autonomous Communities 
Financing Fund, which enabled the regions to exploit the low financing costs enjoyed 
by the Spanish Treasury, causing this to become their main source of funding. 
Although the law allows for these types of extraordinary mechanisms, it also imposes 
strict conditions on the regions’ budgetary performance. Nevertheless, given relatively 
weak enforcement by the central government of these conditions since setting up the 
fund, keeping it indefinitely may create negative fiscal incentives and moral hazard 
issues as well as negative int rac ions with the framework of b dgetary rules. In fact, 
                                                                    
39  Without prejudice to any mutual financial guarantees given when carrying out specific projects jointly. 
This wording is similar to that describing relationships between Member States in Article 125 of the 
consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
40  In addition, all government sectors are subject to a limit on the time taken to pay their suppliers. 
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no-bailout clause (Article 8), under which the State will not be liable for the 
commitments of autonomous regions, local authorities or their dependent bodies.39 In 
addition, autonomous communities are subject to the same budgetary rules as the 
general government, namely, to maintain a structurally balanced budget, an 
expenditure rule and a debt rule.40 Local governments also face an expenditure and 
debt rule, while they have to maintain a balanced budget. 
With respect to debt, b fore the 2008 crisis autonomous communities financed 
themselves mainly by directly issuing debt on the markets with no explicit central 
governm nt guara t . How ver, the central gov r ment provid  them with 
extraordinary liquidity support mechanisms in 2012 in the form of bilat r l loans in 
response to the deterioration of public finances during the crisis, which more than 
doubled the s are of debt ov r GDP in the hands of autonomous communities. All 
these mechanisms w re consolidated in 2015 to form the Autonomous Communities 
Financing Fund, which enabled the regions to exploit the low financing costs enjoyed 
by the Spanish Treasury, causing this to become their main source of funding. 
Although the law allows for these types of extraordinary mechanisms, it also imposes 
strict conditions on the regions’ budgetary performance. Nevertheless, given relatively 
weak enforcement by the central government of these conditions since setting up the 
fund, keeping it indefinitely may create negative fiscal incentives and moral hazard 
issues as well as negative interactions with the framework of budgetary rules. In fact, 
                                                                    
39  Without prejudice to any mutual financial guarantees given when carrying out specific projects jointly. 
This wording is similar to that describing relationships between Member States in Article 125 of the 
consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
40  In addition, all government sectors are subject to a limit on the time taken to pay their suppliers. 
Budgetary framework: fiscal rules 
and bailouts 
 
ECB Occasional Paper Series No 239 / April 2020 
 
34 
Table 11 
Fiscal decentralisation in Spain 
 
1999 2017 Change 
Fiscal decentralisation indicators (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Revenue decentralisation (%)1) 20.5 28.2 7.7 
Tax revenue decentralisation (%)2) 26.0 38.0 12.0 
   based on tax-setting autonomy (%) 21.9 34.2 12.3 
Expenditure decentralisation (%)1) 38.6 44.4 5.8 
Vertical imbalance (% of GDP)3) 7.87 8.46 0.59 
Vertical imbalance (% of own expenditure)3) 49.5 45.90 -3.64 
Sub-national public finances (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Total (% of national GDP) 9.60 27.20 17.60 
   Mean5) (% of regional GDP) 5.29 23.67 18.38 
   Range (% of regional GDP) 6.70 28.25 21.55 
   Coefficient of variation (% of regional GDP) 0.42 0.33 -0.10 
Source: national statistics. 
1) Share of consolidated revenue (expenditure) of regional and local government in total revenue (expenditure) of general government. 
Bas d on national ccounts. 
2) Share of regional and local government tax revenue in total federal, regional and local government tax revenue. Tax-setting autonomy: 
share of revenue from regional and local government taxes for which the t x rates are set autonomously. Based on government finance 
statistics. 
3) Transfers received by consolidated regional and loc l governme t from central government and s cial security. Based on national 
accounts. 
4) Debt of regional and local government incurred with the public and non-public sector. Based on national annual debt tatistics. 
5) Not population-weighted. 
The Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability passed in 2012 includes a 
no-bailout clause (Article 8), under which the State will not be liable for the 
commitments of autonomous regions, local authorities or their dependent bodies.39 In 
addition, autonomous communities are subject to the same budgetary rules as the 
general government, namely, to maintain a structurally balanced budget, an 
expenditure rule and a debt rule.40 Local governments also face an expenditure and 
debt rule, while they have to maintain a balanced budget. 
With respect to debt, before the 2008 crisis autonomous communities financed 
themselves mainly by directly issuing debt on the markets with no explicit central 
g v r ment guarantee. However, the central government provided them with 
extraordin ry liquidity support mechanisms in 2012 in the form of bilateral loans in 
response to the deterioration of public finances during the crisis, which more than 
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these mechanisms were consolidated in 2015 to form the Autonomous Communities 
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fund, keeping it indefinitely may create negative fiscal incentives and moral hazard 
issues as well as negative interactions with the framework of budgetary rules. In fact, 
                                                                    
39  Without prejudice to any mutual financial guarantees given when carrying out specific projects jointly. 
This wording is simil r to that describing relatio ships between Member State  in Article 125 of the 
consolidated version of the Tr aty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
40  In addition, all government sectors are subject to a limit on the time taken to pay th ir suppliers. 
Budgetary framework: fiscal rules 
an  bailouts 
 
ECB Occasional Paper Series No 239 / April 2020
 
34 
Table 11 
Fiscal decentralisation in Spain 
 
1999 2017 Change 
Fiscal decentralisation indicators (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Revenue decentralisation (%)1) 20.5 28.2 7.7 
Tax revenue decentralisation (%)2) 26.0 38.0 12.0 
   b sed on tax-setting autonomy (%) 21.9 34.2 12.3 
Expenditure decentralisation (%)1) 38.6 44.4 5.8 
Vertical imbalance (% of GDP)3) 7.87 8.46 0.59 
Vertical mbalance (% of own expenditure)3) 49.5 45.90 -3.64 
Sub-national public finances (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Total (% of national GDP) 9.60 27.20 17.60 
   Mean5) (% of regional GDP) 5.29 23.67 18.38 
   Range (% of regional GDP) 6.70 28.25 21.55 
   Coefficient of variation (% of regional GDP) 0.42 0.33 -0.10 
Source: nati al statistics. 
1) Share of consolidated revenue (expenditure) of regional and local government in total revenue (expenditure) of general government. 
Based on national accounts.
2) Share of gion l and local government tax reve ue in total federal, regional and local government tax rev nue. Tax-s tting auto omy:
hare of revenue from regional and local government taxes for which the tax rates are set autonomously. Based on government finance 
statistics. 
3) Transfers received by consolidated regional and local govern ent from central government and social security. Based on na ional 
accou ts. 
4 Debt f regi al nd local government incurred with the public and no -public s ctor. Based on national annual debt statistics. 
5) Not population-weighted. 
The Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability passed in 2012 includes a 
no-bailout clause (Article 8), under which the State will not be liable for the 
commitments of autonomous regions, local authorities or their dependent bodies.39 In 
addition, autonomous communities are subject to the same budgetary rules as the 
general government, namely, to maintain a structurally balanced budget, an 
expenditure rule and a debt rule.40 Local governments also face an expenditure and 
debt rule, while they have to maintain a balanced budget. 
ith respect to debt, b fore the 2008 crisis autonomous communities financed 
themselves m inly by directly issuing debt n the markets with no explicit central 
governm nt guara t . How ver, the entral gov r ment provid  them with 
extraordinary liquidity support mechanisms in 2012 in the form of bilat r l loans in 
response to the deterioratio  of public fina ces during the crisis, which more than 
doubled the s are of debt ov r GDP in the hands of autonomous communities. All 
these mechanisms w re consolidated in 2015 to form the Autonomous Communities 
Financing Fund, which enabled the regions to exploit the low financing costs enjoyed 
by the Spanish Treasury, causing this to become their main source of funding. 
Although the law allows for these types of extraordinary mechanisms, it also imposes 
strict conditions on the regions’ budgetary performance. Nevertheless, given relatively 
weak enforcement by the central government of these conditions since setting up the 
fund, keeping it indefinitely may create negative fiscal incentives and moral hazard 
issues as well as negative int rac ions with the framework of b dgetary rules. In fact, 
                                                                    
39  Without prejudice to any mutual financial guarantees given when carrying out specific projects jointly. 
This wording is similar to that describing relationships between Member States in Article 125 of the 
consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
40  In addition, all government sectors are subject to a limit on the time taken to pay their suppliers. 
Budgetary framework: fiscal rules 
and bailouts 
 
ECB Occasional Paper Series No 239 / April 2020 
 
34 
Table 11 
Fiscal d entral sation in Spain 
 
1999 2017 Change 
Fiscal decentralisation indicators (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Revenue decentralisation (%)1) 20.5 28.2 7.7 
Tax revenue decentralisation (%)2) 26.0 38.0 12.0 
   based on tax-setting autonomy (%) 21.9 34.2 12.3 
Expenditure decentralisation (%)1) 38.6 44.4 5.8 
Vertical imbalance (% of GDP)3) 7.87 8.46 0.59 
Vertical imbalance (% of own expenditure)3) 49.5 45.90 -3.64 
Sub-national public finances (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Total (% of national GDP) 9.60 27.20 17.60 
   Mean5) (% of regional GDP) 5.29 23.67 18.38 
   Rang  (% of regional GDP) 6.70 28.25 21.55 
   C efficient of v riati  (% of regional GDP) 0.42 0.33 -0.10 
Source: national statistics. 
1 Share of consolidated revenue ( xpenditure) of regional and local government in total revenue (expenditure) of gen ral government. 
Based on national accounts. 
2 Share of regional and local government tax evenue in total federal, regional and local governme t ax reve ue. Tax-setting autonomy: 
share of revenue from r gional and local government taxes for which the tax rates are set autonomously. Based on government finance 
statistics. 
3) Transfers received by consolidated regional and local government from centr l government and social security. Based on national 
accou ts. 
4) Debt of regional and local government incurred with the public and non-public sector. Based on national annual debt statistics. 
5) Not population-weighted. 
Law o  Budgetary Stability and Fin ncial Sustainability passed in 2012 includes a 
n -b lout clause (Article 8), under which the St te will not be liable for the 
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39  Without prejudice to any mutual financial guara ees iven when carrying out specific projects jointly. 
This wording is similar to that describing relationships between Member States in Article 125 of the 
consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
40  In addition, all government sectors are subject to a limit on the time taken to pay their suppliers. 
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no-bailout clause (Article 8), under which the State will not be liable for the 
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expenditure rule and a debt rule.40 Local governments also face an expenditure and 
debt rule, while they have to maintain a balanced budget. 
With respect to debt, before the 2008 crisis autonomous communities financed 
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extraordinary liquidity support mechanisms in 2012 in the form of bilateral loans in 
response to the deterioration of public finances during the crisis, which more than 
doubled the share of debt over GDP in the hands of autonomous communities. All 
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issues as well as negative interactions with the framework of budgetary rules. In fact, 
                                                                    
39  Without prejudice to any mutual financial guarantees given when carrying out specific projects jointly. 
This wording is similar to that describing relationships between Member States in Article 125 of the 
consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
40  In addition, all government sectors are subject to a limit on the time taken to pay their suppliers. 
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these liquidity mechanisms have not helped to reduce the great dispersion in debt 
lev ls across egions, amounting to more than 28 percentage points of GDP in 2017. 
4.4.2 Mechanisms for macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence 
The main sources of funding for the autonomous communities and municipalities are 
their own taxes and transfers under the Funding System of the Autonomous 
Communities (FSA) and the Funding System of the Municipalities (FSM). Neither of 
the transfer systems have macroeconomic stabilisation as their main objective. 
Instead, the FSA aims to broadly level out per capita tax revenue across regions, by 
ensuring that essential public services are provided at a similar level and quality, while 
the FSM distributes the transfers from the central government according to 
population.41 Since the latest reform of the FSA in 2009,42 this has been implemented 
through two types of instrument (see Table 12). 
Table 12 
Overview over intergovernmental transfer schemes 
  
Guarantee 
Fund (GF) 
Sufficiency 
Fund (SF) 
Convergence 
Fund (CF) 
All 
funds 
(GF+SF
+CF) 
Financial 
facility for the 
autonomous 
communities 
Financial 
facility for 
local 
governments 
Macroeconomic objective/effect Conv rgence Maintain 
status quo 
Conv rgence  Macro 
stabilisation 
Macro 
stabilisation 
   Activation trigger Differences in 
regional tax 
revenues per 
capita 
Differences 
from 
situation in 
base year 
Differences in 
regional 
i co e per 
capita 
 Financial 
restrictions, no 
funding 
possible 
Financial 
restrictions, no 
funding 
possible 
   Transfer direction Horizontal/ 
vertical 
Vertical Vertical  Vertical Vertical 
Size       
   Formula/total available funds (% of  
   GDP) 
7.2% 
(2016)1) 
0.1% 
(2016) 
0.4% 
(2016) 
7.8% 
(2016) 
2.4% 
(2017) 
0.1% 
(2017) 
   Net realised transfers (% of GDP) 0.1% 
(2016) 
0.3% 
(2016) 
0.1% 
(2016) 
0.4% 
(2016) 
  
1) Total autonomous community government financial capacity (as defined in the Funding System of the Autonomous Communities) incl. 
supplementary central government transfers. 
                                                               
41  Population is rescaled by size, with a scaling factor of 2.8 for municipalities with a population in excess of 
0.5 million, 1.7 for those between 0.1 and 0.5 million and 1.32 for those between 0.05 and 0.1 million. In 
addition, the 2002 reform also granted the largest cities a proportion of the personal income tax 
(1.6875%), VAT (1.7897%) and excise duties (2.0454%)) generated in the region and distributed 
according to population. 
42  Prior to 2009 the regional financing system was governed by the 2002 reform. The main difference is that 
the previous system funded all competencies instead of only basic public services. In addition, the share 
of centrally collected taxes distributed to regions has increased since 2009 (personal income tax from 
33% to 50%, VAT from 35% to 50% and excise duties on alcohol, tobacco, etc. from 40% to 58%). 
The FSA’s main objective is to 
reduce disparities across regions, 
not achieve macro stability. 
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Table 11 
Fiscal decentralisation in Spain 
 
1999 2017 Change 
Fiscal decentralisation indicators (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Revenue decentralisation (%)1) 20.5 28.2 7.7 
Tax revenue decentralisation (%)2) 26.0 38.0 12.0 
   based on tax-setting autonomy (%) 21.9 34.2 12.3 
Expenditure decentralisation (%)1) 38.6 44.4 5.8 
Vertical imbalance (% of GDP)3) 7.87 8.46 0.59 
Vertical imbalance (% of own expenditure)3) 49.5 45.90 -3.64 
Sub-national public finances (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Total (% of national GDP) 9.60 27.20 17.60 
   Mean5) (% of regional GDP) 5.29 23.67 18.38 
   Range (% of regional GDP) 6.70 28.25 21.55 
   Coefficient of variation (% of regional GDP) 0.42 0.33 -0.10 
Source: national statistics. 
1) Share of consolidated revenue (expenditure) of regional and local government in total revenue (expenditure) of general government. 
Based on national accounts. 
2) Share of regional and local government tax revenue in total federal, regional and local government tax revenue. Tax-setting autonomy: 
share of revenue from regional and local government taxes for which the tax rates are set autonomously. Based on government finance 
statistics. 
3) Transfers received by consolidated regional and local government from central government and social security. Based on national 
accounts. 
4) Debt of regional and local government incurred with the public and non-public sector. Based on national annual debt statistics. 
5) Not population-weighted. 
The Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability passed in 2012 includes a 
no-bailout clause (Article 8), under which the State will not be liable for the 
commitments of autonomous regions, local authorities or their dependent bodies.39 In 
addition, autonomous communities are subject to the same budgetary rules as the 
general government, namely, to maintain a structurally balanced budget, an 
expenditure rule and a debt rule.40 Local governments also face an expenditure and 
debt rule, while they have to maintain a balanced budget. 
With respect to debt, before the 2008 crisis autonomous communities financed 
themselves ainly by directly issuing debt on the markets with no explicit central 
government guarantee. However, the central government provided them with 
extraordinary liquidity support mechanisms in 2012 in the form of bilateral loans in 
response to the deterioration of public finances during the crisis, which more than 
doubled the share of debt over GDP in the hands of autonomous communities. All 
these mechanisms were consolidated in 2015 to form the Autonomous Communities 
Financing Fund, which enabled the regions to exploit the low financing costs enjoyed 
by the Spanish Treasury, c usi g this to become their mai  sourc  of funding. 
Al hough the law allows for these types of extraordinary mechanisms, it also imposes 
strict conditions on the regions’ budgetary performance. Nevertheless, given relatively 
weak enf rc m nt by the central government of these conditions since setting up the 
fund, keeping it indefinitely may create negative fiscal incentives and moral hazard 
issues as well as negative interactions with the framework of budgetary rules. In fact, 
                                                                    
39  Without prejudice to any mutual financial guarantees given when carrying out specifi  projects joi tly.
This wording is similar to that describing relationships between Member States in Article 125 of the 
consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
40  In addition, all government sectors are subject to a limit on the time taken to pay their suppliers. 
Budgetary framework: fiscal rules 
and bailouts 
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First, the purpose of the Guarantee Fund for Fundamental Public Services is to ensure 
that each region r cei s the same re ources per inhabitant to finance the public 
services related to the welfare state. Each autonomous community contributes 75% of 
its own tax revenues to the fund,43 while the rest comes from the central government. 
The funds are then redistribute  back to the autonomous co munities according to 
adjusted population. Its implementation has resulted i  a significant reduction in the 
differences in re ources cro s areas (the standard deviation of the index of funding 
per inhabitant measured at homogenous competencies in 2016 falls from 24 to 7), 
while broadly respecting the initial ordering according to fiscal capacity. 
Second, there are two vertical funds. Th  purpose f the Suffici ncy Fund is to
maintain the initial status quo, as reflected in the level of funding enjoyed by each 
auton mous commu ity in the bas  ye r (2007). This is achieved by ssigning the 
difference between the total transfers received in that year, updated with the growth 
rate of the central government’s tax rev n es, and t e amounts due from the 
Guarantee Fund.44 As a result, this fund slightly reverses the reduction of differences 
achieved by the Guarantee Fund (increasing the standard deviation of the index of 
funding per inhabitant from 7 to 8 in 2016) and changes completely and arbitrarily the 
initial ordering of autonomous communities according to their fiscal capacity to such 
an extent that the correlation between the initial and the final ordering is close to 
zero.45 This creates clear negative fiscal incentives, since some autonomous regions 
with below (above) the mean financial capacity are penalised (benefit) due to their 
relatively lower (greater) trength in the initial negotiating process. Finally, the vertical 
Convergence Funds are received by all regions, with the amounts being determined 
according to several criteria, including per capita income, population growth and 
relative transfers per inhabitant. However, since the dispersion of these funds across 
regions is much smaller than in the other cases, they do not significantly affect th  
relative positions. 
4.4.3 The socioeconomic situation of Spanish autonomous communities 
The 17 autonomous communities have significant economic disparities, due mainly to 
historical differences in economic structure and specialisation (see Table 13a). 
Historically, the more agriculture-oriented southern, western and central regions of the 
country (excluding Madrid) have lower levels of nominal GDP (more than 
20 percentage points below the mean) than the more industrialised or 
services-oriented Madrid, Catalonia, Basque Country and Balearic Islands regions 
(more than 20 percentage points above the mean). Over the period 1999-2017, some 
catching up is observed during the boom (until 2007), which is almost completely 
reversed during the crisis (2008-2012). These differences remain largely unchanged 
when looking at primary income per capita, which accounts for cross-border factor 
                                                                    
43  The region’s tax revenues include a percentage of the revenues of the taxes generated in each region but 
collected centrally (50% of personal income tax and VAT, 58% of special taxes, 100% of electricity and 
hydrocarbon taxes and car registration taxes) and all the revenues from the taxes collected locally 
(wealth tax, inheritance and donation tax, stamp duty and game tax). 
44  The FS also includes funds to finance competencies only assumed by some regions. 
45  See Commission on the Reform of the Financing of Spanish Autonomous Regions (2017). 
The Guarantee Fund significantly 
reduces regional differences in fiscal 
capacity. 
The vertical funds increase regional 
fiscal differences and arbitrarily alter 
the initial ordering. 
Economic performance differs 
considerably across Spanish 
regions in spite of strong 
interrelations. 
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Table 11 
Fi al d centralisation in Sp in 
 
1999 2017 Change 
Fiscal decentralisation indicators (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Revenue decentralisation (%)1) 20.5 28.2 7.7 
Tax revenue decentralisation (%)2) 26.0 38.0 12.0 
   based on tax-setting autonomy (%) 21.9 34.2 12.3 
Expenditure de entralisation (%)1) 38.6 44.4 5.8 
V rti al imbalance (% of GDP)3) 7.87 8.46 0.59 
Vertical i balance (% of own expenditure)3) 49.5 45.90 -3.64 
Sub-national public finances (regional and local gov. consolidated) 
Total (% of na i nal GDP) 9.60 27.20 17.60 
   Mean5) (% of regional GDP) 5.29 23.67 18.38 
   Range (% of regional GDP) 6.70 28.25 21.55 
   Coefficient of variation (% of regional GDP) 0.42 0.33 -0.10 
Source: national statistics. 
1) Share of consolidated revenue (expenditure) of r gional and local government in total revenue (expenditure) of general governm nt. 
Based on national accounts. 
2) Share of regional a d local government tax revenue in total federal, regi nal and local gov rnment tax r venue. Tax-setting utonom : 
share of revenue from regional and local government taxes for which the tax rates are set autonomously. Based on government finance 
statistics. 
3) Transfers received by consolidated regional and local government from central government and social security. Based on national 
accounts. 
4) Debt of regional and local government incurred with the public and non-public sector. Based on national a nual debt statistics. 
5) Not population-weighted. 
The Law on Budget r Stability and Fina cial Sustainabilit  passed in 2012 includes a 
no-bailout clause (Article 8), under which the State will not be liable for the 
commitments of autono ous regions, local authorities or their dependent bodies.39 In 
addition, autonomous co munities are subject to the same budgetary rules as the 
general government, na ely, to aintain a structurally balanced budget, an 
expenditure rule and a debt rule.40 Local governments also face an expenditu e and 
debt rule, while they have to maintain a bal nced budget. 
With respect to debt, before the 2008 crisis autonomous communities financed 
themselves mainly by directly issuing debt on the markets with no explicit central 
government guarantee. However, the central government provided the  with 
extraordinary liquidity support mechanisms in 2012 in the form of bilateral loans in 
response to the deterioration of public finances during the crisis, which more than 
doubled the share of debt over GDP in the hands of autonomous communities. All 
these mechanisms were consolidated in 2015 to form the Autonomous Communities 
Financing Fund, which enabled the regions to exploit the low financing costs enjoyed 
by the Spanish Treasury, causing this to become their main source of funding. 
Although the law allows for these types of extraordinary mechanisms, it also imposes 
strict conditions on the regions’ budgetary performance. Nevertheless, given relatively 
we k e forcement by the central governm nt of hese conditi ns since setting up the 
fund, keeping it indefinitely may create negative fiscal incentives and moral hazard 
issues as well as negative interactions with the framework of budgetary rules. In fact, 
                                                           
39 Without prejudice to any mutual financial guarantees give  when carrying out specif c projects jointly. 
This word ng is simil r to that describing relationships between Member States in Article 125 of the 
consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
40  In a dition, all government sectors are subject to a limit on the tim taken to pay their suppliers. 
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these liquidity mechanisms have not helped to reduce the great dispersion in debt 
levels across regions, amounting to more than 28 percentage points of GDP in 2017. 
4.4.2 Mechanisms for macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence 
The main sources of funding for the autonomous communities and municipalities are 
their own taxes and transfers under the Funding System of the Autonomous 
Communities (FSA) and the Funding System of the Municipalities (FSM). Neither of 
the transfer systems have macroeconomic stabilisation as their main objective. 
Instead, the FSA aims to broadly level out per capita tax revenue across regions, by 
ensuring that essential public services are provided at a similar level and quality, while 
the FSM distributes the transfers from the central government according to 
population.41 Since the latest reform of the FSA in 2009,42 this has been implemented 
through two types of instrument (see Table 12). 
Table 12 
Overview over intergovernmental transfer schemes 
  
Guarantee 
Fund (GF) 
Sufficiency 
Fund (SF) 
Convergence 
Fund (CF) 
All 
funds 
(GF+SF
+CF) 
Financial 
facility for the 
autonomous 
communities 
Financial 
facility for 
local 
governments 
Macroeconomic objective/effect Convergence Maintain 
status quo 
Convergence  Macro 
stabilisation 
Macro 
stabilisation 
   Activation trigger Differences in 
regional tax 
revenues per 
capita 
Differences 
from 
situation in 
base year 
Differences in 
regional 
income per 
capita 
 Financial 
restrictions, no 
funding 
possible 
Financial 
restrictions, no 
funding 
possible 
   Transfer direction Horizontal/ 
vertical 
Vertical Vertical  Vertical Vertical 
Size       
   Formula/total available funds (% of  
   GDP) 
7.2% 
(2016)1) 
0.1% 
(2016) 
0.4% 
(2016) 
7.8% 
(2016) 
2.4% 
(2017) 
0.1% 
(2017) 
   Net realised transfers (% of GDP) 0.1% 
(2016) 
0.3% 
(2016) 
0.1% 
(2016) 
0.4% 
(2016) 
  
1) Total autonomous community government financial capacity (as defined in the Funding System of the Autonomous Communities) incl. 
supplementary central government transfers. 
                                                                    
41  Population is rescaled by size, with a scaling factor of 2.8 for municipalities with a population in excess of 
0.5 million, 1.7 for those between 0.1 and 0.5 million and 1.32 for those between 0.05 and 0.1 million. In 
addition, the 2002 reform also granted the largest cities a proportion of the personal income tax 
(1.6875%), VAT (1.7897%) and excise duties (2.0454%)) generated in the region and distributed 
according to population. 
42  Prior to 2009 the regional financing system was governed by the 2002 reform. The main difference is that 
the previous system funded all competencies instead of only basic public services. In addition, the share 
of centrally collected taxes distributed to regions has increased since 2009 (personal income tax from 
33% to 50%, VAT from 35% to 50% and excise duties on alcohol, tobacco, etc. from 40% to 58%). 
The FSA’s main objective is to 
reduce disparities across regions, 
not achieve macro stability. 
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First, the purpose of the Guarantee Fund for Fundamental Public Services is to ensure 
that each region receives the same resources per inhabitant to finance the public 
services related to he welfare st te. Each autonomous com unity contributes 75% of
its own tax revenues to the fund,43 while the rest comes from the central government. 
The funds are then redistributed back to the autonomous communities according to 
adjusted population. Its implementation has resulted in a significant reduction in the 
differences in resources across areas (the standard deviation of the index of funding 
per inhabitant measured at homogenous competencies in 2016 falls from 24 to 7), 
while br adly respecting the initial ordering according to fiscal capacity. 
Second, there are two vertical funds. The purpose of the Sufficiency Fund is to 
maintain the initial status quo, as reflected in the level of funding enjoye  by each 
autonomous community in the base year (2007). This is achieved by assigning the 
difference between the total transfers received in that year, updated with the growth 
rate of the central government’s tax revenues, and the amounts due from the 
Guarantee Fund.44 As a result, this fund slightly reverses the reduction of differences 
achieved by the Guarantee Fund (increasing the standard deviation of the index of 
funding per inhabitant from 7 to 8 in 2016) and changes completely and arbitrarily the 
initial ordering of autonomous communities according to their fiscal capacity to such 
an extent that the correlation between the initial and the final ordering is close to 
zero.45 This creates clear negative fiscal incentives, since some autonomous regions 
with below (above) the mean financial capacity are penalised (benefit) due to their 
relatively lower (greater) strength in the initial negotiating process. Finally, the vertical 
Convergence Funds are received by all regions, with the amounts being determined 
according to several criteria, including per capita income, population growth and 
relative transfers per inhabitant. However, since the dispersion of these funds across 
regions is much smaller than in the other cases, they do not significantly affect the 
relative positions. 
4.4.3 The socioeconomic situation of Spanish autonomous communities 
The 17 autonomous communities have significant economic disparities, due mainly to 
historical differences in economic structure and specialisation (see Table 13a). 
Historically, the more agriculture-oriented southern, western and central regions of the 
country (excluding Madrid) have lower levels of nominal GDP (more than 
20 percentage points below the mean) than the more industrialised or 
services-oriented Madrid, Catalonia, Basque Country and Balearic Islands regions 
(more than 20 percentage points above the mean). Over the period 1999-2017, some 
catching up is observed during the boom (until 2007), which is almost completely 
reversed during the crisis (2008-2012). These differences remain largely unchanged 
when looking at primary income per capita, which accounts for cross-border factor 
                                                                    
43  The region’s tax revenues include a percentage of the revenues of the taxes generated in each region but 
collected centrally (50% of personal income tax and VAT, 58% of special taxes, 100% of electricity and 
hydrocarbon taxes and car registration taxes) and all the revenues from the taxes collected locally 
(wealth tax, inheritance and donation tax, stamp duty and game tax). 
44  The FS also includes funds to finance competencies only assumed by some regions. 
45  See Commission on the Reform of the Financing of Spanish Autonomous Regions (2017). 
The Guarantee Fund significantly 
reduces regional differences in fiscal 
capacity. 
The vertical funds increase regional 
fiscal differences and arbitrarily alter 
the initial ordering. 
Economic performance differs 
considerably across Spanish 
regions in spite of strong 
interrelations. 
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differences in resources across areas (the standard deviation of the index of funding 
p r inhabitant measured at homogenous compet ncies in 2016 falls from 24 t  7), 
while broadly respecting the initial ordering according t  fiscal capacit . 
Second, there are two vertical funds. The purpose of the Sufficiency Fund is to 
maintain the initial status quo, as reflected in the level of funding enjoyed by each 
autonomous community in the base year (2007). This is achieved by assigning the 
difference between the total transfers received in that year, updated with the growth 
rate of the central government’s tax revenues, and the amounts due from the 
Guarantee Fund.44 As a result, this fund slightly reverses the reduction of differences 
achieved by the Guarantee Fund (increasing the standard deviation of the index of 
funding per inhabitant from 7 to 8 in 2016) and changes completely and arbitrarily the 
initial ordering of autonomous communities according to their fiscal capacity to such 
an extent that the correlation between the initial and the final ordering is close to 
zero.45 This creates clear negative fiscal incentives, since some autonomous regions 
with below (above) the mean financial capacity are penalised (benefit) due to their 
relatively lower (greater) strength in the initial negotiating process. Finally, the vertical 
Convergence Funds are received by all regions, with the amounts being determined 
acc rding to sev ral crit ia, inclu ing p r ca ita incom , population growth and 
relative tran fer  per inhabitant. How v r, since the dispersio  of thes  funds cross 
regions is mu h s aller than in the othe cases, they do not significantly affect t  
relative positions. 
4.4.3 The socio conomic situation of Sp i h auton mous communities 
The 17 autonomous comm nities have signifi ant econ mic disparities, due mainly to 
historical differences in ec omic structure and specialisation (s e Table 13a). 
Historically, the more agriculture-oriented southern, west rn and central regions of the
country (excluding Madrid) have lower levels of nominal GDP (more han 
20 percentag  points below the mean) than the more dustriali ed or 
services-oriented Mad id, Catalonia, Basque Country and Balearic Islands r gions 
(more than 20 percentage poi ts above the me n). Over the period 1999-2017, some 
catching up is observed during the boom (until 2007), which is almost completely 
versed during the crisis (2008-2012). The  differences remain largel  unchanged 
when looking at primary income per capita, which accounts for cross-border factor 
                                                               
3 region’s tax revenues include a p rcentag  of the revenues of the taxes generated in each region but 
collected centrally (50% of personal income tax and VAT, 58% of special taxes, 100% of electricity and 
hydrocarbon taxes and car registration taxes) and all the revenues from the taxes collected locally 
(wealth tax, inheritance and donation tax, stamp duty and game tax). 
44  The FS also includes funds to finance competencies only assumed by some regions. 
45  See Commission on the Reform of the Financing of Spanish Autonomous Regions (2017). 
The Guarantee Fund significantly 
reduces regional differences in fiscal 
capacity. 
The vertical funds increase regional 
fiscal differences and arbitrarily alter 
the initial ordering. 
Economic performance differs 
considerably across Spanish 
regions in spite of strong 
interrelations. 
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incomes, since the contribution of regional commuters is very small in Spain. On the 
contrary, these differences are smaller in terms of per capita disposable income. This 
is mainly the result of national fiscal policy instruments, due to differences between the 
regions in per capita contributions to national taxes and per capita receipts of central 
government or social security transfers, as well as to transfers through the regional 
financing system. 
The variations in the primary per capita income of households between the regions are 
highly correlated with differences in the labour market situation, although some poor 
regions have lower unemployment rates due to the emigration of younger people. At 
the same time, there is a large degree of correlation in unemployment and real 
business cycles, while private consumption growth is correlated to a lesser extent. 
Our calculations indicate that the government sector contributes significantly to the 
smoothing of asymmetric regional shocks (see Table 13b). In particular, the 
government sector smoothed on average around 10.3% of a shock in autonomous 
community GDP in Spain during the period 2003-16.46 Within the government sector, 
by far the biggest contribution to macroeconomic stabilisation and convergence 
across regions comes from the transfers in cash provided centrally – financed by 
central government tax revenues – which smooth 6.1% of shocks. Of these transfers, 
those involving pensions (3.3%) and unemployment benefits (2.6%) play a particularly 
relevant role. The richest autonomous regions, characterised by relatively high per 
capita income, contribute more than the other regions in personal and corporate 
income tax revenues, social security contributions and indirect taxes, which are then 
transferred by the social security system to the poorest regions in the form of 
unemployment benefits and pensions. In addition, the regional financing system also 
plays a significant role in consumption-smoothing (3.3%) because regions contribute 
less to the financing of the common pool in a downturn. It is important to note that the 
smoothing only happens through the advanced payments made during the current 
year.47 This is a consequence of how the transfers from the regional financing system 
are distributed to the regions: advanced payments are made during the current year 
on the basis of the central government’s revenue forecast for taxes collected centrally 
(as included in the Draft Budget Law), while the differences from the final outcome are 
settled two years later. Finally, the factor and credit markets each assumed a 
significant contribution (29%), while 35% of shocks remained unsmoothed. 
                                                                    
46  The empirical analysis excludes the two “chartered” territories, Basque Country and Navarra, which do 
not participate in the fiscal equalisation system, since they collect almost all taxes and send to the central 
government a pre-arranged amount for the competences exclusive to the state. In addition, we start in 
2003 to exclude the impact of the 2002 reform. 
47  Although the main aim of the regional financing system is not risk-sharing, it could help to absorb 
asymmetric regional shocks to tax revenues since the system’s transfers are inversely related to the 
financial capacities of the individual states in relation to the national average. 
Empirical results show that the 
greatest macro stabilisation comes 
from social transfers in cash at the 
central government level, while the 
FSA does not seem to play a 
significant role. 
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relatively lower (greater) strength in the initial negotiating process. Finally, the vertical 
Convergence Funds are received by all regions, with the amounts being determined 
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relative transfers per inhabitant. However, since the dispersion of these funds across 
regions is much smaller than in the other cases, they do not significantly affect the 
relative positions. 
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country (excluding Madrid) have lower levels of nominal GDP (more than 
20 percentage points below the mean) than the more industrialised or 
services-oriented Madrid, Catalonia, Basque Country and Balearic Islands regions 
(more than 20 percentage points above the mean). Over the period 1999-2017, some 
catching up is observed during the boom (until 2007), which is almost completely 
reversed during the crisis (2008-2012). These differences remain largely unchanged 
when looking at primary income per capita, which accounts for cross-border factor 
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Table 13 
Economic performance and fiscal risk sharing in Spain 
a) Economic performance (interregion variation) in Spain 
 
1999 2017 1999-2017 (average) 
Mean4) Range 
Coefficient 
of variation Mean4) Range 
Coefficient 
of variatio  Mean4) 
Correlation 
coefficient5) 
Nominal GDP per capita (EUR) 14,620 10,183 0.21 24,483 16,560 0.20 19,552 0.20 
Nominal primary income per capita 
(EUR) 14,845 10,764 0.21 20,573 15,230 0.20 17,709 0.21 
Nominal disposable income per 
capita (EUR) 12,609 7,677 0.17 18,515 12,095 0.17 15,562 0.17 
Real GDP growth per capita (%)1) 4.2 5.1 0.32 2.7 3.3 0.28 3.4 0.30 
Real private consumption growth 
per capita (%)1) 2) 2.9 5.4 0.40 1.1 9.6 2.50 2.0 1.45 
Unemployment rate (%)3) 14.2 19.1 0.36 16.1 16.0 0.31 15.1 0.33 
b) Share of GDP shocks smoothed by fiscal channel over the period 2013-2016 in Spain 
Total government 
   of which 
10.3% 
(5.5) 
*  
   Federal taxes/social contributions -5.5% 
(3.9) 
  
   Federal social benefits 
      of which 
6.1% 
(1.7) 
***  
         Unemployment benefits 2.6% 
(1.4) 
*  
         Pensions 3.3% 
(1.6) 
**  
   Intergovernmental transfers 
      of which 
4.5% 
(3.9) 
  
         Advanced payments of reg. financing system 3.0% 
(1.6) 
*  
         Liquidation of reg. financing system (t-2) 0.9% 
(3.7) 
  
Source: national statistics. 
1) Calculations based on region-specific chain price indices. Regional data for private consumption are only available until 2016. 
2) 1999 data refer to 2001. 
3) As a % of dependent labour force. 
4) Not population-weighted. 
5) Mean of regions' correlation coefficients 1999-2017 (correlation between individual region and total figures). 
6) New calculations based on Asdrubali t al. (1996). Excluding the two "chartered" territories, which do not participate i  the fiscal 
equalisation system. 
4.5 United States 
4.5.1 The US fiscal-federal system 
The US constitution assigns considerable fiscal autonomy to state governments, 
allowing them considerable leeway to decide on their tax and expenditure structures 
and their system of local government (see, for example, Laubach (2005)). Regarding 
taxation, state governments have the right to levy taxes and regulate taxation at the 
local level. While there is no tax-sharing arrangement in the US system, the different 
levels of government to some extent co-exploit major revenue sources. Both the 
federal government and state governments levy personal income taxes, for example. 
The United States is characterised 
by a fairly decentralised 
fiscal-federal system, with 
pronounced expenditure 
decentralisation and tax autonomy 
at the state and local level. 
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Nevertheless, a division of major tax bases has developed over time, with the federal 
government focusing on income taxes whereas state and local governments rely more 
strongly on sales and property taxation respectively. Most major public expenditure 
functions are performed at the state or local government level, including education 
spending and the provision of social services and public infrastructure, while the 
federal government budget mainly covers national defence spending, pensions, 
health insurance and grants to state governments. 
In 2016 state and local governments in the United States received 42.4% of general 
government revenues, while the sub-national spending share amounted to almost 
50% (see Table 14). State and local tax revenues accounted for around a third of total 
taxes in the same year. The degree of vertical imbalance – the gap between 
sub-national governments’ own revenue and spending for the state and local 
governments – reached 3.3% of GDP or 23.3% of state and local government 
spending. This implies that around a quarter of sub-national spending is financed via 
intergovernmental transfers from the federal level (including social security). Despite 
the pronounced fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments in the United States, 
there is therefore a significant fiscal interconnection between different layers of 
government which has grown over time. Table 13 shows how vertical fiscal 
imbalances rose significantly between 1999 and 2016 in terms of both GDP and 
expenditure share. 
In the US system, there are no centrally imposed restrictions on state and local 
government public finances and therefore no explicit responsibility of the federal 
government for sub-national government debt. Due to the credible federal no-bailout 
policy, the fiscally autonomous states are subject to market-based surveillance (see, 
for example, Bayoumi et al. (1995)) and therefore operate under self-imposed fiscal 
constraints. On the ground, the vast majority of states abide by some form of balanced 
budget requirement (BBR) which, however, typically refers to the operating budget 
and exempts capital spending, which can be debt financed. The BBRs vary 
significantly in terms of stringency and design: in some states, the budget only needs 
to be balanced ex ante, at the stage of political adoption, while in others there is the 
requirement of ex post balance. The debt-to-GDP ratio at the state and local level 
amounted to around 16% in 2016 (in weighted terms), up from around 14% in 1999 
(see Table 13). The mean (unweighted ratio) remained relatively stable over the 
period 1999-2016. State and local debt accounts for a relatively small portion of the 
general government debt ratio which stood at around 107% in 2016. At the same time, 
there is significant interstate variation in debt-to-GDP levels, considering the range of 
around 18% of GDP in 2016. The highest ratio in 2016, of around 23% of GDP, was 
recorded in the state of New York. 
Around one-third of tax revenues in 
the United States are raised at the 
state and local level while the ratio of 
sub-national-to-total spending 
amounts to around 50%. 
In the absence of federal 
responsibility for sub-national 
government debt, state 
governments mostly operate under 
self-imposed balanced budget rules. 
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5) Mean of regions' correlation coefficients 1999-2017 (correlation between individual region and total figures). 
6) New calculations based on Asdrubali et al. (1996). Excluding the two "chartered" territories, which do not participate in the fiscal 
equalisation system. 
4.5 United States 
4.5.1 The US fiscal-federal system 
The US constitution assigns considerable fiscal autonomy to state governments, 
allowing them considerable leeway to decide on their tax and expenditure structures 
and their system of local government (see, for example, Laubach (2005)). Regarding 
taxation, state governments have the right to levy taxes and regulate taxation at the 
local level. While there is no tax-sharing arrangement in the US system, the different 
levels of government to some extent co-exploit major revenue sources. Both the 
federal government and state governments levy personal income taxes, for example. 
The United States is characterised 
by a fairly decentralised 
fiscal-federal system, with 
pronounced expenditure 
decentralisation and tax autonomy 
at the state and local level. 
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Table 14 
Fiscal decentralisation in the United States 
  1999 2016 
Fiscal decentralisation indicators (state and local gov.) 
Revenue decentralisation (%)1) 40.6 42.4 
Tax revenue decentralisation (%)2) 34.2 32.9 
   based on tax-setting autonomy (%) 34.2 32.9 
Expenditure decentralisation (%)1) 50.1 48.4 
Vertical imbalance (% of GDP)3) 3.2 4.3 
Vertical imbalance (% of expenditure) 19.0 23.8 
Sub-national public finances (state and local gov. consolidated) 
Debt (% of GDP)4) 14.2 16.1 
Mean 14.5 14.9 
   Range 21.9 17.8 
   Coefficient of variation 0.3 0.2 
Sources: OECD fiscal decentralisation database, U.S. Census Bureau. 
1) Share of consolidated revenue (expenditure) of state and local government in total revenue (expenditure) of general government. 
2) Share of state and local government tax revenue in total federal, state and local government tax revenue. Tax-setting autonomy: share 
of revenue from state and local government taxes for which the tax rates are set autonomously. 
3) Transfers received by consolidated state and local government from central government and social security. 
4) Debt of state and local government incurred with the public and non-public sector. 
4.5.2 Mechanisms for stabilisation and convergence 
In the United States, there are far smaller intergovernmental grants that redistribute 
central government revenue to the states. Redistribution across states mainly occurs 
via federal grants to states related to public welfare and social security. These include 
differentiated block grants under the federally provided Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) programme as well as state-specific federal matching rates 
for Medicaid (which provides medical insurance for low income households). Table 14 
shows that federal grants to states amounted to around 3½% of GDP in 2016, of which 
more than half were related to public welfare while only a small fraction were linked to 
medical insurance. 
The US unemployment insurance (UI) system is a partnership between the federal 
government, which sets federal guidelines and oversees the UI system, and the 
states, which provide payments to eligible workers under the regular UI programme. 
The federal government supplements these state benefits during times of high 
unemployment via the permanent Extended Benefits (EB) programme and the 
temporary “emergency” benefit extensions that are enacted in specific circumstances, 
most recently following the 2008-09 recession (see, for example, Albrizio et al. 
(2017)). State UI systems vary considerably in the rules governing eligibility for 
benefits, benefit amounts and payroll tax rates. When a state’s unemployment rate is 
high and its benefit payments exceed its payroll tax revenues, the state can draw from 
its account in the federal trust fund to cover the benefit payments or receive federal 
loans. Transfers to households related to the UI system amounted to 0.4% of GDP in 
2016. Following the last recession, these transfers peaked at around 0.7% of GDP in 
2011, partly as a result of federal benefit extension and emergency benefits. 
The US fiscal-federal system is 
characterised by fewer but more 
targeted intergovernmental grants. 
The US unemployment insurance 
programme is administered and 
financed by the states under federal 
guidelines and oversight; during 
times of high unemployment, the 
federal government extends UI 
benefits and/or provides emergency 
compensation. 
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Nevertheless, a division of major tax bases has developed over time, with the federal 
government focusing on income taxes whereas state and local governments rely more 
strongly on sales and property taxation respectively. Most major public expenditure 
functions are performed at the state or local government level, including education 
spending and the provision of social services and public infrastructure, while the 
federal government budget mainly covers national defence spending, pensions, 
health insurance and grants to state governments. 
In 2016 state and local governments in the United States received 42.4% of general 
government revenues, while the sub-national spending share amounted to almost 
50% (see Table 14). State and local tax revenues accounted for around a third of total 
taxes in the same year. The degree of vertical imbalance – the gap between 
sub-national governments’ own revenue and spending for the state and local 
governments – reached 3.3% of GDP or 23.3% of state and local government 
spending. This implies that around a quarter of sub-national spending is financed via 
intergovernmental transfers from the federal level (including social security). Despite 
the pronounced fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments in the United States, 
there is therefore a significant fiscal interconnection between different layers of 
government which has grown over time. Table 13 shows how vertical fiscal 
imbalances rose significantly between 1999 and 2016 in terms of both GDP and 
expenditure share. 
In the US system, there are no centrally imposed restrictions on state and local 
government public finances and therefore no explicit responsibility of the federal 
government for sub-national government debt. Due to the credible federal no-bailout 
policy, the fiscally autonomous states are subject to market-based surveillance (see, 
for example, Bayoumi et al. (1995)) and therefore operate under self-imposed fiscal 
constraints. On the ground, the vast majority of states abide by some form of balanced 
budget requirement (BBR) which, however, typically refers to the operating budget 
and exempts capital spending, which can be debt financed. The BBRs vary 
significantly in terms of stringency and design: in some states, the budget only needs 
to be balanced ex ante, at the stage of political adoption, while in others there is the 
requirement of ex post balance. The debt-to-GDP ratio at the state and local level 
amounted to around 16% in 2016 (in weighted terms), up from around 14% in 1999 
(see Table 13). The mean (unweighted ratio) remained relatively stable over the 
period 1999-2016. State and local debt accounts for a relatively small portion of the 
general government debt ratio which stood at around 107% in 2016. At the same time, 
there is significant interstate variation in debt-to-GDP levels, considering the range of 
around 18% of GDP in 2016. The highest ratio in 2016, of around 23% of GDP, was 
recorded in the state of New York. 
Around one-third of tax revenues in 
the United States are raised at the 
state and local level while the ratio of 
sub-national-to-total spending 
amounts to around 50%. 
In the absence of federal 
responsibility for sub-national 
government debt, state 
governments mostly operate under 
self-imposed balanced budget rules. 
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Table 14 
Fiscal decentralisation in the United States 
  1999 2016 
Fiscal decentralisation indicators (state and local gov.) 
Revenue decentralisation (%)1) 40.6 42.4 
Tax revenue decentralisation (%)2) 34.2 32.9 
   based o  tax-setti g autonomy (%) 34.2 32.9 
Expenditur  decentralisation (%)1) 50.1 48.4 
Vertical imbalance (% of GDP)3) 3.2 4.3 
Vertical imbalance (% of expenditure) 19.0 23.8 
Su -national public finances (state and local gov. consolidated) 
Debt (% of GDP)4) 14.2 16.1 
Mean 14.5 14.9 
   Range 21.9 17.8 
   C efficient of variation 0.3 0.2 
Sources: OECD fiscal decentralisation database, U.S. Census Bureau. 
1) Share of consolidated revenue (expenditure) of sta e a d local government in total r venue (expenditure) of general government. 
2) Share of state and local government tax revenue in total federal, state and local government tax revenue. Tax-setting autonomy: share 
of reve ue from state and local government taxes for which the tax rates are set autonomously. 
3) Transfers received by consolidated state and local government from central government and social security. 
4) Debt of state and local government incurred with the public and non-public sector. 
4.5.2 Mechanisms for stabilisation and convergence 
In the United States, there are far smaller intergovernmental grants that redistribute 
central government revenue to the states. Redistribution across states mainly occurs 
via federal grants to states related to public welfare and social security. These include 
differentiated block grants under the federally provided Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) programme as well as state-specific federal matching rates 
for Medicaid (which provides medical insurance for low income households). Table 14 
shows that federal grants to states amounted to around 3½% of GDP in 2016, of which 
more th n half were r lated to public welfare while only a small fraction were linked to 
medical insurance. 
The US unemployment insurance (UI) system is a partnership between the federal 
government, which sets federal guidelines and oversees the UI system, and the 
states, which provide payments to eligible workers under the regular UI programme. 
The federal government supplements these state benefits during times of high 
unemployment via the permanent Extended Benefits (EB) programme and the 
temporary “emergency” benefit extensions that are enacted in specific circumstances, 
most recently following the 2008-09 recession (see, for example, Albrizio et al. 
(2017)). State UI systems vary considerably in the rules governing eligibility for 
benefits, benefit amounts and payroll tax rates. When a state’s unemployment rate is 
high and its benefit payments exceed its payroll tax revenues, the state can draw from 
its account in the federal trust fund to cover the benefit payments or receive federal 
loans. Transfers to households related to the UI system amounted to 0.4% of GDP in 
2016. Following the last recession, these transfers peaked at around 0.7% of GDP in 
2011, partly as a result of federal benefit extension and emergency benefits. 
The US fiscal-federal system is 
characterised by fewer but more 
targeted intergovernmental grants. 
The US unemployment insurance 
programme is administered and 
financed by the states under federal 
guidelines and oversight; during 
times of high unemployment, the 
federal government extends UI 
benefits and/or provides emergency 
compensation. 
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In 2016 fed ral transfers to private households mou ted to around 10% of GDP. The 
bulk of these transfers relate to social s curity, notably r tirement and disability 
insurance nd various income maintenance programmes such as the earned income 
tax credit. 
Table 15 
Overview of federal fiscal transfers in the United States 
 
Federal grants to 
states 
of which:  
welfare grants 
of which:  
medical grants 
Federal/state 
unemployment 
benefits 
Macroeconomic objective/effect . Redistribution Redistribution Risk sharing 
Activation trigger . . . Unemployment 
rate beyond certain 
threshold 
Transfer direct n Vertical Vertical Vertical Vertical 
Size         
   Total funds (% of GDP) 3.4 1.8 0.2 0.4 
   Realised transfers (% of GDP) 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
4.5.3 Macroeconomic performance 
Table 16a shows that while GDP per capita levels in US states have increased 
significantly over 1999-2016, the range (i.e. the difference between the highest and 
lowest income) remains high at around 80% of the mean. The degree of heterogeneity 
is similar when looking at primary income levels per capita. Disposable income, on the 
other hand, shows lower coefficients of variation together with ranges which suggest 
income redistribution between states. 
Business cycles in US states have been fairly synchronised in the period 1999-2016, 
based on standard indicators covering the correlation of per capita growth rates of real 
GDP and real private consumption and of unemployment rates. Labour market 
developments appear to be particularly synchronised with a correlation coefficient of 
more than 90%. There has been less co-movement in GDP growth rates than in 
private consumption growth, which points to interstate smoothing of GDP shocks. 
Applying the fiscal risk-sharing framework described in Section 3.1 shows that, 
between 1999 and 2016, 11.3% of the interstate variation in real GDP growth per 
capita was stabilised via federal grants to states and transfers to private households 
(Table 16b).48 The bulk of interstate stabilisation was related to federal social security 
and income maintenance payments. Pension payments accounted for around 40% of 
the stabilisation via federal transfers to households, while unemployment payments 
via the regular state system only explained around 18% of the federal transfer 
channel. Federal unemployment benefits did not contribute to interstate risk-sharing, 
which suggests that these transfers mainly help to support shocks to GDP that are 
common to all US states. 
                                                                    
48  Similarly, Asdrubali et al. (1996) estimated a total federal smoothing of 13% for the period 1964-1990. 
Federal transfers to households 
largely reflect social security and 
income maintenance payments. 
GDP and income levels vary 
significantly between US states; 
disposable income levels less so, 
implying some degree of interstate 
redistribution. 
The degree of business cycle 
correlation among US states has 
been high, especially when 
considering unemployment 
developments. 
Around 11% of the cross-state 
volatility in real GDP growth has 
been smoothed via the federal 
budget, in particular through federal 
social security and income 
maintenance payments. 
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In 2016 federal transfers to private households amounted to around 10% of GDP. The 
bulk of these transfers relate to social security, notably retirement and disability 
insurance and various income maintenance programmes such as the earned income 
tax credit. 
Table 15 
Overview of federal fiscal transfers in the United States 
 
Federal grants to 
states 
of which:  
welfare grants 
of which:  
medical grants 
Federal/state 
unemployment 
benefits 
Macroeconomic objective/effect . Redistribution Redistribution Risk sharing 
Activation trigger . . . Unemployment 
rate beyond certain 
threshold 
Transfer direction Vertical Vertical Vertical Vertical 
Size         
   Total funds (% of GDP) 3.4 1.8 0.2 0.4 
   Realised transfers (% of GDP) 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
4.5.3 Macroeconomic performance 
Table 16a shows that while GDP per capita levels in US states have increased 
significantly over 1999-2016, the range (i.e. the difference between the highest and 
lowest income) remains high at around 80% of the mean. The degree of heterogeneity 
is similar when looking at primary income levels per capita. Disposable income, on the 
other hand, shows lower coefficients of variation together with ranges which suggest 
income redistribution between states. 
Business cycles in US states have been fairly synchronised in the period 1999-2016, 
based on standard indicators covering the correlation of per capita growth rates of real 
GDP and real private consumption and of unemployment rates. Labour market 
developments appear to be particularly synchronised with a correlation coefficient of 
more than 90%. There has been less co-movement in GDP growth rates than in 
private consumption growth, which points to interstate smoothing of GDP shocks. 
Applying the fiscal risk-sharing framework described in Section 3.1 shows that, 
between 1999 and 2016, 11.3% of the interstate variation in real GDP growth per 
capita was stabilised via federal grants to states and transfers to private households 
(Table 16b).48 The bulk of interstate stabilisation was related to federal social security 
and income maintenance payments. Pension payments accounted for around 40% of 
the stabilisation via federal transfers to households, while unemployment payments 
via the regular state system only explained around 18% of the federal transfer 
channel. Federal unemployment benefits did not contribute to interstate risk-sharing, 
which suggests that these transfers mainly help to support shocks to GDP that are 
common to all US states. 
                                                                    
48  Similarly, Asdrubali et al. (1996) estimated a total federal smoothing of 13% for the period 1964-1990. 
Federal transfers to households 
largely reflect social security and 
income maintenance payments. 
GDP and income levels vary 
significantly between US states; 
disposable income levels less so, 
implying some degree of interstate 
redistribution. 
The degree of business cycle 
correlation among US states has 
been high, especially when 
considering unemployment 
developments. 
Around 11% of the cross-state 
volatility in real GDP growth has 
been smoothed via the federal 
budget, in particular through federal 
social security and income 
maintenance payments. 
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Table 16 
Economic performance and fiscal risk sharing in the US 
a) Economic performance in the United States 
 
1999 2016 1999-2016 (average) 
Mean Range1) CV2) Mean Range CV Mean CC3) 
Nominal GDP per capita (EUR) 30,486 27,710 0.18 49,445 37,877 0.19 36,903 . 
Nominal primary income per capita (EUR) 22,531 18,019 0.17 36,043 30,875 0.19 26,659 . 
Nominal disposable income per capita (EUR) 22,382 12,896 0.13 38,621 23,625 0.14 28,040 . 
Real GDP growth per pita (%) 3.00 9.37 0.59 0.29 9.50 6.19 1.09 0.63 
Real private consumption growth per capita 
(%) 4.15 4.97 0.24 1.84 3.85 0.48 1.47 0.75 
Unemployment rate (%) 4.07 3.89 0.24 4.64 4.01 0.21 5.69 0.93 
b) Share of GDP shocks smoothed by fiscal channel in the United States4) 
 
1999-2016  
Total government 
   of which: 
11.3 
(1.9) 
***  
   Federal taxes/social contributions 0.2 
(1.8) 
   
   Federal grants to states 2.1 
(0.6) 
***  
      Public welfare grants 0.9 
(0.3) 
**  
      Medical grants 0.2 
(0.0) 
***  
   Federal transfers to households 7.6 
(1.2) 
***  
      Federal pension benefits 3.2 
(0.4) 
***  
      State unemployment benefits 1.1 
(0.6) 
*  
      Federal unemployment benefits 0.0 
(0.0) 
**  
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, national statistics, own computations. 
1) The range is defined as the difference beteern the smallest and largest value across US states. 
2) The coefficient of variation (CV) is defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean across US states. 
3) The correlation coefficient (CC) is defined as the mean correlation of US state and US average values. 
4) Calculations based on Asdrubali et al (1996). 
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Table 14 
Fiscal decentralisation in the United States 
  1999 2016 
Fiscal decentralisation indicators (state and local gov.) 
Revenue decentralisation (%)1) 40.6 42.4 
Tax revenue decentralisation (%)2) 34.2 32.9 
   based on tax-setting autonomy (%) 34.2 32.9 
Expenditure decentralisation (%)1) 50.1 48.4 
Vertical imbalance (% of GDP)3) 3.2 4.3 
Vertical imbalance (% of expenditure) 19.0 23.8 
Sub-national public finances (state and local gov. consolidated) 
Debt (% of GDP)4) 14.2 16.1 
Mean 14.5 14.9 
   Range 21.9 17.8 
   Coefficient of variation 0.3 0.2 
Sources: OECD fiscal decentralisation database, U.S. Census Bureau. 
1) Share of consolidated revenue (expenditure) of state and local government in total revenue (expenditure) of general government. 
2) Share of state and local government tax revenue in total federal, state and local government tax revenue. Tax-setting autonomy: share 
of revenue from state and local government taxes for which the tax rates are set autonomously. 
3) Transfers received by consolidated state and local government from central government and social security. 
4) Debt of state and local government incurred with the public and non-public sector. 
4.5.2 Mechanisms for stabilisation and convergence 
In the United States, there are far smaller intergovernmental grants that redistribute 
central government revenue to the states. Redistribution across states mainly occurs 
via federal grants to states related to public welfare and social security. These include 
differentiated block grants under the federally provided Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) programme as well as state-specific federal matching rates 
for Medicaid (which provides medical insurance for low income households). Table 14 
shows that federal grants to states amounted to around 3½% of GDP in 2016, of which 
more than half were related to public welfare while only a small fraction were linked to 
medical insurance. 
The US unemployment insurance (UI) system is a partnership between the federal 
government, which sets federal guidelines and oversees the UI system, and the 
states, which provide payments to eligible workers under the regular UI programme. 
The federal government supplements these state benefits during times of high 
unemployment via the permanent Extended Benefits (EB) programme and the 
temporary “emergency” benefit xte sions that are enacted in specific circumstances, 
most recently following the 2008-09 recession (see, for example, Albrizio et al. 
(2017)). State UI systems vary considerably in the rules governing eligibility for 
benefits, benefit amounts and payroll tax rates. When a state’s unemployment rate is 
high and its benefit payments exceed its payroll tax revenues, the state can draw from 
its account in the federal trust fund to cover the benefit payments or receiv  federal 
loans. Transfers to households related to the UI system amounted to 0.4% of GDP in 
2016. Following the last recession, these transfers peaked at around 0.7% of GDP in 
2011, partly as a result of federal benefit extension and emergency benefits. 
The US fiscal-federal system is 
characterised by fewer but more 
targeted intergovernmental grants. 
The US un mployment insur ce 
program e is administered and
financed by the states under federal 
guidelines and oversight; during 
times of high unemployment, the 
federal government extends UI 
benefits and/or provides emergency 
compensation. 
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In 2016 federal transfers to private households amounted to around 10% of GDP. The 
bulk of these transfers relate to social security, notably retirement and disability 
insurance and various income maintenance programmes such as the earned income 
tax credit. 
Table 15 
Overview of federal fiscal transfers in the United States 
 
Federal grants to 
states 
of which:  
welfare grants 
of which:  
medical grants 
Federal/state 
unemployment 
benefits 
Macroeconomic objective/effect . Redistribution Redistribution Risk sharing 
Activation trigger . . . Unemployment 
rate beyond certain 
threshold 
Transfer direction Vertical Vertical Vertical Vertical 
Size         
   Total funds (% of GDP) 3.4 1.8 0.2 0.4 
   Realised transfers (% of GDP) 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
4.5.3 M croeconom c performanc
Table 16a shows that while GDP per capita levels in US states have increased 
significantly over 1999-2016, the range (i.e. the difference between the highest and 
lowest income) remain  high at around 80% of the m a . The degree of heterogeneity 
is similar when looking at primary income levels per capita. Disposable income, on the 
other hand, shows lower coefficients of variation together with ranges which suggest 
income redistribution between states. 
Business cycles in US states have been fairly synchronised in the period 1999-2016, 
based on standard indicators covering the correlation of per capita growth rates of real 
GDP and real private consumption and of unemployment rates. Labour market 
developments appear to be particularly synchronised with a correlation coefficient of 
more than 90%. There has been less co-movement in GDP growth rates than in 
private consumption growth, which points to interstate smoothing of GDP shocks. 
Applying the fiscal risk-sharing framework described in Section 3.1 shows that, 
between 1999 and 2016, 11.3% of the interstate variation in real GDP growth per 
capita was stabilised via federal grants to states and transfers to private households 
(Table 16b).48 The bulk of interstate stabilisation was related to federal social security 
and income maintenance payments. Pension payments accounted for around 40% of 
the stabilisation via federal transfers to households, while unemployment payments 
via the regular state syst m o ly explained around 18% of the federal transfer 
channel. Fed ral unemployment be efits did not co tribut  to int rstate risk-sharing, 
which suggests that these transfers mainly help to support shocks to GDP that are 
common to all US states. 
                                                                    
48  Similarly, Asdrubali et al. (1996) estimated a total federal smoothing of 13% for the period 1964-1990. 
Federal transfers to households 
largely reflect social security and 
income maintenance payments. 
GDP and income levels vary 
significantly between US states; 
disposable income levels less so, 
implying some degree of interstate 
redistribution. 
The degree of business cycle 
correlation among US states has 
been high, especially when 
considering unemployment 
developments. 
Around 11% of the cross-state 
volatility in real GDP growth has 
been smoothed via the federal 
budget, in particular through federal 
social security and income 
maintenance payments. 
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Table 16 
Economic performance and fiscal risk sharing in the US 
a) Economic performance in the United States 
1999 2016 1999-2016 (average) 
Me n Range1) CV2) Mean Range CV Mean CC3) 
N minal GDP per capita (EUR) 30,486 27,710 0.18 49,445 37,877 0.19 36,903 . 
Nominal primary income per capita (EUR) 22,531 18,019 0.17 36,043 30,875 0.19 26,659 . 
Nominal disposable income per capita (EUR) 22,382 12,896 0.13 38,621 23,625 0.14 28,040 . 
Real GDP growth per capita (%) 3.00 9.37 0.59 0.29 9.50 6.19 1.09 0.63 
Real private consumption growth per capita 
(%) 4.15 4.97 0.24 1.84 3.85 0.48 1.47 0.75 
Unemployment rate (%) 4.07 3.89 0.24 4.64 4.01 0.21 5.69 0.93 
b) Share of GDP shocks smoothed by fiscal channel in the United States4) 
 
1999-2016  
Total government 
   f which: 
11.3 
(1.9) 
***  
   Federal taxes/social contributions 0.2 
(1.8) 
   
   Federal grants to states 2.1 
(0.6) 
***  
      Public welfare grants 0.9 
(0.3) 
**  
      Medical grants 0.2 
(0.0) 
***  
   Federal transfers to households 7.6 
(1.2) 
***  
      Federal pension benefits 3.2 
(0.4) 
***  
      State unemployment benefits 1.1 
(0.6) 
*  
      Federal unemployment benefits 0.0 
(0.0) 
**  
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, national statistics, own computations. 
1) The range is defined as the difference beteern the smallest and largest value across US states. 
2) The coefficient of variation (CV) is defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean across US states. 
3) The correlation coefficient (CC) is defined as the mean correlation of US state and US average values. 
4) Calculations based on Asdrubali et al (1996). 
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In 2016 federal transfers to private households amounted to around 10% of GDP. The 
bulk of these transfers relate to social security, notably retirement and disability 
insurance and various income maintenance programmes such as the earned income 
tax credit. 
Table 15 
Overview of federal fiscal transfers in the United States 
 
Federal grants to 
states 
of which:  
welfare grants 
of which:  
medical grants 
Federal/state 
unemployment 
benefits 
Macroeconomic objective/effect . Redistribution Redistribution Risk sharing 
Activation trigger . . . Unemployment 
rate beyond certain 
threshold 
Transfer direction Vertical Vertical Vertical Vertical 
Size         
   Total funds (% of GDP) 3.4 1.8 0.2 0.4 
   Realised transfers (% of GDP) 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
4.5.3 Macroeconomic performance 
Table 16a shows that while GDP per capita levels in US states have increased 
significantly over 1999-2016, the range (i.e. the difference between the highest and 
lowest income) remains high at around 80% of the mean. The degree of heterogeneity 
is similar when looking at primary income levels per capita. Disposable income, on the 
other hand, shows lower coefficients of variation together with ranges which suggest 
income redistribution between states. 
Business cycles in US states have been fairly synchronised in the period 1999-2016, 
based on standard indicators covering the correlation of per capita growth rates of real 
GDP and real private consumption and of unemployment rates. Labour market 
developments appear to be particularly synchronised with a correlation coefficient of 
more than 90%. There has been less co-movement in GDP growth rates than in 
private consumption growth, which points to interstate smoothing of GDP shocks. 
Applying the fiscal risk-sharing framework described in Section 3.1 shows that, 
between 1999 and 2016, 11.3% of the interstate variation in real GDP growth per 
capita was stabilised via federal grants to states and transfers to private households 
(Table 16b).48 The bulk of interstate stabilisation was related to federal social security 
and income maintenance payments. Pension payments accounted for around 40% of 
the stabilisation via federal transfers to households, while unemployment payments 
via the regular state system only explained around 18% of the federal transfer 
channel. Federal unemployment benefits did not contribute to interstate risk-sharing, 
which suggests that these transfers mainly help to support shocks to GDP that are 
common to all US states. 
                                                                    
48  Similarly, Asdrubali et al. (1996) estimated a total federal smoothing of 13% for the period 1964-1990. 
Federal transfers to households 
largely reflect social security and 
income maintenance payments. 
GDP and income levels vary 
significantly between US states; 
disposable income levels less so, 
implying some degree of interstate 
redistribution. 
The degree of business cycle 
correlation among US states has 
been high, especially when 
considering unemployment 
developments. 
Around 11% of the cross-state 
volatility in real GDP growth has 
been smoothed via the federal 
budget, in particular through federal 
social security and income 
maintenance payments. 
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Only around 2½% of the state-specific shocks to real GDP were smoothed by 
intergovernmental transfers that states received from the federal budget. The biggest 
sh re f this stabilisation happened via earmarked transfers for public welfare transfer 
payments, such as the block grants to support the TANF programme. Medical grants, 
including the matching grants to states related to the Medicaid programme, explain 
only a minor share of the interstate risk-sharing via federal grants to states. 
The fairly decentralised US fiscal-federal system is typic lly asse sed to feature 
sound fiscal instituti ns and e fective disciplining via financial m rk t , supportin  
sustainable pu lic fi ances at the state level (see, for example, Bayoumi et al. (1995), 
Poterba and Rueben (1997) and Rodden (2002)). At the same time, balanced budget 
rules at the state level tend to limit the scope for stabilisation in economic downturns, 
implying that the federal budget has a role in smoothing (idiosyncratic) cyclical 
fluctuations (see, for example, Leiner-Killinger and Nerlich (2019)). In line with earlier 
empirical work (e.g. Asdrubali et al. (1996)), the estimates in this case study suggest 
that the federal budget provides for significant interstate risk-sharing, mainly via 
transfers to households. 
Intergovernmental transfers only 
play a limited role in interstate 
risk-sharing in the United States. 
Conclusion: The US fiscal-federal 
system combines effective fiscal 
institutions and market incentives for 
sustainable public finances at the 
state level with federal fiscal 
risk-sharing. 
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budget, in particular through federal 
social security and income 
maintenance payments. 
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5 Cross-country assessment 
The US type of federalism is characterised by significant revenue autonomy at each 
layer of government together with credible no-bailout policies by the federal 
government. Fiscal discipline at the sub-national government level is therefore 
imposed by a combination of strong own financial responsibility, market discipline and 
self-imposed balanced budget rules. In the United States, there are far fewer 
intergovernmental grants that redistribute central government revenue to sub-national 
entities. European countries typically feature higher intergovernmental transfers, while 
the grants in the United States are targeted more at the most needy. 
High transfer dependency for the financing of sub-national spending, meaning large 
vertical imbalances, tend to undermine incentives for sound fiscal policymaking, 
especially where there are expectations of federal bailouts (which occurred in 
Germany, for example). Sub-national spending in European federal countries is often 
largely financed by intergovernmental transfers. As shown in Section 4, vertical fiscal 
imbalances reach levels of around 70%, as seen in Austria. Levels of around 50% can 
also be observed in Belgium and Spain. At the same time, it is important to consider 
the specific institutional provisions in a given country. Germany, for example, shows 
relatively small vertical fiscal imbalances, of around 10%, which reflect the extensive 
sharing of tax revenues among the different government layers. In Belgium, on the 
other hand, a quarter of the intergovernmental grants are distributed according to 
regions’ contributions to personal income tax. Furthermore, European federal 
countries are typically characterised by limited sub-national tax-setting powers, as 
suggested by the relatively low degrees of tax revenue decentralisation when 
considering actual rate-setting autonomy. The case of Austria is striking in this 
context, given that sub-national governments only set rates for 1.5% of their share in 
total tax revenues. In the case of the United States, around a quarter of state spending 
is financed by federal transfers. At the same time, state governments have full tax 
autonomy for the taxes that are collected at the state level.49 
In the United States, average state debt amounted to around 16% of GDP in 2016, 
with maximum levels of around 34% of GDP. In Germany, by contrast, despite 
aggregate indebtedness remaining below a moderate 24% of GDP at the sub-national 
level in 2017, there are states that have accumulated debt ratios of almost 90% of their 
GDP. In recent decades, rates of change in sub-national debt have also been 
significant in the Spanish regions, where the debt ratio almost tripled since 1999. 
The empirical estimates of the degree of fiscal risk-sharing presented in the case 
studies suggest relatively similar cross-regional fiscal smoothing effects in the United 
States and the European federal countries, notably Austria, Germany and Spain. We 
find that between 1999 and 2016, around 11% of the interstate variation in GDP has 
been smoothed via the fiscal channel in the United States. For the Spanish regions, 
we observe a very similar level of fiscal risk-sharing since 2003. The estimated degree 
                                                                    
49  Revisions to sub-national tax arrangements may have important implications for the degree of 
interregional risk-sharing which therefore may vary over time. 
US and European fiscal-federal 
structures differ considerably with 
regard to degree of sub-national 
revenue autonomy. 
European federal countries typically 
have a significantly higher degree of 
transfer dependency, which may 
undermine incentives for sound 
sub-national public finances. 
Sub-national debt levels and their 
dispersion tend to be lower in the 
United States than in major 
European economies. 
The degree of interregional fiscal 
risk-sharing in the United States has 
been relatively similar to some euro 
area federal countries. 
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of interregional fiscal stabilisation was somewhat smaller in Germany and Austria 
between 1999 and 2016 (7-8% of the variation in regional GDP was smoothed via the 
fiscal channel). 
According to the estimation results presented above, around 75% of the fiscal 
risk-sharing provided in the United States resulted from transfers paid to private 
households, including pension payments and transfers received from the state 
unemployment insurance scheme, which are financed by central government taxes 
and social security contributions. This pattern is very similar in some of the European 
federal states, notably Germany and Spain, where cash transfers to households 
account for large parts of cross-regional stabilisation in the event of asymmetric 
shocks. In Austria, there is also significant fiscal risk-sharing via the redistribution of 
taxes and social security contributions. Intergovernmental transfers, on the other 
hand, do not play a quantitatively important role for cross-regional income 
stabilisation. In the United States, such transfers explain around a quarter of the 
interstate fiscal risk-sharing. The fairly strong statistical significance results from the 
fact that the federal government provides matching grants for cyclically sensitive state 
expenditures related to health and public welfare for needy families and low income 
households. In the European federal states, the effects of intergovernmental grants 
are often found to be small or not statistically significant. In the case of Germany, 
which maintains a large-scale, formula-based fiscal equalisation scheme, the vertical 
and horizontal intergovernmental transfers do not provide significant fiscal smoothing 
in the event of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks to the states. Some cross-regional 
fiscal smoothing takes place in Austria and Spain via the sharing of tax revenues. 
In both the United States and 
European federal countries, fiscal 
risk-sharing mainly occurs via 
transfers to households rather than 
intergovernmental transfers. 
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other hand, a quarter of the intergovernmental grants are distributed according to 
regions’ contributions to personal income tax. Furthermore, European federal 
countries are typically characterised by limited sub-national tax-setting powers, as 
suggested by the relatively low degrees of tax revenue decentralisation when 
considering actual rate-setting autonomy. The case of Austria is striking in this 
context, given that sub-national governments only set rates for 1.5% of their share in 
total tax revenues. In the case of the United States, around a quarter of state spending 
is financed by federal transfers. At the same time, state governments have full tax 
autonomy for the taxes that are collected at the state level.49 
In the United States, average state debt amounted to around 16% of GDP in 2016, 
with maximum levels of around 34% of GDP. In Germany, by contrast, despite 
aggregate indebtedness remaining below a moderate 24% of GDP at the sub-national 
level in 2017, there are states that have accumulated debt ratios of almost 90% of their 
GDP. In recent decades, rates of change in sub-national debt have also been 
significant in the Spanish regions, where the debt ratio almost tripled since 1999. 
The empirical estimates of the degree of fiscal risk-sharing presented in the case 
studies suggest relatively similar cross-regional fiscal smoothing effects in the United 
States and the European federal countries, notably Austria, Germany and Spain. We 
find that between 1999 and 2016, around 11% of the interstate variation in GDP has 
been smoothed via the fiscal channel in the United States. For the Spanish regions, 
we observe a very similar level of fiscal risk-sharing since 2003. The estimated degree 
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Germany, for example). Sub-national spending in European federal countries is often 
largely financed by intergovernmental transfers. As shown in Section 4, vertical fiscal 
imbalances reach levels of around 70%, as seen in Austria. Levels of around 50% can 
also be observed in Belgium and Spain. At the same time, it is important to consider 
the specific institutional provisions in a given country. Germany, for example, shows 
relatively small vertical fiscal imbalances, of around 10%, which reflect the extensive 
sharing of tax revenues among the different government layers. In Belgium, on the 
other hand, a quarter of the intergovernmental grants are distributed according to 
regions’ contributions to personal income tax. Furthermore, European federal 
countries are typically characterised by limited sub-national tax-setting powers, as 
suggested by the relatively low degrees of tax revenue decentralisation when 
considering actual rate-setting autono y. The case of Austria is striking in this 
context, given that sub-national governments only set rates for 1.5% of their share in 
total tax revenues. In the case of the United States, around a quarter of state spending 
is financed by federal transfers. At the same time, state governments have full tax 
autonomy for the taxes that are collected at the state level.49 
In the United States, average state debt amounted to around 16% of GDP in 2016, 
with maximum l vels of around 34% of GDP. In Germany, by contrast, despite 
aggregate indebtedness remaining below a moderate 24% of GDP at the sub-national 
level in 2017, there are states that have accumulated debt ratios of almost 90% of their 
GDP. In recent decades, rates of change in sub-national debt have also been 
significant in the Spanish regions, where the debt ratio almost tripled since 1999. 
The empirical estimates of the degree of fiscal risk-sharing presented in the case 
studies suggest relatively similar cross-regional fiscal smoothing effects in the United 
States and the European federal countries, notably Austria, Germany and Spain. We 
find that between 1999 and 2016, around 11% of the interstate variation in GDP has 
been smoothed via the fiscal channel in the United States. For the Spanish regions, 
we observe a very similar level of fiscal risk-sharing since 2003. The estimated degree 
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Sub-national debt levels and their 
dispersion tend to be lower in the 
United States than in major 
European economies. 
The degree of interregional fiscal 
risk-sharing in the United States has 
been relatively similar to some euro 
area federal countries. 
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of interregional fiscal stabilisation was somewhat smaller in Germany and Austria 
between 1999 and 2016 (7-8% of the variation in regional GDP was smoothed via the 
fiscal channel). 
According to the estimation results presented above, around 75% of the fiscal 
risk-sharing provided in the United States resulted from transfers paid to private 
households, including pension payments and transfers received from the state 
unemployment insurance scheme, which are financed by central government taxes 
and social security contributions. This pattern is very similar in some of the European 
federal states, notably Germany and Spain, where cash transfers to households 
account for large parts of cross-regional stabilisation in the event of asymmetric 
shocks. In Austria, there is also significant fiscal risk-sharing via the redistribution of 
taxes and social security contributions. Intergovernmental transfers, on the other 
hand, do not play a quantitatively important role for cross-regional income 
stabilisation. In the United States, such transfers explain around a quarter of the 
interstate fiscal risk-sharing. The fairly strong statistical significance results from the 
fact that the federal government provides matching grants for cyclically sensitive state 
expenditures related to health and public welfare for needy families and low income 
households. In the European federal states, the effects of intergovernmental grants 
are often found to be small or not statistically significant. In the case of Germany, 
which maintains a large-scale, formula-based fiscal equalisation scheme, the vertical 
and horizontal intergovernmental transfers do not provide significant fiscal smoothing 
in the event of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks to the states. Some cross-regional 
fiscal smoothing takes place in Austria and Spain via the sharing of tax revenues. 
In both the United States and 
European federal countries, fiscal 
risk-sharing mainly occurs via 
transfers to households rather than 
intergovernmental transfers. 
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6 Conclusion 
The results from our case studies of existing fiscal-federal systems suggest that 
present intergovernmental transfers contribute little to cross-regional stabilisation 
because most of them are not triggered by variables related to the business cycle. 
Most of the proposals for a euro area fiscal capacity discussed in this paper envisage 
a dedicated mechanism for macroeconomic stabilisation which relies on 
intergovernmental transfers that are triggered by variables related to the business 
cycle. This implies that when activated, for example on the basis of an increase of 
unemployment in a certain Member State, the central European stabilisation 
instrument would pay out transfers to the government of the country concerned. These 
transfers would then be used to finance and/or maintain national public investment, for 
example, or to support the national unemployment insurance scheme. Whether the 
central transfers swiftly contribute to macroeconomic stabilisation would then depend 
on various factors, such as procedural lags or the availability of shovel-ready 
investment projects at the national level. 
Reliance on intergovernmental transfers may also result in moral hazard, especially if 
such transfers are granted without conditionality. As highlighted in this paper, reliance 
on centrally provided transfers could result in weakened incentives for sound 
economic and fiscal policymaking at the Member State level and possibly reduce 
national economic resilience as a result. Therefore, it appears important that a 
prospective central stabilisation instrument for the euro area would be integrated in an 
overall fiscal policy framework that ensures proper incentives for national 
policymakers. Many of the proposals for a euro area stabilisation instrument therefore 
feature a certain fiscal conditionality, for example in the form of compliance with the 
European fiscal rules. In this context, the US fiscal-federal system may serve as a 
benchmark, given its high degree of fiscal autonomy at all levels of government, 
effective fiscal constraints at the state level and credible federal no-bailout policies 
(see, for example, Leiner-Killinger and Nerlich (2019)). 
The empirical risk-sharing analyses for different federal countries presented in this 
paper suggest that effective cross-regional stabilisation of asymmetric shocks tends to 
work via direct cash transfers to households, such as unemployment benefits, which 
are financed by cyclical central government revenue sources like payroll taxes and 
social security contributions. Automatic stabilisers – such as unemployment benefit 
schemes – are generally assessed to provide timely support to the economy, given 
that they are not subject to political implementation lags and are typically targeted at 
households with a high marginal propensity to consume. This would suggest that– to 
the extent possible – a euro area budgetary instrument for stabilisation should be 
designed to enhance the automatic stabilisation capacity in the single currency area. A 
European unemployment scheme that reinsures national schemes in the event of 
severe recessions is a prominent proposal in this context. However, our analysis of 
existing fiscal-federal systems speaks in favour of financing a European budgetary 
instrument for stabilisation purposes via central taxes or social security contributions 
similar to the US state-federal unemployment insurance. In the euro area setting, this 
Intergovernmental transfers are only 
effective for risk-sharing if triggered 
by cyclical variables and transferred 
immediately. 
Intergovernmental transfers may 
entail moral hazard. 
Ideally a euro area fiscal capacity 
would operate as an automatic fiscal 
stabiliser. 
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would certainly require far-reaching institutional and political changes towards a 
deeper fiscal and political union, in part to ensure proper democratic legitimation and 
nullify disincentives to national economic policymaking. 
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Data appendix 
Table A.1 
Austria 
  Variable Description Source 
  Province income 
= HH primary income  Provincial household primary income NSI/Eurostat 
+ Other taxes generated in province Corporate taxes allocated via provincial 
operating surplus; property-related taxes 
based on administrative data; 
wage-related indirect taxes via wages 
received by households; consumption 
taxes via provincial households 
disposable income 
Own calculations based on MoF and NSI 
data 
  Disposable province income 
= Province income See above   
- All taxes and social contributions 
contained in province income 
See above   
+ Own taxes Property-related taxes and municipal 
payroll tax 
MoF 
+ Transfers from federal government and 
social security funds 
See schemes a.1-a.3 below MoF, NSI, own calculations 
+ HH social benefits Social benefits other than in kind 
received by households (regional 
accounts) 
NSI/Eurostat 
  Fiscal sub-items 
  a Intergovernmental fiscal transfers     
  a.1 Sharing of federal tax revenue About 1/3 of income taxes, VAT, excise 
duties and insurance taxes collected by 
federal government is distributed to 
provinces and municipalities 
MoF 
  a.2 Other federal transfers Co-financing of certain expenditure (esp. 
for schools and hospitals) 
MoF 
  a.3 Transfers by health insurance funds 
for hospitals 
Hospitals are run by provinces, health 
insurance funds partly co-finance 
expenditure via lump-sum transfers 
Own calculations based on NSI data and 
social security law 
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Table A.2 
Germany 
  Variable Description Source 
  State income 
= HH primary income  Income from employment and wealth of 
private households 
Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung 
der Länder (VGRDL) 
- HH direct taxes Taxes on income and wealth paid by 
private households 
VGRDL 
+ State taxes before redistribution Sum of federal, state and local taxes 
collected at state level 
German Statistical Office (Destatis) 
  Disposable state income 
= State income     
- State taxes before redistribution See above Destatis 
+ State taxes after redistribution State taxes after federal/state fiscal 
equalisation 
Destatis 
- HH social contributions Sum of social welfare contributions paid 
by private households 
VGRDL 
+ HH social benefits (Monetary) social transfers received by 
private households 
VGRDL 
  Fiscal sub-items 
  a Federal/state fiscal equalisation   
  a.1 VAT redistribution Interstate redistribution of the state share 
in value-added taxes based on 
population and relative fiscal capacity   
Destatis 
  a.2 Interstate transfers Interstate redistribution based on per 
capita differences in fiscal capacity 
Destatis 
  a.3 Federal supplementary transfers Supplementary federal transfers to state 
based on per capita differences in fiscal 
capacity and special needs 
Destatis 
  b Federal transfers to households   
  b.1 HH social benefits (Monetary) social transfers received by 
private households 
VGRDL 
  b.1.1 Pension benefits Benefits received by HH from the public 
pension system 
VGRDL 
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Table A.3 
Spain 
  Variable Description Source 
  Region income 
= HH primary income (B5) Income from employment and wealth of 
private households (including taxes and 
SSC) 
Regional Annual Accounts (Spanish 
Statistical Office (INE)) 
- HH direct taxes (D5)   Regional Annual Accounts (INE) 
+ State taxes before distribution HH direct taxes (D5), corporate taxes 
(NA) allocated via regional operating 
surplus (INE); property-related taxes 
derived from RLNA; indirect taxes 
(GGNA) allocated using regional private 
consumption 
Regional Annual Accounts (INE) and 
own calculations based on General, 
Regional and Local Governments 
National Accounts (GGNA, RGNA and 
LGNA) (General Intervention of the State 
Administration (IGAE)) and INE data 
  Disposable region income 
= Region income See above   
- All taxes (D5) and social contributions 
(D61) contained in region income 
See above Regional Annual Accounts (INE) 
+ Own taxes State & municipal taxes (NA) within taxes 
on products excl. VAT and imports 
(D214), other taxes on production (D29) 
and capital taxes (D91) 
RGNA & LGNA (IGAE) 
+ HH social benefits (D62) Social benefits other than in kind, 
received by households 
Regional Annual Accounts (INE) 
+ Transfers from federal to regional & local 
governments 
transfers mainly related to the regional 
and municipal financing system 
RGNA & LGNA (IGAE) 
  Fiscal sub-items 
  a Regional financing system   Ministry of Finance data in cash terms 
  a.1 Advanced payments (in current year) During current year based on federal 
budget revenues forecast 
Ministry of Finance data in cash terms 
  a.2 Final payment (t-2) Final payment of the remaining balance 
of the regional financing system from two 
years before 
Ministry of Finance data in cash terms 
  b Federal transfers to households     
  b.1 HH social benefits (D62) Social benefits other than in kind 
received by households 
Regional Annual Accounts (INE) 
  b.1.1 Pension benefits Benefits received by HH from the public 
pension system, distributed using (cash) 
data on average pension by region 
IGAE and Social Security Administration 
  b.1.2 Unemployment benefits Benefits received by HH from social 
security, distributed using (cash) data on 
average unemployment benefits by 
region 
IGAE and Social Security Administration 
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Table A.4 
United States 
  Variable Description Source 
  State income 
= State personal income   U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
+ Federal non-personal taxes and 
contributions 
Corporate/indirect taxes and social 
welfare contributions collected by the 
federal government 
BEA 
+ State and local non-personal taxes Non-personal taxes collected at state 
and local  government level 
OECD/BEA 
- Direct transfers Direct government transfers to 
individuals (and non-profit institutions) 
BEA 
  Disposable state income 
= State income     
- Federal non-personal taxes and 
contributions 
See above BEA 
- Federal personal taxes Income taxes collected by the federal 
government 
BEA 
+ Federal grants to state governments   U.S. Census Bureau 
+ Federal transfers to individuals Various federal transfers BEA 
  Fiscal sub-items 
  a Intergovernment fiscal transfers     
  a.1 Public welfare grants Federal intergovernmental transfers for 
public welfare 
U.S. Census Bureau 
  a.2 Medical grants Federal intergovernmental transfers for 
health & hospitals 
U.S. Census Bureau 
  b Transfers to HH     
  b.1 Federal pension benefits Retirement and disability insurance 
benefits 
BEA 
  b.2 State unemployment benefits State unemployment insurance 
compensation 
BEA 
  b.3 Federal unemployment benefits Federal unemployment insurance 
compensation 
BEA 
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